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Abstract 
 
At the moment of the founding of the Second Republic in April 1931, the labour movement in 
Spain was dominated by two organizations, namely the anarcho-syndicalist Confederación 
Nacional del Trabajo (CNT) and the socialist Unión General de Trabajadores (UGT). The 
Second Republic marked the first period in which the two organizations had concurrently 
operated openly since the Primo de Rivera dictatorship had made the CNT illegal at the same 
time as the UGT had agreed to cooperate with the General’s corporatist project. With the 
founding of the Republic, a long-standing organizational and ideological hostility between the 
two organizations was exacerbated by the fact of the UGT actively participating in the reform 
project of the Republican-socialist government and the CNT increasingly opposing that 
project. However, the Republic progressively became polarized between left and right; as 
fascist regimes came to the fore across Europe, increasingly large sectors of the Spanish left 
called for a unity of their forces to prevent a similar occurrence in Spain. The outbreak of the 
Civil War in July 1936 made this unity even more imperative. 
 
This thesis focuses on interactions between the CNT and the UGT between 1931 and 1936 
within this socio-political context, primarily from the perspective of the CNT. The thesis 
traces and analyses the evolution of CNT as a national actor’s overall position on the UGT 
from one of outright hostility to a stance of proposing a revolutionary alliance with it in 1936. 
The thesis also examines interactions between the two organizations in Catalonia, which was 
both the CNT's birthplace and stronghold and a region in which the UGT had historically 
garnered little support. In addition to highlighting the pivotal role that the Catalan CNT had in 
determining the CNT's national-level stance on the UGT throughout this period, the thesis 
explores how the anarcho-syndicalist movement in the region presented its socialist 
counterpart as the embodiment of a socialist- and state-sponsored project to destroy the CNT, 
and also examines the largely hostile encounters between CNT and UGT unions in workplaces 
and localities across the region.  
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General Introduction 
 
This thesis will consider the relationship and interactions between the Confederación 
Nacional del Trabajo (CNT) and Unión General de Trabajadores (UGT) labour federations 
in Spain and Catalonia between the foundation of the Second Republic in April 1931 and 
the outbreak of the Civil War in July 1936.1 One of the most well-known features of the 
history of the Spanish left during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is that it contained 
strong anarchist and syndicalist currents, which more than two decades before the founding 
of the Second Republic in 1931 began converging in the ‘anarcho-syndicalist’ CNT. In the 
context of the labour movements of other European countries during the same period, 
Spain was in this respect something of an anomaly. Whilst the anarchist and syndicalist 
movements of France, Germany and others were declining in the early twentieth century, 
those of Spain continued to gain ground. Consequently, whereas in much of Europe splits 
within the left were based around different interpretations of Marxism, in Spain there 
existed a still more fundamental distinction between Marxist-oriented organizations and 
those that defined themselves as anarchist and/or syndicalist. In the Second Republic, this 
divide had manifested itself on the level of organizations principally in the form of the 
Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) and the UGT labour federation on the one hand, 
and the CNT and the Federación Anarquista Ibérica (FAI), a collection of anarchist affinity 
groups, on the other.  
 
The CNT and the UGT were divided by a legacy of theoretical differences, over which 
opposing camps had been in dispute since the expulsion of Marxists from the Federación 
de la Región Española (FRE) in 1872 by the followers of Mikhail Bakunin.2 The 
fundamental differences expressed by these ideological groupings in the 1870s formed the 
different foundations on which the CNT and the UGT were built.3  
 
The CNT’s ultimate goal since the late 1910s, when anarchists came to stamp a decisive 
influence on the organization,4 was the implantation of ‘libertarian communism’ or, 
synonymously, ‘anarchist communism’.5 These terms signified a post-revolutionary 
structuring of society which would be faithful to the original aims of Bakunin and his 
followers in the First International. Libertarian or anarchist communism required the 
destruction of the state, which was consistent with the basic anarchist principle that a 
central state, even one run by the proletariat, was intrinsically oppressive towards those 
who lived within it. Within the CNT there were different views as to how quickly and by 
what means revolution could be achieved, ranging from immediately and through 
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spontaneous uprisings that would set off an innate revolutionary instinct in the masses, all 
the way through to revolution being unachievable until the CNT had consolidated itself 
into an all-powerful organizational force in which all workers were enrolled. All currents 
of opinion within the CNT, however, were certain that revolutionary confrontation would 
be necessary to overthrow capitalism and the state. With the exception of small nuclei of 
communists who operated within the CNT, virtually all active cenetistas, whether through 
a commitment to anarchist or syndicalist principles, rejected the possibility of bringing 
about proletarian emancipation through participation in political processes or political 
organizations. Politicians were regarded in CNT circles simply as advancing bourgeois and 
capitalist interests, and in the case of left-wing ones, tricking workers into supporting them 
through false claims, simply so they could acquire power and live off workers.6 Instead of 
workers placing their hopes in politicians, they should, in the view of the syndicalist strand 
of principles that guided the CNT, organize themselves outside of the political sphere, and 
in unions. A key rational basis for this principle was that unions, unlike political parties, 
were controlled by workers and not politicians, and therefore were the real expression of 
proletarian interests. On a day-to-day basis, unions would be used to fight against the 
material conditions imposed by capitalism, with the unions alone carrying out this function 
and rejecting solutions offered by the political system. In the long term, the unions would 
be used to coordinate production in the absence of a state and political system after the 
libertarian communist revolution had begun.7 
 
The prevailing theoretical bases of the UGT diverged from those of the CNT in a number 
of crucial respects. Above all, the UGT, as a Marxist organization connected to a political 
party, rejected the anti-political and anti-statist principles of the CNT. The founder of both 
the PSOE and the UGT, Pablo Iglesias, who had been at the helm of the socialist 
movement up until his death in 1925, was amongst those who had been expelled from the 
FRE by the Bakuninists.8 The rejection of politics was seen by the socialists as entirely 
self-defeating for workers, cutting them off from an avenue through which material 
improvements to their lives could be made, and from advances towards a society in which 
workers controlled the means of production. Although there were different currents of 
opinion within the socialist movement as to whether the PSOE should be involved in 
government or should remain outside of it until capitalism had been overthrown, the 
socialist movement nevertheless participated in the political process, both via the PSOE, 
whose leaders were also key figures within the UGT, and through participation in dispute 
negotiation and social reform initiatives managed by government institutions. The 
socialists had traditionally regarded proletarian revolution as a long-term project to be 
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achieved gradually and in line with a deterministic reading of the Marxist view of 
historical change, and continued to do so in the Republic.9  
 
The Second Republic in its first years represented an unprecedented period of rivalry 
between the CNT and the UGT, with the UGT operating in support of and within the 
government and the CNT increasingly opposed to it. The conflict between the CNT and the 
UGT during these years was an ongoing cause of deep concern to those who sought to 
build the new Republic. Following a debate on the matter in the Cortes on 29th July 1931, 
Manuel Azaña remarked that the issue was ‘one of the most serious and intense’ questions 
facing the Republic.10 At the same time, however, the political and social currents in Spain 
also became increasingly polarized between left and right. The Marxist left and left 
Republicans in particular witnessed the rise of fascist and authoritarian movements abroad, 
and saw them as foreshadowing what the domestic right had designs on bringing about in 
Spain, a fear borne out to a large extent by the open admiration for fascist regimes abroad 
that was expressed by different sectors of the Spanish right such as the Confederación 
Española de Derechas Autónomos (CEDA) and the Falange. In tandem with this CNT-
UGT hostility there was thus a counter-current towards a belief in the need for the left and 
the working classes to unite against this threat of fascism. This belief gained even greater 
momentum following the rebellion of October 1934 and in the context of increasingly open 
confrontation between left and right over the first half of 1936. The importance that was 
publicly attached to unity by the left would increase even further with the outbreak of the 
Civil War, especially as the organizations of the left became embroiled in infighting. 
 
This thesis will examine the way in which the CNT interacted with the UGT in the period 
1931-1936, approaching the subject from the CNT’s perspective. At the heart of the thesis 
is a goal of examining how far the CNT’s relationship with the UGT both at the national 
level and specifically in Catalonia changed in response to the overall framework of a 
polarization of Spanish political organizations and different sectors of society into 
opposing camps that would ultimately create the conditions for the outbreak of what would 
prove to be a protracted, bloody and deeply tragic civil war. This is not simply a question 
of establishing the ostensible official position of the CNT on the UGT at the national level 
on the eve of the war, but also a matter of establishing the agendas that lay beneath this 
position and determining how much the basic mentalities of mutual hostility that cenetistas 
and ugetistas exhibited towards one another since the early months of the Republic had 
changed in response to the gathering storm clouds. To truly understand the many different 
fissures within the Republican side during the war, it is every bit as important to 
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understand their pre-war sources as it is to examine their intensification in the war itself. 
Indeed, without the context of the pre-war years, accounts of the infighting that plagued the 
Republic during the war will always be incomplete.  
 
The thesis will not merely determine the official positions adopted by the CNT towards the 
UGT and vice versa in their capacity as national actors and explain how and why they 
came about and how they linked to the organizations’ broader agendas, but will also 
examine the ulterior motives that hid behind these official positions, as well as the de facto 
positions the two organizations developed on one another on the national level through 
their most important newspapers. Beneath these layers of interaction, the thesis will 
examine the deeper mentalities of CNT and UGT militants towards one another, which is 
to say what they regarded as being the essential qualities and characteristics of the other 
organization and its members.  
 
Much of the analysis of the thesis focuses on the interactions between the CNT and the 
UGT in Catalonia. In some respects this analysis draws on the national level of the CNT’s 
interactions with the UGT, in that it considers what role the Catalan CNT – by some 
distance the largest CNT grouping in Spain – played in determining the CNT’s national-
level stance on the UGT, as well as determining how the national dynamic of the CNT’s 
interactions with the UGT establishing the CNT’s stance on the UGT in the region. The 
focus on Catalonia also has a more grassroots dimension, through examining how the 
unions of the two movements and their militants interacted with one another as they 
competed to further their movements and represent the interests of workers across 
Catalonia. Above all, it will examine how the belief of the cenetistas of Catalonia that the 
CNT had a deep historical and even spiritual bond with the working classes of Catalonia 
shaped their interactions with UGT organizers and nascent UGT unions in workplaces and 
localities across the region. It is generally taken for granted in the historiography of the 
Second Republic that the UGT was at its weakest in Catalonia, where the proletariat were 
overwhelmingly allied to the CNT; in examining interactions between the two 
organizations in the region, this thesis will suggest that the notion of the proletariat in 
Catalonia almost unanimously backing the CNT and rejecting the UGT may need some 
revision.  
 
At present, there is no substantial piece of research into the subject of CNT-UGT relations. 
However, this is not to say that the literature that exists on the workers’ movement or 
indeed more general narratives of the Second Republic and the Civil War does not 
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acknowledge this theme. On the contrary, amongst researchers into early twentieth-century 
Spain it is fairly widely acknowledged and often mentioned – though usually in passing – 
that the CNT and the UGT were, generally speaking and notwithstanding a few momentary 
exceptions in the 1910s, the most bitter of rivals as a consequence of their clashing ideas 
on the questions of revolution, the state, political participation and methods for dealing 
with employers. In making this observation, creators of general narratives and specialists in 
the left or the workers’ movement alike largely do not expand upon the subject in much 
greater depth. The acknowledgement of the enmity between the organizations has followed 
these lines since at least Gerald Brenan’s depiction of the two union movements in The 
Spanish Labyrinth, and has since made appearances in narratives of the Republic or earlier 
decades.11 Raymond Carr’s study of Spain between 1808 and 1975, for example, depicts an 
enduring animosity between the two labour federations that was both a legacy of the 
theoretical disagreements that had divided Marxists and anarchists since the nineteenth 
century and a product of the two organizations’ conflicting ideas regarding the handling of 
labour conflicts and the role of political organizations.12 This appraisal of the dynamic of 
relations between the CNT and the UGT is certainly not incorrect; it is rather the case that 
because an overall dynamic of animosity was prevalent and can seemingly be attributed to 
glaring differences of theoretical and practical tenets, not much in the way of further 
investigation of the subject has been forthcoming. 
 
As is to be expected, more explicitly CNT-centred studies provide a more comprehensive 
account of the CNT’s national-level stance on the UGT than do more generally focused 
studies of Spain in the early twentieth century. For example, Antonio Bar in La CNT en los 
años rojos provides a detailed consideration of the debates on the CNT’s relationship with 
the UGT as it was discussed at the main plenums and congresses of the organization during 
the 1910s, in which he traces the key positions that existed within the movement on the 
matter as well as how and why the one particular faction came to have a decisive say in the 
matter.13 Works such as José Peirats’s seminal three volume La CNT en la revolución 
española provide information on the main resolutions passed on the UGT at CNT plenums 
and congresses, as well as the pacts into which the CNT entered with the UGT over the 
course of the Civil War.14 However, the subject is somewhat secondary to other themes 
that the authors of these works have sought to address.  
 
At the same time, there are numerous studies that focus on the workers’ movement in 
specific towns and regions during the Republic and the Civil War. Because the CNT and 
the UGT’s unions co-existed in localities across Spain, a substantial proportion of these 
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works provide details of the interactions between local CNT and UGT organisms.15 Such 
works provide important indications as to the extents of the rivalries and occasional 
instances of cooperation between CNT and UGT militants in their geographical area of 
study. Just as importantly, these studies also illustrate very clearly how disputes between 
CNT and UGT unions during the Republic readily broke out as a result of the CNT’s 
commitment to direct action tactics clashing with the UGT’s reticence towards striking and 
preference for using government-backed arbitration mechanisms to win improvements. 
However, because of their local focus and the fact that the question of CNT-UGT 
interactions is not central to these works, these studies are unable to offer a full insight into 
how these local interactions linked to the bigger picture of CNT-UGT relations, and nor do 
their authors seek to base the overall arguments and conclusions of their work around the 
question of CNT-UGT interactions. 
 
Although the CNT’s interactions with the UGT are rarely the specific subject of focus of 
historical research into the Second Republic, more recent years have seen crucial advances 
in the way in which the CNT has been studied. In addition to shedding crucial new light on 
the anarcho-syndicalist movement itself, the innovative approaches of these works have 
provided important advances that allow the CNT’s interactions with the UGT to be 
examined from a more multi-faceted perspective. 
 
The works of Eulàlia Vega on the CNT, which focus principally on the competing factions 
and ideological currents in the CNT during the Second Republic, represent a crucial 
advance in the way in which the CNT is studied and understood.16 They approach their 
subject matter to a very large extent through an examination of the unions and local 
federations of which the CNT was comprised rather than simply the activities of its elite, 
and consequently demonstrate the importance of understanding how the CNT was 
structured and operated, especially at grassroots level. Factors such as the decision-making 
process within the CNT are brought to the fore, as are the way in which the crucial issue of 
the factional split was understood and manifested itself at the level of local federations and 
sindicatos únicos.  
 
In a similar vein Anna Monjo’s Militants is fundamental for understanding the internal 
dynamics of the CNT in terms of its decision-making processes.17 Monjo systematically 
explores how the CNT was structured, how it made decisions and which cadres of the 
organization had in practice a deciding say in the positions formally held by the 
organization as a whole. Her examination of this aspect of the CNT leads her to suggest 
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that the inclusive ‘direct democracy’ that the organization claimed to uphold, which was 
supposed to set the organization apart from the controlling tendencies of political 
organizations over their bases, did not always function in practice. Instead, local leaders, 
upper cadres and more personally influential militants in practice exerted a substantial 
degree of control over decision-making processes, not to mention a decisive influence over 
precisely what matters could be addressed internally through a control over meetings.18 
Monjo carries out the equally important task of examining the militants of the CNT 
themselves. This aspect of her work involves identifying the different categories of 
militancy, from grassroots labour activists to oral propagandists, as well as examining 
precisely why people chose to join the CNT and participate in it, particularly at the 
grassroots level. Her study demonstrates how those at the lowest end of the CNT, such as 
its representatives in individual workplaces and even the organisers of its sindicatos únicos 
often participated little in the discussion of the bigger questions that confronted the 
organization, and instead were focused on the narrow tasks such as collecting membership 
dues. 
  
The works of Monjo and Vega highlight the importance of examining the CNT – and in 
this case its position on the UGT – with an awareness of the dynamics of its decision-
making system and how the activities of its grassroots militants on a day-to-day basis tied 
in with the bigger goals that the movement articulated on the national level. The thesis is 
very much concerned with examining the issue of CNT-UGT interactions in relation to the 
internal mechanics of the CNT, namely how decisions were made on the UGT, how they 
were transmitted through the organization’s hierarchy and which cadres played a 
determining role in formulating positions on the UGT. A study of CNT-UGT interactions 
from the CNT’s perspective would be very much incomplete without an understanding of 
how the organization’s decision-making process operated.  
 
Monjo and Vega also demonstrate the importance of a constant awareness that the CNT 
was not merely a national or a regional actor, but that it was built fundamentally on the 
activities of grassroots militants in workplaces across Spain. Recognition of this requires 
the thesis to approach the question of CNT-UGT interactions in part from the level of the 
factory floor, recognising that it was in such contexts that the bulk of tangible CNT-UGT 
interactions took place. The work of Chris Ealham is also crucial in this regard. Ealham’s 
Anarchism and the City is geared towards delineating the customs, lifestyle and routines of 
the Barcelona proletariat – with a particular emphasis on the development of community 
structures and networks in the barris inhabited by the unskilled workforce – and using this 
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in part to help understand the attraction of the Barcelona working classes to the CNT.19 
Ealham illustrates that the CNT was so popular in the city in large measure as a result of its 
ability to integrate itself into the culture of popular protest and mutual support of working-
class communities and to help promote the causes and preoccupations that underlay them. 
Perhaps more so than any other study, Ealham’s work highlights the extent to which an 
understanding of movements such as the CNT can be improved significantly with an 
awareness of their operation at the grassroots level, the social context in which they 
operated on a day-to-day basis and the motivations of the individuals the organization 
hoped to represent, rather than simply focusing on their doctrinal positions and the actions 
of their leaderships. Again, this is an approach that will be adopted in this thesis to better 
understand the CNT’s interactions with the UGT, above all in the form of a case study of 
interactions between the two organizations in the town of Igualada. 
 
The work of Julián Casanova on the CNT also constitutes a major advance in the study of 
the anarcho-syndicalist movement. His Anarchism, the Republic and Civil War in Spain is 
concerned to a large degree with separating the rhetoric and discourse of the anarcho-
syndicalists from the reality of their actions; in many respects the work is an attempt to 
debunk the myths generated by CNT-FAI propaganda and passed into secondary literature 
by writers sympathetic to the anarchists.20 Casanova’s work is a crucial advance in the 
political study of the CNT for a number of reasons. He painstakingly unpicks the discourse 
produced in CNT-FAI propaganda over the Second Republic and the Civil War, examining 
for example its superimposition of the idea of violent revolution as a panacea during the 
Second Republic, and its creation of a mystique and a myth regarding the CNT and its 
leading figures. His highly critical analysis of the anarcho-syndicalist movement is crucial 
as it draws attention to the centrality of rhetoric in the CNT’s modus operandi, as well as 
highlighting the failures of the movement that have often been masked by this 
representation of itself.  
 
The concepts of rhetoric and discourse are crucial to the question of the CNT’s interactions 
with the UGT because, to a large extent, the CNT’s stance on the UGT was articulated 
most regularly through the pages of the CNT press. It was here that the basic prevailing 
position amongst CNT militants – or at least those who controlled the means of public 
expression – were reproduced on a daily basis and in response to the wider developments 
of the Republic. A study of this discourse is thus fundamental to understanding what was 
the CNT’s prevailing stance on the UGT. In addition, and departing from Casanova’s 
examination of CNT discourse, this thesis will also take certain aspects of the CNT’s press 
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output as indicative of the more deeply ingrained mentality of cenetistas towards ugetistas. 
Looking beyond editorials that were written about, for example, Largo Caballero in 
response to specific pieces of legislation, a detailed study of the CNT’s public discourse 
reveals recurring themes and assumptions that were made about the UGT. These were 
expressed not just in the main editorials of the papers, but also in contributions to 
Solidaridad Obrera and others by union juntas and even ordinary CNT members. 
 
The primary research for this thesis is based mainly on documents produced by the CNT 
and the socialist movement. The newspapers and internal bureaucratic documentation of 
the two organizations provide different but equally important facets of how the CNT and 
the UGT interacted with one another. On the one hand, the newspapers produced by the 
CNT and the UGT reveal how their leading figures wished the other labour federation, its 
members and its activities to be understood by the working classes, as well as revealing 
how militants from both organizations understood their rivals. A substantial proportion of 
interactions between the two organizations revolved around how they sought to construct 
an interpretation of one another to be transmitted to the working classes; as such the 
newspapers of the two movements constitute an essential source for examining CNT-UGT 
interactions.21 They also provide crucial details regarding how CNT and UGT unions 
interacted with one another during the course of both large and small, localized labour 
conflicts, albeit through accounts which contain heavy organizational biases. On the other 
hand, the organizations’ internal minutes, correspondence and circulars provide an insight 
into the decision-making processes through which positions and strategies relating to the 
other labour federation – or individual unions within it, in the case of documents produced 
at the grassroots level – were formulated, not to mention a window through which strategic 
calculations that were not publicly articulated through the press can be viewed.  
 
The thesis is divided into three parts. Part one examines the national level of interactions 
between the CNT and the UGT between 1931 and 1934. This takes the form of two 
chapters which consider the official national-level position adopted by the CNT on the 
UGT (and vice versa) through their decision-making mechanisms and bodies, as well as 
the organizations’ stances on one another as expressed through the main newspapers of the 
movement. These factors are placed within the context of the key developments of the 
Second Republic. The first of these chapters deals with the period of the Republican-
socialist government; the second focuses on the period between the November 1933 
election and the October 1934 rebellion, a crucial period in terms of both the escalation of 
hostilities between the left and the right and in terms of the development of discussions on 
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unity amongst the left. Part one also contains a chapter that focuses on the discursive 
output expressed by anarcho-syndicalists and socialists on one another between 1931 and 
October 1934. 
 
Part two switches the focus of the thesis to Catalonia in the period between the founding of 
the Republic and October 1934. This part of the thesis partly examines specific, on-the-
ground interactions between CNT and UGT militants, whilst also considering how the 
CNT and UGT in the region interpreted one another’s movements in the region as a whole, 
as well as referring back to the national positions of the two organizations on one another. 
More specifically, the chapters in part two examine the attempts of CNT entities in the 
region to marginalize UGT unions, the rationale that underpinned these efforts, and the 
dynamics of labour conflicts in Barcelona in which the two organizations clashed. 
 
Part three focuses on the post-October 1934 period, going as far as the eve of the 
nationalist uprising of July 1936, with the strands of the national level and Catalonia this 
time being interwoven. Its first chapter charts the change of the CNT’s national-level 
stance on the UGT to one of proposing an alliance, examining in particular the role of the 
Catalan region in the creation of this stance, and also considers grassroots instances of 
convergence between CNT and UGT organisms. The following chapter then examines the 
counter-currents against unity within the CNT that went against its official pro-alliance 
position, as well as focusing on instances of grassroots hostilities and manifestations of the 
anti-UGT mentality that had prevailed earlier in the Republic. Like in part one, the analysis 
within these chapters will be placed into the wider context of escalating social and political 
conflict that beset the Republic.  
 
The final main chapter of the thesis is a case study of interactions between the CNT and 
the UGT in the Catalan town of Igualada between 1931 and 1936. The case study examines 
the interactions between the two labour federations in much greater detail than in previous 
chapters, and also ties its analysis into the principal themes examined in the previous three 
parts of the thesis. This chapter is designed to highlight the significance of the question of 
CNT-UGT interactions to cenetistas who were on the front line of organizing and 
sustaining a local CNT movement, both in terms of how they viewed national relations 
between the two organizations and how they handled their own interactions with a local 
UGT counterpart.  
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The thesis then ends with a summary of its overall conclusions, as well as a short 
consideration of the impact of the interactions between the CNT and the UGT in the 
Second Republic on how the CNT handled relations with the UGT during the Civil War.  
 
As a final comment, it is worth stressing that examining how political or labour 
organizations interact with one another, even (or perhaps especially) if they seek to draw 
their support from similar sectors of society, will almost inevitably unearth the least 
savoury aspects of an organization’s behaviour. It is not without good reason that there is 
an almost universal tendency for historians and contemporary writers to refer almost 
instinctively to two or more organizations operating in the same political or social space – 
whether it be Spain, France, Britain, or any other country – as ‘rivals’ or even ‘enemies’. 
Because this thesis focuses first and foremost on the CNT’s handling of its interactions 
with the UGT, often it presents a critical analysis of the anarcho-syndicalist labour 
federation. This should not be taken as indicative of an overall stance of criticism of the 
movement. Outside the realm of interactions with other organizations, the CNT’s unions 
and militants played a vital role in organizing and fighting for the concerns of some of the 
most exploited groups of Spanish industrial society, as studies by several authors such as 
Chris Ealham, have demonstrated.  
 
Nor should this thesis be interpreted as singling out the CNT for being responsible for a 
failure to create a united front of left-wing and democratic forces in a context of escalating 
political polarization. Were this study to have focussed on the UGT’s relationship with the 
CNT instead, it is highly likely that it would be equally critical of the socialist labour 
federation’s handling of relations with its anarcho-syndicalist counterpart, something that 
is hinted at above all by the critical and groundbreaking studies of the socialists put 
forward by Helen Graham and Paul Heywood, who outline the leadership of the 
movement’s repeated spurning of opportunities to build alliances through what Heywood 
describes as their ‘bureaucratic imperialism over the workers’ movement’.22 This thesis 
merely presents one strand of what was, in reality, a failure by virtually all the actors of the 
Republic to come to the type of meaningful understanding that could have made a vital 
difference to the Republic’s ability to fight a war.  
 
                                                 
1
 There is no single satisfactory term that describes both the CNT and the UGT. To refer to them as ‘unions’ 
in this thesis would potentially create confusion, since the thesis considers both the activities of the 
organizations as national actors, as well as the activities of the organizations’ individual unions. Although the 
UGT had a federal structure while the CNT was structured as a confederation, for the sake of clarity and 
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Chapter One: The CNT, the UGT and the bienio reformista 
 
The final months of the monarchy 
 
The CNT began to emerge and regroup from the clandestinity imposed by Primo de 
Rivera’s illegalization of the organization from the spring of 1930 onwards. As it did, its 
militants were eager to witness the fall of the monarchy. But although the CNT 
participated in some anti-regime initiatives, it was a coalition of Republicans and socialists, 
formed following a meeting in San Sebastián in August 1930, that was the focal point of 
opposition to the ailing system and that would be in a position to take charge once Alfonso 
XIII had fled Spain after 14th April 1931.1 Initially, socialist participation at this event was 
limited to the more informal involvement of Indalecio Prieto and Fernando de los Ríos, 
two of the most prominent members of the PSOE. At first, some of the key socialist 
leaders, amongst them Julán Besteiro and Francisco Largo Caballero, were wary of 
creating formal ties with the bourgeois Republican parties.2 However, by October an 
inkling developed amongst the sectors of the socialist leadership who had hitherto resisted 
the possibility of joining the San Sebastián conspirators that were they not to join the 
movement, the socialist movement would be left behind.3 By October 1930 the socialist 
leadership had agreed to throw its weight behind the plans of the San Sebastián 
Republicans.4 
 
In formally joining the movement conceived in San Sebastián, the socialists and the UGT 
became indirectly connected through it to the CNT, whose leaders had been courted by the 
Republican protagonists since the signing of the San Sebastián Pact.5 The representative of 
the provisional government in Barcelona, the Republican Rafael Sánchez Guerra, kept in 
contact with, among others, Ángel Pestaña and Joan Peiró, perhaps the most prominent and 
still active figures of the CNT from its heyday of the late 1910s, with a view to convincing 
them to have the unions of the CNT support the military coup they planned with a general 
strike.6 With some of the legal restrictions on its activity being removed in April 1930, 
CNT unions once more began to organize and expand, especially in their former 
strongholds such as Catalonia, and as such their support would be a boon for any group 
that wished to overthrow the political system.7 Although public commitments to supporting 
Republican causes by some of the most prominent members of the CNT such as Pestaña 
were met with censure from the more radical sectors of the CNT that would go on to be 
characterized as ‘faístas’, there was no question that the anarcho-syndicalist movement 
favoured the collapse of the system.8  
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However, the circumstances that to a certain degree tied the CNT and the UGT to the same 
goals did not by any means bring about any rapprochement between the two labour 
federations. Relations between the CNT and the UGT had remained frozen in a state of 
animosity since 1923.9 The coming of the Primo de Rivera dictatorship, and in particular 
the UGT’s response to it, had massive implications for the overall state of relations 
between the CNT and the UGT, not to mention on the CNT itself. Whilst the CNT was 
declared illegal by the new regime, and so were driven underground until the end of the 
decade, Primo de Rivera made overtures towards the socialist leadership to allow the UGT 
to avoid a similar fate by participating in the corporatist state framework he intended to set 
up. Although the wing of the socialist movement most closely aligned to Indalecio Prieto 
was against collaboration with the regime, Pablo Iglesias, Largo Caballero and their 
supporters took the UGT into partnership with the dictator, with Largo taking up a position 
as a councillor in the government.10  
 
Once the CNT had found its public voice through the re-establishment of its press, a 
hostility towards the UGT and the socialist movement was articulated, based around its 
collaboration with the dictatorship.11 The view was also put forward that the socialist 
leaders were in the present moment working towards the illegalization of the CNT, an 
argument that foreshadowed the anarcho-syndicalists’ interpretation of the UGT’s 
objectives during the Second Republic.12 The attacks were every bit as personal as they 
were ideological. Solidaridad Obrera mockingly claimed in January 1931 that an 
incarcerated Largo Caballero had been unable to leave his cell for fear of being confronted 
by other prisoners.13 On other occasions, he was lampooned in such terms as the ‘perpetual 
secretary’ of the UGT, a reference to his decades-long activity in the leading committees of 
the labour federation.14 As time progressed, the regularity of printed attacks increased. 
Such criticisms had been expressed in the anarchist or CNT press in 1928 and even before, 
but were by late 1930 being expressed much more frequently and to a much wider 
audience as a result of the remobilization of the organization.15 
 
Of course, these criticisms were certainly not a one-way street, with pieces in the CNT 
press often being written in response to public criticisms of the anarcho-syndicalist 
movement made by the leaders of the socialist movement.16 At the same time, the socialist 
press also routinely mocked ‘anarchists’ and ‘syndicalists’ for a variety of reasons, above 
all for the apparent primitiveness of their ideas and their lack of open, unequivocal support 
for the anti-monarchy movement.17 
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The CNT and the UGT thus entered the Republic largely divorced from one another’s 
activities and agendas. Although both were definitely on the same side of the divide that 
separated the old establishment from the anti-monarchy movement, there was no 
recognized communal purpose between the two labour federations. The CNT remained as 
hostile to the UGT in 1930 and early 1931 as it had throughout the Primo de Rivera era, 
and the two organizations acted virtually in isolation of one another even as they adhered 
to the same anti-monarchist cause, even during the failed strike movement of 15th 
December 1930 that formed a key component of the provisional government’s attempt to 
take down the monarchy and install itself in government.18 Instead, there was merely 
public animosity and mockery, articulated through the pages of their respective 
newspapers. The basic foundations of the war of words that would characterize the CNT 
and the UGT’s national-level relationship over the first years of the Republic had already 
been laid by April 1931. 
 
Once the December movement against the monarchy had failed, the CNT leaders to a large 
extent turned their attentions away from playing a role in the activities of the provisional 
government, and instead focused on rebuilding the CNT.19 This was achieved with some 
success; as the dictablanda stuttered from one crisis to another, the monarchy collapsed 
following the 13th April municipal elections and the provisional government took charge, 
the CNT entered the Republic as a movement whose membership base was expanding 
rapidly.20  
 
The Republican-socialist government and the UGT 
 
The Republican-socialist government that was elected in June 1931 would set about trying 
to implement extensive reforms of labour conditions, agrarian questions and the role of the 
Catholic Church in public life; as is well-known these attempts were from the outset met 
with opposition from several sectors of society and embroiled the Azaña government in 
battles with both left and right. The UGT would be at the heart of supporting the 
Republican-socialist government, with the hopes of its membership pinned to its ability to 
implement wholesale social reforms. 
 
The provisional government that had been waiting for the fall of the monarchy became the 
key protagonists in the government of the new Republic. Following their initial installation 
in government a general election was held, at which the Republican-socialist coalition 
swept to victory. The PSOE was the largest party in the Cortes, winning 116 deputies.21 
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The socialists occupied three seats in first the provisional government, as had been agreed 
upon in late 1930, and then again in the subsequent government of Manuel Azaña; this 
crucially included Francisco Largo Caballero occupying the position of Labour Minister in 
the name of the UGT.22 As will become apparent, the position held by Largo and the 
initiatives he attempted to pursue through it would become in many respects the key focal 
point of the battle between the CNT and the UGT at the national level. The participation of 
the leader of the UGT and other prominent socialists in the government is the most obvious 
demonstration that socialism in its party-political and labour-union manifestations had a 
vested interest in defending and shaping the new Republic. The PSOE ratified socialist 
participation in government at a special congress held in July 1931,23 which the UGT also 
formally approved at its October 1932 congress.24  
 
The overall picture of the UGT’s membership levels during the first years of the Second 
Republic appears to be one of an initial surge followed by a decline from the latter part of 
1932. Having had roughly a quarter of a million members in 1930, by the end of 1931 the 
socialist labour federation had approximately one million members.25 But by 1933, the 
overall figure had fallen to around 400000.26 Both the rise and the fall came principally 
through the expansion of the UGT in the countryside, with rural labourers joining the 
Federación Nacional de Trabajadores de la Tierra (FNTT) in large numbers at the 
beginning of the Republic. Membership of the FNTT increased from 36639 in June 1930 
to 392953 in June 1932.27 This represented a fundamental change in the overall 
composition of the UGT, in which peasants had been a much smaller grouping. At the 
same time, however, the UGT’s presence in urban areas across the country continued to 
grow, albeit at a relatively more modest rate. When the decline did come within the urban 
movement, it appears to have been fairly uniform across different industries and regions, 
with unions often being ejected from the labour federation for non-payment of dues or 
simply dissolving themselves, a trend that undoubtedly reflected the frustration many 
workers felt with the lack of progress delivered during the tenure of the Republican-
socialist government.28 
 
For the Republican-socialist government, the period following on from the June 1931 
election was one in which the near impossibility of implementing the sweeping reforms it 
proposed would become apparent as its opponents on the right began to coalesce and 
present a well-organized, well-financed and more coherent threat. The social groups 
represented by the ‘old’ Spain were horrified with the new government’s intentions for 
reform of the countryside, the armed forces and the Church. As Preston above all has 
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demonstrated, the legalist right placed obstacles in the passage of the government’s reform 
bills, ensuring they were delayed and watered down. Outside of parliamentary business the 
right-wing press continually attacked the reforms and the integrity of the government 
itself.29 It soon became apparent that the government lacked the control over the machinery 
of the state to implement the reforms it actually managed to pass through parliament. In the 
countryside in particular the legislation designed to redistribute land was hardly 
implemented due to an inability to enforce it at the local level, leading to confrontations 
between peasants and landowners and local authorities across the countryside.30  
 
The issue of state-backed repression became an increasingly thorny one, over which 
protests were voiced most strongly by the anarcho-syndicalist movement. As some 
commentators have pointed out, Miguel Maura took up his position as Minister of the 
Interior with a zeal for ensuring that the laws of the Republic were obeyed at all costs.31 
Maura himself dedicates an entire chapter of his memoirs to outlining the threat he 
believed the CNT posed to the Republic.32 Moreover, the government also lacked control 
over the security apparatus it inherited from the monarchy.33 Both these factors lead to it 
being tarnished with the same accusations of repression as the ancien régime. As early as 
May 1931, protesting workers in Pasajes, Guipúzcoa, were shot at by the Civil Guard, 
causing eight fatalities. At the turn of the year massacres were committed by security 
forces in Castilblanco and Arnedo.34 The setbacks suffered by the Republican-socialist 
government and its supporters continued throughout 1932 and 1933. The government was 
criticized by the right not only for the reforms that it had planned, but also cynically 
capitalized on acts of repression meted out by the state security apparatus. The massacre by 
Assault Guards in Casas Viejas, Andalucía in response to an uprising there in January 
1933, in which several peasants were murdered in reprisal, was met with a barrage of 
outrage by politicians from across the political spectrum, including those of the right.35 
 
The accumulated calamities suffered by the Republican-socialist coalition took their toll on 
the socialist movement’s commitment to the Republic, especially at grassroots level. Many 
within the socialist camp had become increasingly disillusioned with the process of 
governing, in particular the failure of reform to take effect and the stigma that their 
movement suffered through being in a government whose security forces had committed 
such atrocities as Castilblanco and Casas Viejas.36 When parliament was dissolved by the 
President in September 1933, the PSOE in many areas of Spain chose to fight the 
subsequent election in isolation from Republican groups. The result was that the right, 
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whose consolidation into a coherent electoral bloc suited the Republic’s electoral system, 
swept to power as the divided Republicans and socialists floundered.37 
 
The CNT and the Republic 
 
Workers enrolled in the CNT, and to a degree cenetista militants and leaders, were filled 
with a sense of optimism and elation upon the founding of the Republic, a position that 
retrospectively seems surprising given the rapidity with which the CNT would come to 
present a position of outright hostility to the Republican state.  The initial public reaction 
of the movement to the Republic itself was somewhat ambiguous. By as early as 18th April 
Solidaridad Obrera had suggested from its front page that ‘it seems that the Republican 
government is betraying us’. At the same time, however, the very same issue of the paper 
also suggested that the Republic itself could satisfy some or the working classes’ 
immediate demands.38 But the general consensus in the CNT at the time was that the 
Republic and the freedom it offered was not so much an endpoint as it was an opportunity 
for the movement to quickly spread and take root, and ultimately lead Spain to libertarian 
communism.39 Between the different factions of the CNT there were diverging opinions on 
how quickly this final goal could be achieved, but in the initial months of the Republic 
these were less apparent. 
 
The cenetistas’ optimism at this juncture was undoubtedly buoyed considerably by the 
continued renaissance that their organization was experiencing. The collapse of the 
monarchy initially removed any remaining restraints on open CNT activity, and 
consequently stimulated an enormous push by militants to return the organization to the 
height of its strength of 1919 and beyond. Over the spring and summer of 1931, new CNT 
unions and local federations were created across Spain, and old ones reformed. This 
process of expansion was particularly notable in Catalonia, where the membership base of 
the CNT expanded dramatically, reaching a high of 291150 members in June 1931.40 This 
expansion was accompanied and to a significant degree fed by an increase in labour 
militancy against employers, especially in industrial Catalonia.41  
 
A CNT national congress was convoked for June 1931 in Madrid. Overall, the congress 
reflected the general optimism in the CNT camp at this moment in time. Important 
structural changes were made to the CNT, such as an agreement to create national 
industrial federations to organize workers operating in the same industries across the 
country.42 However, the congress did also hint at the factional differences that would later 
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come to the fore and nearly destroy the organization.43 Essentially at this point two overall 
positions within the CNT could be discerned. On the one hand, there were those who saw 
the Republic as offering the CNT time and freedom to expand and consolidate as an 
organization so that it could then proceed to carrying out its social revolution on strong 
foundations. This moderate – or merely reformist in the eyes of its enemies – faction would 
go on to coalesce into the treintista movement and ultimately split from the CNT in 1933. 
On the other, there were those who saw possibilities for immediate social revolution in the 
present moment, thus meaning no temporary coexistence with the bourgeois Republic 
would be necessary. This current, though much more heterodox than its single labelling of 
‘faísta’ would suggest, had by 1932 stolen the initiative from the moderates, setting off a 
process of self-destructive infighting as they attempted to assert a doctrinal purity over the 
CNT.44  
 
For the most part the hopes of cenetistas regarding the possibilities of the new era proved 
to be quickly dashed. Instead, from the summer of 1931 onwards, the overall experience of 
the CNT as a national movement was one of embitterment and setbacks. The difficulties 
encountered by the CNT to a large extent resulted from it clashing with the new state. As 
the summer of 1931 progressed, the CNT’s anger came to be directed every bit as much at 
the government and the state as it was against employers. A nationwide telephone 
operators’ strike which began in July 1931 marked the point at which the CNT’s battle 
against employers came to overlap with, and in many respects be eclipsed by, a struggle 
with the government. Initially the vast majority of telephone operators adhered to the 
strike. However, the government had a vested interest in Telefónica, and was also aware 
that the conflict was outside of its control whilst in the hands of the CNT. The strike was 
declared illegal. There was a spate of violent confrontations between strikers and security 
forces, with the gravest incidents occurring in Seville. Most provocatively of all from the 
CNT’s perspective, the UGT undermined the strike through providing replacement 
workers. The conflict was presented in Solidaridad Obrera, other CNT newspapers from 
around Spain and the pro-CNT La Tierra as representing an offensive by a reactionary 
government, backed by the UGT and in hock to American capital, against the CNT and the 
telephone operators.45 
 
Although the CNT had already publicly been at loggerheads with the government, and 
particularly Largo Caballero’s Labour Ministry, the Telefónica strike marked something of 
a point of no return, after which the CNT placed itself on a permanent war footing against 
the government and, as an integral part of this, as will be discussed, against the UGT. With 
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Largo in charge as the Labour Minister, a raft of legislation relating to labour arbitration, 
creating a rigid legal framework for labour disputes was created, centred around arbitration 
bodies known as jurados mixtos, which would replace the comités paritarios of the 
dictatorship. These jurados mixtos were to be more comprehensively enforced and were 
intended to be the only legal method through which labour disputes could be channelled, 
and linked in with legislation specifying how strikes could be conducted. The jurados 
mixtos were one of the flagship policies of Largo Caballero’s Labour Ministry, and for the 
UGT leadership the implementation and usage of the jurados would be at the forefront of 
their labour relations strategy. Although militants lower down the hierarchy sometimes 
found the process of the jurados being set up and ensuring their settlements were enforced 
in the face of concerted employer opposition to be a frustrating experience, as a general 
rule those actively involved in the UGT wholeheartedly supported the notion of the 
jurados.46  
 
The arbitration systems put in place were highly suited to the UGT’s methods for handling 
industrial relations, which Santos Juliá succinctly describes as an approach of 
‘management unionism’. As Juliá illustrates, this ‘management unionism’ was 
characterized by UGT unions attempting to settle labour issues through committees and 
negotiation, seeking to eliminate the conflict element of dealings with employers. The 
chances of success of such an approach were improved immeasurably by the 
implementation of institutions that would arbitrate negotiations between workers and 
employers. In addition to viewing the Republic as a golden opportunity to implant such 
systems, the socialist leadership had taken the chance to be involved with other state-
sponsored initiatives which might allow worker gains through less conflictive means; in 
the 1910s it had participated in the Instituto de Reformas Sociales, and much more 
controversially had been actively involved in Primo de Rivera's comités paritarios.47 The 
UGT’s unions across Spain attempted to implement jurados mixtos in their spheres of 
activity, much to the disgust of their CNT counterparts, who frequently opposed their 
creation and the settlements they produced. In backing the jurados, UGT organizers were 
not just fulfilling their preferred method of handling industrial relations, but also lending 
their support to the socialists’ programme of social and labour legislation. 
 
As has been commented upon by various authors, Largo’s initiatives represented to a 
degree an illegalization of the CNT’s preferred methods of negotiating labour relations.48 
The CNT’s approach to industrial relations had, since its foundation, been grounded in the 
principles of ‘direct action’. In many respects the tenets of direct action were squarely at 
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odds with the ‘management unionism’ of the UGT. For one thing, anarcho-syndicalism 
rejected the notion that workers should seek mediated solutions with employers; as Santos 
Juliá points out, such an approach was regarded as making concessions to the bourgeoisie 
and in turn stalling the course of proletarian emancipation. For the state to be in charge of 
these negotiations was, for an anarchist movement, doubly unacceptable.49 The very notion 
of direct action was based upon workers having total control over their interactions with 
employers, in which they could deploy the methods they thought necessary – such as 
strikes, picketing, boycotts or even sabotage – to make gains against the bourgeoisie. A 
legally regulated framework for labour negotiations would render this approach illegal. 
 
However, the CNT’s problems with the government did not simply stem from the narrow 
world of industrial relations. Within a year of the Republic’s foundation a cycle of 
insurrection being followed by repression which then incited protest against the 
government had become established. By as early as June 1931, Solidaridad Obrera was 
complaining of ‘the Republican dictatorship’.50 Its hostility towards the Second Republic 
and its government on the grounds of its repression of the CNT would only intensify as 
CNT strikes were declared illegal, protest actions were dealt with by heavy-handed law 
enforcers and its attempts at insurrections were met with widespread arrests and closures of 
CNT organisms across the country.  
 
The event that truly gave momentum to this cycle of insurrection and repression was the 
attempted uprising carried out by miners in the Alt Llobregat region of Catalonia in 
January 1932. The uprising began in Figols, where miners disarmed the local authorities, 
before spreading to neighbouring localities. It was ultimately crushed through the 
intervention of the armed forces. Under the terms of the Ley de Defensa de la República – 
which itself was inevitably a key preoccupation of CNT propaganda – the cenetistas 
arrested at the end of January 1932 were sentenced to be deported.51 The decision sparked 
enormous protests from the CNT press, and kick-started a concerted propaganda campaign 
against the government and its repression.52  
 
The turn of the CNT towards such an insurrectionary stance was in part a result of the 
deepening of factional splits within the organization, with more radical elements beginning 
to gain the initiative in deciding the propagandistic stance taken by the CNT and 
organizing protest campaigns and insurrections. When the Republic was founded, many of 
the key positions in the National Committee, the Catalan Regional Committee and the 
editorial board of Solidaridad Obrera were filled by moderates. However, following the 
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release of the treintista manifesto by prominent moderate figures in August which railed 
against the radical position that revolution would be brought about through spontaneous 
insurrection, tensions between the moderates and the radicals escalated. The faístas 
responded to the manifesto with a combination of angry condemnation and ridicule. The 
radicals of the movement proved to be far more adept at publicly attacking their moderate 
rivals. Moreover, the circumstances of the government’s attacks on the CNT movement, 
exemplified in key strikes such as the Telefónica conflict in the summer of 1931, played 
into the hands of the radicals. Under pressure from these criticisms, moderate figures such 
as Joan Peiró began to resign from their positions of responsibility from the end of 1931. 
On the union level, radicals also began to make progress in controlling sindicatos únicos, 
especially in Barcelona.53 
 
The difficulties for the CNT as a national actor continued and intensified throughout the 
Republican-socialist biennium, grounded in the same two areas of repression in response to 
its protest movements and internal factional conflict. Another set of insurrections took 
place in January 1933, which again failed absolutely and led to arrests and imprisonments 
of militants. Of these, the rebellion in Casas Viejas and the massacre in response to it by 
the local security forces gave ample stimulus to the CNT’s protest campaign against the 
government, which more than ever was presented as an outright enemy of the working 
classes. Illegal strikes also continued to be called, with militants arrested, further sapping 
the strength of the organization.54 
 
Over the course of 1932 and 1933 the factional war within the CNT intensified. When 
CNT entities led by moderates, such as the local federation of Sabadell, voiced their 
protests against FAI control, the faístas were able to push through their expulsion from the 
CNT. By the spring of 1933 many unions dominated by moderates had formally seceded 
from the CNT and founded the Sindicatos de Oposición bloc of unions and the Federación 
Sindicalista Libertaria, which was in effect the moderates’ organizational equivalent of the 
FAI. Their leaders were drawn from the signatories of the treintista manifesto. In Levante 
they represented a majority of unions, whereas in Catalonia they constituted a significant 
minority. It is estimated that the treintista unions in Catalonia had a membership of 
somewhere between 35000 and 50000, which though not a large enough figure to represent 
the dominant tendency amongst the Catalan working classes, nevertheless represented a 
significant dent on the CNT’s membership in the region.55  
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As the name suggests, the Sindicatos de Oposición saw their organization as standing in 
opposition to what they viewed as the aberration of the CNT’s principles through the 
faísta’s dominance of the organization; the treintistas viewed themselves as representing 
the real essence of the Confederation, and one day hoped to return to the fold. Accordingly, 
much of their press output during 1933 and 1934 was dedicated to attacking the faístas.56  
The unions in the Sindicatos de Oposición for the most part adhered to the same tenets of 
direct action that formed the core of the CNT’s principles. However, the movement as a 
whole took a very critical view of their Barcelona CNT counterparts’ long, violent strike 
actions that were a consequence of their refusal to obstinately reject any settlement that 
was handed down by the jurados or the labour ministry.57 However, the treintistas did not 
stay united for long. A further split developed within their ranks as a result of Ángel 
Pestaña’s advocacy of the movement breaking the taboo of participating in politics. 
Pestaña went on to form a political party, the Partido Sindicalista, which was rejected by 
the majority of the rest of the treintistas.58 The Sindicatos de Oposición remained on the 
outside of the CNT, gaining no real additional momentum during 1933 and 1934, and then 
found themselves targeted by repression following October 1934, having participated, 
along with the Marxist left, in the October general strike in Barcelona.59 It would only be 
in the spring of 1936, in the context of both the radicals and moderates realizing that they 
had both made strategic mistakes that had only damaged the Confederation, that 
reconciliation came about. Even then, however, not all those who had left the CNT in the 
first years of the Republic returned; some, such as the Sabadell Local Federation, remained 
autonomous, and then joined the UGT during the Civil War.  
 
The functioning of the CNT’s organizational structure and the decision-making processes 
embedded within it also began to suffer as a consequence of the disintegration of the 
organization. Prior to the Republic, the full organizational structure and procedures of the 
Confederation had lain dormant for years. With the organization operating openly once 
more from 1931, however, its decision-making bodies and the configuration in which they 
were linked could – and indeed needed – to be re-established so that the organization could 
engage with the political and social circumstances of the new era and work towards 
fulfilling the movements’ overall goals. The CNT’s militants viewed their organization as 
fundamentally different from – and superior to – the UGT due to their belief that whereas 
the UGT operated according to a strict hierarchy, at the top of which sat a national 
executive with which a substantial degree of overall authority rested, the CNT was, in their 
eyes, a collection of autonomous regional groupings which collectively decided upon the 
path that the organization would take. In practice, however, there was inevitably an 
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element of hierarchy in terms of how the CNT operated, both because there ultimately had 
to be a level at which a final decision was made and also because the reality of how 
decisions were made did often not match the anti-authoritarian ideals on which its structure 
was based.  
 
The fundamental unit of division in the CNT’s organizational structure was its regional 
confederations, of which there were ten during the Republic, each covering a different 
geographical area of Spain. Each region was headed by a regional committee, which acted 
as the coordinating body for the region and provided delegates to represent the region at 
national plenums. Grouped within each regional confederation were all of the sindicatos 
únicos and local federations – the focal points for unions in a given locality – that operated 
within the region. Plenums and congresses were held by each region, at which 
representatives of the region’s unions and local federations attended, with a view to 
formulating that region’s stance on whatever matters had been placed on the agenda for 
discussion, relating both to local and national matters. The representatives at these plenums 
and congresses attended holding positions that, if procedures had been followed correctly, 
had been agreed on through open assemblies of the organisms which they represented.60 
The overall coordinating body of the CNT was its National Committee, which was 
comprised of delegates from the city in which it was based, this location being decided 
upon at national congresses. The National Committee had the remit of organizing the 
convocation of national plenums and congresses, which were the two forums at which 
decisions of a national nature were made, as well as serving as the central body through 
which communications between regions were passed. National congresses involved a 
much wider participation of the grassroots, with all CNT unions and local federations able 
to send delegates. Officially national congresses were to be held every year and were 
supposedly the only forum through which important decisions could be definitively made. 
National plenums, by contrast, were attended only by delegates from each region, with 
these delegates carrying stances on the plenum agenda that had been agreed upon through 
aforementioned plenums or congresses held within their region.  
 
Overall, then, the CNT was divided according to regions, with national-level decisions 
being formulated at national plenums and congresses attended by militants from each 
region, rather than the organization having any permanent national bodies that had the 
power to make decisions in the name of the entire organization, as the UGT’s National 
Committee and National Executive could. On a day-to-day basis, union activity did not 
revolve around national questions, but rather local labour ones, and the handling of these 
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issues stayed within the CNT organisms of that region, rather than being passed onto a 
national executive or national industrial federation.61 And because the positions that 
regional delegates took to national plenums were meant to be the product of consultation 
with the unions and local federations of that region, the decisions taken at national level 
were, if the chain of deliberation functioned correctly, ultimately an expression of the 
organizations’ ordinary members. 
 
However, the decision-making process was highly susceptible to being disrupted if any 
links in this chain were damaged, as occurred with increasing frequency throughout the 
Republic. National congresses were supposed to occur on a yearly basis, and were meant to 
be the only forum in which truly important issues affecting the CNT as a national 
movement could be decided upon. However, national congresses took place only in 1931 
and 1936. In their absence, national plenums, which were easier to arrange as they 
involved the attendance of only small delegations of the leaders of each region, were relied 
upon for making national-level decisions.62 However, the breakdown of decision-making 
mechanisms did not end there. Regional delegates frequently attended national plenums 
without carrying positions on the items on the agenda that had been agreed upon through 
regional plenums or congresses. It was a similar story within the regions themselves, where 
many of the delegates who attended regional plenums or congresses had not – either 
through poor organization or the effects of repression – held meetings with the members of 
the organisms they represented to agree a stance on a given issue.  
 
As will be seen during the thesis, the breakages in the CNT’s decision-making system 
would have important consequences for how the organization developed a stance on the 
UGT. In the absence of issues being discussed according to procedure, corners came to be 
cut, and decisions on important matters were taken by those towards the top of the CNT 
hierarchy without the full consultation of the grassroots organisms and ordinary members 
of the CNT. As the Republic progressed, as Anna Monjo demonstrates, the CNT’s 
decision-making mechanisms eroded, leaving influential individual factions or individuals 
increasing options to impose their agendas on the organization as a whole.63 Moreover, 
some regions, as will be demonstrated, saw fit to exploit the weaknesses in this complex 
decision-making process, or even brazenly tried to ignore established procedures to either 
force through their own positions or block those which they opposed. 
 
The overall changes in membership of the CNT between the start of the Republic and 1934 
vividly illustrate the initial optimism and confidence of the movement and the subsequent 
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difficulties it suffered. Looking at the overall membership of the CNT, it is clear that the 
organization experienced an enormous surge in membership in the earliest months of the 
Republic, which was a quickening of the momentum that had initially begun in 1930. The 
official national figure at the organization’s June 1931 congress was 535566 members. The 
lion’s share of these members came from Catalonia, with the organization also expanding 
rapidly in Andalucía.64 By 1932, the overall trend was towards decline, though there are no 
overall membership figures until 1936. As with the membership surge, the erosion of the 
membership base occurred principally in Catalonia and Andalucía. In Catalonia, for 
example, membership fell from 291150 in June 1931 to 202354 in March 1933, with 
further falls still to come as a result of the treintista split.65 It was a similar story in the 
Levant region; although the CNT here continued growing throughout 1931, reaching a 
peak of 99741 in January 1932,66 by October of the same year that figure had fallen to 
72604,67 and would drop as low as 23308 in February 1934, the decline exacerbated as in 
Catalonia by the treintistas’ formation of the Sindicatos de Oposición.68  This is not to say 
that the CNT declined to the same extent across all of Spain. Regional membership figures 
compiled by historians reveal that in some regions the CNT’s membership base stayed 
relatively constant, and sometimes continued to increase. In Asturias, for example, 
membership of the CNT rose from 24881 in June 1931 to 30803 in July 1933.69 The rapid 
gains made by the CNT in the Madrid construction sector contributed to the CNT growing 
in the capital over the period in question.70 However, in spite of such gains the inescapable 
truth for the CNT leaders was that, in the regions that constituted the overwhelming 
majority of the CNT’s national membership, the organization shrank significantly.  
 
In addition to demonstrating the rapid decline of the CNT, the above figures highlight the 
very uneven distribution of the CNT’s membership throughout Spain, which had 
significant consequences regarding how the organization as a national actor operated. In 
June 1931, fifty-four percent of the CNT’s members lived in Catalonia.71 Although the 
CNT was comprised of ten regional confederations, therefore, in practice half of its 
members were concentrated in one single region. Andalucía was the next most important 
region in terms of its membership levels. It is possible that in 1932 its membership base 
eclipsed even that of Catalonia due to the fact that its decline in membership truly began in 
1933, whereas the CNT in Catalonia was already waning in late 1931, though the true 
membership figures of the Andalusian CNT are virtually impossible to ascertain given the 
fleeting and disorganized nature of many of its rural unions.72 The Levant region initially 
accounted for a significant portion of the CNT’s membership, though its haemorrhaging of 
members reduced it by 1933 to being proportionally much less important. The remainder 
  
28
of the CNT’s ten regional confederations therefore accounted for a relatively small 
proportion of the organization’s overall membership base, even if in some, such as 
Asturias or Aragón, they either rivalled or outnumbered the number of workers in the 
UGT.  
 
This highly uneven distribution of members inevitably had an impact on how the CNT 
operated as a national entity. As discussed, the organization was based on the premise of 
autonomous regional confederations that would collectively formulate the CNT’s national 
stances and goals. Unsurprisingly, however, the largest regions asserted a much greater 
level of influence when it came to the formulating the CNT’s overall goals and strategies. 
As will become clear later in the thesis, Andalucía and above all Catalonia often steered 
debates at national plenums in the directions that they wished them to go, especially with 
regard to discussions on alliances and the UGT that would take place in 1934 and 1936. 
However, this influence of the largest CNT regions on the rest of the organization was not 
confined to national plenums. On a day-to-day basis, the Catalan CNT, as the region with 
the greatest resources, produced Solidaridad Obrera, which was by far the CNT’s largest 
newspaper and de facto the organization’s national mouthpiece. The public interpretation 
of the Republic and the UGT that was put forward by the CNT was therefore largely that 
of the Catalan CNT. On a more intangible level, as Anna Monjo argues individual militants 
within the CNT had a disproportionate influence in accordance to the weight of their public 
profile and the level of importance accorded to them by other militants.73 The leading 
figures of the Catalan and Andalusian regions inevitably acquired a cache and national-
level influence that was impossible for the leading militants of the smaller regions. Figures 
such as Buenaventura Durruti, Federica Montseny, Juan García Oliver and Joan Peiró, all 
based in Catalonia, received much greater exposure in Solidaridad Obrera and were 
nationally-known, whereas the leaders of the CNT in Galicia or the Basque Country, for 
example, were not. 
 
The combined effects of government repression, factional splits and the faístas’ 
mismanagement of the CNT ensured that by the time the right had gained power in the 
1933 elections, the CNT was in disarray. Though the radicals were still able to cajole 
certain elements of the grassroots into carrying out ill-advised insurrections, and a vitriolic 
anti-Republic line was maintained from the pages of CNT and Solidaridad Obrera that 
promised an imminent libertarian revolution, the reality was that the CNT was badly 
damaged.  
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The confrontation between the CNT, the government and the UGT 
 
What, then, was the CNT’s public stance on the UGT as a national actor in this context? 
Put simply, it was one of unprecedented hostility, articulated through the pages of CNT 
and anarchist newspapers and through the speeches of leading CNT militants. The socialist 
labour federation was put at the heart of the CNT’s overall interpretation of the Republic, 
to the effect that the UGT was presented as being a driving force behind the acts of 
repression against the CNT, and that this was part of an overriding goal on the UGT’s part 
to destroy the CNT.   
 
The fact of the UGT being in the government and the CNT being opposed to it, a 
manifestation of the two movements’ clashing theoretical standpoints, was the axis on 
which the hostilities between the two organizations on the national level turned. The CNT 
press presented an overall interpretation of the UGT between April 1931 and November 
1933 of it having the overriding goal of destroying the CNT so that ‘the way will be clear 
for the UGT to try and recruit the proletariat, organizing it in its ranks and placing it under 
the tutelage of the state’.74 From the earliest months of the Republic, Solidaridad Obrera 
and other CNT papers spoke of ‘the UGT offensive against the CNT’.75 Indeed, even 
before the founding of the Republic, Solidaridad Obrera had argued that the provisional 
government would put the UGT to use for this purpose.76 This argument was articulated 
repeatedly by anarcho-syndicalist newspapers in relation to both the activities of the 
socialist leadership and of UGT unions across the country.  The claim was even 
occasionally made that local UGT leaders attempted to arrange for the Civil Guard to 
murder cenetistas to this end.77 The CNT press presented the overall dynamic of relations 
between the CNT and the UGT as being one of a battle whose winner would be ‘them or 
us’.78  
 
The legislation and other initiatives spearheaded by the Labour Ministry, such as the laws 
regarding strikes, the regulation of unions and the implementation of arbitration systems 
and government-appointed officials to regulate labour disputes, and the heavy-handed 
public order initiatives of the Interior Ministry, above all the Ley de Defensa de la 
República, were interpreted as being designed specifically to allow the CNT to be 
destroyed and the UGT to replace it. For example, outlining the imposition of labour 
relations settlement in Andalucía by the Captain General which stipulated that revisions to 
bases de trabajo had to be submitted and negotiated through comités paritarios, 
Solidaridad Obrera argued that  
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in Andalucía, as in Barcelona, the UGT wishes to impose, through the authorities that 
represent it in government, a system of organization that the CNT never has and never 
will accept. For this reason militants are incarcerated and unions are closed.79  
 
Any possibility that socialist legislation was designed for reasons other than to destroy the 
anarcho-syndicalist movement was implicitly rejected by this stance. With regard to the 
Republic’s stance on public order, Solidaridad Obrera gave the following interpretation of 
the ley de defensa de la República: ‘it means that the socialists can remain alone, having as 
they wish the Spanish proletariat and the organizations of struggle against capital. Those 
organizations of open struggle against the state, let us just say that they will disappear’.80  
 
This overall interpretation of the socialist movement’s goals in the new era was expressed 
above all through the notion of Francisco Largo Caballero, the most publicly-known 
socialist figure, the Labour Minister and the General Secretary of the UGT, masterminding 
a plan to destroy the CNT. This plan was executed from above by the machinery of state, 
and from below by his command of the UGT. It was ‘Largo Caballero’s offensive against 
the CNT’.81 In May 1931, for example, Solidaridad Obrera provided a summary of key 
conflicts across the country in which the CNT were involved. There was not necessarily 
any direct involvement from Largo in any of them, but each occurrence was presented as 
having been masterminded by Largo. His hand was seen behind an apparent pact between 
employers and the UGT in Zaragoza against the CNT. He was condemned for attempting 
to prevent the Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC) mediating in negotiations at the 
Barcelona port. And he was also seen as directly responsible for the incidents in Pasajes, 
San Sebastián, where in the view of Solidaridad Obrera ‘to protect the UGT a peaceful 
demonstration was dispersed with gunshots, killing people in the most vile and cowardly 
manner’. The verdict of the paper was that ‘the coercions of Largo Caballero have had and 
could have tragic consequences that in any other country in the world would be punished 
with a prison sentence and the death penalty’.82 Largo quickly took on the role of an 
omnipotent despot who could strike out against the CNT anywhere and everywhere, a 
notion that, as Julián Casanova has pointed out, was totally detached from the realities of 
how much control the socialists could have exerted at the local level from their position in 
government.83 
 
These core arguments regarding the UGT were not simply made and then forgotten. 
Rather, they were repeated throughout the lifespan of the bienio reformista. On one level 
this repetition came about through editorials written in the aftermath of bouts of repression 
  
31
suffered by the CNT following its various insurrections, or as new legislative initiatives 
were passed. Just as importantly, however, they and the more basic sentiment of an all-out 
fight for survival between the CNT and the UGT were recurrently expressed on a day-to-
day basis through the CNT’s press coverage of labour conflicts involving the CNT and/or 
the UGT, or even just of reports on the activities of UGT unions from across Spain. 
Between April 1931 and the end of 1933 each week brought with it reports of new outrages 
committed by UGT organisms as they set about fulfilling the government and socialist 
movement’s anti-CNT agenda.  
 
To give some examples to convey the continual nature of these attacks on the UGT,84 in 
August 1931, CNT shoemakers in Valencia accused the Labour Ministry and local 
employers of colluding in an attempt to sideline the CNT and establish the UGT in the 
sector.85 In September, cenetistas in Córdoba published a lengthy article in the paper in 
which they attacked both their local UGT counterparts and the Spanish socialist movement 
in general for its collusion with the bourgeoisie and the yellow nature of its unions.86 In 
October, a militant from Reinosa, Cantabria, recounted the apparently deceitful activities 
of the local socialist leadership in their attempts to ensure workers were not laid off from a 
local factory, with the contributor advising other local workers to ‘get away from anyone 
who has a whiff of socialism about them or is a member of the UGT’.87 In November, 
CNT waiters in Játiva reported in the paper that a strike they had led had collapsed after 
the UGT provided strike breakers.88 In January 1932, the newspaper reported on the 
collusion of local UGT leaders and employers in the sugar processing industry in 
Zaragoza, vehemently attacking their corrupt self-interest and selling-out of workers.89 In 
March, members of the CNT’s barbers’ union in Madrid published a piece that exhorted 
barbers in the capital to abandon the UGT on the basis that its barbers’ union had done 
nothing but manipulate and betray them for the previous quarter of a century.90  
 
Once CNT had gone into publication from 1932, thus giving the anarcho-syndicalist labour 
federation an officially ‘national’ mouthpiece for the first time, the coverage of CNT-UGT 
grassroots conflict outside of Catalonia increased. In November 1932, the paper accused 
the socialists’ mining union in Asturias of betraying workers through curtailing a strike 
action there.91 In December, CNT reported, amongst several other conflicts over which it 
attacked the UGT, on the intervention of socialist leaders in Vitoria in an attempt to 
suppress a strike by the CNT-affiliated bakers there.92 Also that month the paper alerted 
readers to a case of the UGT in Valladolid preventing CNT workers from finding 
employment in local public works schemes.93 In March 1933, the paper reported on the 
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‘treachery’ of the UGT’s mineworkers’ union in Asturias after it voted to end a strike in 
the region.94 In April, apparent collusion between the local authorities and the UGT in 
Córdoba against the CNT led to the paper decrying another case of ‘eternal socialist 
treachery’. 95 In June the UGT in La Coruña was strongly criticized as ‘social fascists’ for 
‘betraying’ the CNT at the city’s port for refusing to back a CNT strike there.96  
 
Of course, between April 1931 and November 1933 there were numerous altercations 
between CNT and UGT unions across the length and breadth of Spain which were the 
product of local union leaders from the two organizations approaching labour questions 
from conflicting theoretical and practical approaches to industrial relations, rather than 
these conflicts simply being an interpretative spin of the two movements’ newspapers, as 
several important local studies of the union activity in this period illustrate,97 as do the 
preoccupations of British diplomats with incidents such as clashes between the CNT and 
the UGT in the Río Tinto mines and at the port in Tenerife.98 What is important to note, 
however, is that the CNT chose to draw attention to the UGT’s activities on a regular basis, 
even if the incident in question was relatively small or did not directly or indirectly involve 
a CNT counterpart, and with a scant regard for context. As a result, minor conflicts such as 
a bakers’ strike in Vitoria often received front-page billing in CNT papers as part of 
attempts to publicly discredit the UGT. Similarly, conflicts run by the UGT, such as the 
general strike in Salamanca in December 1932, were given a running commentary that 
argued that the organization was trying to prevent the workers from carrying out the strike 
action and ‘manoeuvring with the goal of bursting the movement before it has borne its 
fruits’.99 
 
Crucially, the idea that the UGT was acting from government and through its unions to 
destroy the CNT and replace it with the UGT was far from a secondary aspect of the 
CNT’s overall public interpretation of the Republic and the Republican-socialist 
government. The Republic was a ‘socialist dictatorship’100 that dedicated its efforts to 
creating ‘socialist laws against the workers’ and the CNT.101 At the same time, the sheer 
frequency with which the socialists’ activities in government were referred to and with 
which the activities of UGT organisms across Spain were reported ensured that the UGT 
dominated the CNT’s ongoing interpretation of the Republic. The scheme of destroying the 
CNT and replacing it with UGT was presented as being a central component, at times even 
the overriding one, of the project of the Second Republic. The UGT and its apparent 
sectarian, anti-worker objectives were thus at the very heart of the CNT’s overall 
understanding of the new political and social era.   
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The repeated and consistent articulation of this stance on the UGT begs the question as to 
how such an interpretation came about. Given that the UGT occupied such a central role in 
the CNT’s narration of the Second Republic, it would be easy to assume that it was the 
product of some sort of formal decision emanating from within the CNT to deliberately 
target the UGT with the intention of mobilizing the working classes against a rival. 
However, an examination of the proceedings of the CNT’s national plenums and national 
congress that took place during the first years of the Republic reveals that in this period the 
UGT was seldom a topic of discussion.  
 
To put the relevance of national plenums and congresses into context, according to the 
CNT’s established processes, it was at these meetings that national CNT principles, goals 
and strategies were formally discussed and implemented. They were the principal outlets 
for representatives of the different CNT regions (and representatives of different unions 
and local federations across Spain in the case of national congresses) to come together and 
reach a national consensus on issues that were deemed to be of primary importance to the 
CNT. The decisions made at these meetings were generally taken to be binding. The 
organization’s national plenums dealt with outstanding ongoing matters between 
congresses, which were supposed to be the forum for the outstanding practical and 
theoretical issues facing the movement.102 As such, it would be expected that if cenetistas 
wished to build a coherent public line on the UGT, formally discuss the implications of the 
CNT’s coexistence alongside the UGT in the new context of the Republic, or establish a 
strategy for CNT-UGT interactions, it would be carried out at these meetings. 
 
However, at neither the national congress of June 1931 nor in any of the national plenums 
held between the founding of the Republic and November 1933 was the issue of UGT in 
any shape a formal item of discussion on the agenda of the meetings, and nor did the issue 
of the CNT’s relationship with the UGT on the national level become a topic of discussion 
at the sessions of these meetings as they progressed. The main themes discussed at the 
national congress and early national plenums focused rather on a combination of how to 
expand the organization and administer its press, with the playing out of factional 
differences also playing a role.103  
 
By 1932, the items of discussion at national plenums reflected the more insurrectional tone 
of the faístas who dominated the organization’s agenda, not to mention the preoccupation 
of cenetistas with the effects of repression on their organization and increasingly divisive 
factional battles. The December 1932 plenum, for example, was convoked to discuss the 
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possibility of a national strike by rail workers and the viability of it being backed by other 
strike and insurrectional activity around the country.104 In January 1933 a national plenum 
was held in which the failure of these efforts were discussed, as well as how to launch a 
fightback campaign, especially with regard to the imprisonment of cenetistas.105 At the 
January 1933 plenum an analysis of the UGT did not extend beyond the suggestion made 
by the delegate for the central region regarding a propaganda campaign to fight back 
following the failure of the January 1933 insurrections, which should in his view target the 
socialists in government, ‘who are responsible for everything’.106 At the June 1933 national 
plenum, in reporting on the course of the general strike of the previous month in their 
respective regions, delegates from some regions commented upon the position adopted by 
their UGT counterparts, often reporting on their refusal to participate and the effect this 
had on dampening popular participation in the strike. The Aragonese, for instance, reported 
on the efforts made by the UGT, ‘faithful to their trajectory of treachery’, to dampen the 
general strike by postponing the general strike they coincidentally had planned for the 
same day.107 
 
However, aside from tangential references to the stance of the UGT in the midst of CNT 
labour conflicts and protest actions, the socialist labour federation was certainly not a point 
of discussion, especially not in a sense of analyzing the relationship between it and the 
CNT. This non-discussion of the UGT during these forums for national policy and strategy 
formulation highlights two salient points. First of all, it demonstrates that the founding of 
the Republic did not, for the CNT, serve as a stimulus to re-evaluate its overall relationship 
to its socialist counterpart, whether with a view to deciding upon a strategy for decisively 
eclipsing its rival or for seeking some form of rapprochement. Given the respective 
positions occupied by the two labour federations, and above all the links of the UGT with 
the government and its reform program, it is hardly surprising that the CNT’s ongoing and 
longstanding hostility towards the UGT intensified with the founding of the Republic, 
which had no bearing on the differences of theories, principles and goals that had divided 
the two ideological currents since the nineteenth century, and nor did it change a past in 
which the UGT had collaborated with Primo de Rivera and the CNT had been made illegal. 
However, it is evident that this increase in hostility was essentially a reflexive 
amplification of a position created during a previous social and political epoch. It is clear 
that once the UGT was generally perceived to be an enemy by cenetistas, no further 
consideration of the rival organization was required. The question of how to orientate the 
organization towards its biggest rival therefore slipped through the cracks of the decision-
making mechanisms. 
  
35
Secondly, it is evident that the CNT’s placing of the UGT at the heart of its interpretation 
of the Republic was not part of a formally agreed-upon strategy by its members. Instead, it 
would appear that the articulation of the interpretation of the UGT was left to the writing 
and editorial teams of the CNT press organs, and also the cenetistas who contributed 
articles to the papers, generally in a capacity in which their writings were not themselves a 
statement created through consultation with fellow cenetistas. The CNT’s public position 
on the UGT was therefore created in a largely non-consultative fashion. At the same time, 
however, there is nothing to suggest that there was any significant opposition within the 
movement to the public stance that was taken against the UGT – neither with regard to the 
propensity to attack the UGT, nor the overall interpretation of it having a goal of 
destroying the CNT – from within the movement. What prevailed as the CNT’s de facto 
stance on the UGT was something that was on the one hand created by a small proportion 
of militants writing in what was effectively a personal capacity, yet at the same time 
appears to have been unanimously endorsed by the rest of the movement. 
 
The socialists’ stance on the CNT 
 
The socialist movement and the UGT likewise were on a constant footing of public 
opposition to the CNT throughout the first years of the Republic, though not to the same 
vitriolic degree exhibited by Solidaridad Obrera and CNT. Editorials in El Socialista 
above all presented the CNT’s disregard for the Republic’s social legislation and its 
continued attempts at insurrection as at best ‘playing into the hands of the bourgeoisie’108 
and at worst simply ‘counter-revolutionary’.109 Whilst the socialist press overall presented 
less of a continual narrative based around attacking specific CNT strikes, it and local UGT 
leaderships were certainly willing to make their position clear regarding the CNT’s 
activities. When El Socialista did comment on a CNT strike, it was usually to condemn it.  
Commenting on a CNT general strike in Granada in November 1932, for instance, the 
paper condemned what it viewed as a crude ‘importation’ of Catalan syndicalism, 
combined with forms of violent protest redolent of nineteenth-century Andalucía. In its 
news coverage of the conflict El Socialista dwelt in particular on the incidents of violence 
that were carried out.110 El Socialista warned its readers that a CNT general strike in 
Zaragoza in May 1933 was a ‘monarcho-anarchist plot’.111  
 
The deliberations of the UGT National Committee reveal that this was not simply a 
propagandistic spin, but a genuinely-held belief – though it hardly needs pointing out that 
the CNT were not carrying out their protest movements on behalf of the right – by the 
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labour federation’s leaders. In the December 1932 meeting of the National Committee, for 
example, Julián Besteiro raised as a point for urgent discussion that ‘syndicalist and 
communist elements, together with the extreme right, have the goal of overthrowing the 
Republic’. Other members of the Committee were similarly convinced that in the areas in 
which they were based the CNT was planning either to carry out an insurrection on behalf 
of the forces of reaction or destroy the local UGT organisms at their behest, including 
planning a series of assassinations of UGT members. 112  
 
Like the CNT, the UGT’s own public opposition to the CNT was not the product of its 
most important decision-making forums, namely its national congress or the meetings of 
the National Committee. That said, the CNT did feature more heavily in the appraisals 
made of the Republic by socialists. At the PSOE extraordinary congress held in July 1931, 
the CNT’s activities were cited by both those who were in favour of and those who were 
opposed to ministerial participation in defence of their respective positions.113 The issue of 
the organization’s stance on the CNT was also indirectly addressed at the UGT’s 1932 
national congress, through a debate on whether to amend the UGT’s basic position, 
established at its previous congress in 1928, that the organization would not enter into 
alliances with other organizations. However, no amendment was ultimately made, with the 
opinion of one delegate that ‘the simple fact’ of changing this position ‘means recognizing 
that there are other trustworthy organizations, and this is not correct’ seeming to reflect the 
perspective of the majority.114 At the congress there was also a brief and fairly unanimous 
condemnation of ‘anarchist violence’ and the ‘murders of several of our comrades carried 
out by syndicalist elements’.115  
 
It must be emphasized, however, that these discussions were a relatively minor aspect of 
the congress and were quickly resolved with little required in the way of discussion. 
Instead, the bulk of the congress was dedicated to appraising the conduct of the Executive 
Commission, particularly during the December 1930 attempt to topple the monarchy; the 
statutes of the UGT; and the social program of the UGT with regards to matters such as 
education, workplace safety, working hours and so on. In proportional terms, then, the 
CNT was not a principal subject of discussion.116  
 
More importantly, it must also be borne in mind that the UGT’s national congress did not 
take place until October 1932, approximately eighteen months after the Republic had been 
declared. By this time, the Republican-socialist government and its reform program had 
already run into considerable difficulties and opposition, and the CNT had become firmly 
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entrenched in its hostility to both the government and the UGT. It must be stressed, 
therefore, that in spite of the declaration of the Republic representing a watershed moment 
that ought to have prompted an immediate analysis and re-evaluation of the UGT’s 
relationship with the Republic and a whole host of other matters besides, the socialist 
labour federation had not convened such a forum of discussion since 1928. In turn, this 
meant that the forum for discussing the UGT's position on the CNT – and indeed any other 
organizations – going into the Republic was essentially the one carried over from the final 
years of the monarchy. The hostile line of El Socialista and other socialist newspapers 
towards ‘syndicalists’ and ‘anarchists’ during the Republic was therefore a continuation of 
the position developed in the previous decade (and indeed in decades prior to that), rather 
than being the product of a discussion of the CNT by representatives of the constituent 
parts of the UGT during the first moments of the Republic.  
 
Whilst an overall position on the CNT was not formulated through the UGT’s formally 
most important decision-making forum, an examination of the role played by the 
organization’s Executive Commission and National Committee in presiding over their 
organization through their regular meetings reveals that there was an overall, coherent line 
taken against the CNT. The National Committee retained a preoccupation with instances of 
violence directed against UGT members and organisms by the CNT. Members of the 
committee who were based in regions in which the CNT were strongest painted a picture to 
the rest of the committee of their memberships living in continual fear of attack from 
cenetistas, sometimes with the assent of the local authorities. For example, Luis Viesca, 
who as representative of the national sugar workers’ federation was based in Zaragoza, 
described instances of the CNT organizing lockouts of factories to prevent UGT members 
from working in them, and generally planning, in his view, a campaign of terror against 
UGT organisms and members.117 Reports of CNT activity in Catalonia were no less bleak, 
with the UGT presented as being forced to fight every bit as much against the CNT as 
against intransigent employers.118  
 
On a day-to-day basis, the Executive Commission of the UGT handled queries from 
individual UGT organisms regarding how to handle their CNT counterparts. UGT 
organisms would contact the commission with details of their problem with ‘anarchists’ 
and ‘syndicalists’, and the UGT leaders would dispense advice or attempt to offer a 
solution, where they could. On several occasions, UGT grassroots entities wrote to the 
Commission to complain that syndicalists were attempting to take over the local UGT 
movement. For example, the Executive became concerned in September 1932 that UGT 
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organisms in Vigo, Galicia, were ‘finding themselves influenced by communist and 
syndicalist elements’, which, they were concerned, could lead to ‘unpleasant things’.119 
Clearly, the leadership of the UGT was concerned throughout the Republic to ward off any 
possible anarcho-syndicalist interference in UGT organisms and ensure that the grassroots 
of the organization remained closely aligned to the agenda of the socialist movement. 
Based on the fact that these reports and denunciations were often made by local ugetistas, 
it would appear that this was every bit as much a concern for lower-level UGT organizers 
as it was for the leadership, rather than it having simply been a case of the UGT leaders 
keeping their grassroots under unwanted surveillance. 
 
Sometimes the UGT Executive Commission would use its position to attempt to elevate 
cases of CNT threats to UGT organisms to the authorities of the Republic. For example, in 
June 1931 a delegation from Valencia visited the UGT leadership to seek help for workers 
in the leather industry there; the delegation asked for the Commission to help ‘guarantee 
liberty of work in the face of syndicalist elements’. Wenceslao Carrillo made contact with 
the Civil Governor to try and ensure this.120 The commission attempted to make a similar 
ministerial-level intervention on the request of UGT workers in Málaga who were 
dismissed from an olive oil manufacturer and replaced by CNT workers, who were 
apparently operating in collusion with the owner of the business.121 
 
However, the most common response made by the UGT Executive Commission to details 
of cenetista threats sent to it by the organization’s grassroots was to send out orators to the 
locality in question. Consequently, the UGT Executive’s principal strategy for fighting for 
territory with the anarcho-syndicalists around Spain seems to have been based on the belief 
that the best – or perhaps only – method at their disposal was to try and initiate a 
propaganda war. So, for example, the head of the UGT’s local federation in Barcelona, 
Juan Sánchez Marin, contacted the Executive Commission to request that Pascual Tomás 
be sent to address a meeting they had planned, the object of which was to ‘counteract the 
work of syndicalist elements’ who were attempting to force UGT members at the port to 
abandon their union.122 Both Tomás and Andrés Saborit were sent by the Commission. 
Towns that were far smaller than Barcelona also received this dispatch of UGT leaders as 
part of a propaganda counter-attack against local cenetistas. Localities such as Aranda de 
Duero, Burgos, and Alcira, Valencia, upon writing to receive support for their propaganda 
efforts to ‘counteract the work of the anarchists’123 were offered prominent ugetistas such 
as Wenceslao Carrillo.124  
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The overall strategy of the UGT national leadership on the CNT was thus one of fighting a 
defensive action against CNT unions across the country, based on an overall impression 
that CNT unions represented a significant threat to the survival of UGT organisms – not to 
mention militants – across the country. Far from corresponding to the CNT’s belief that the 
UGT’s unions would be used to destroy the CNT, the stance taken by the Executive 
Commission was in fact that of attempting to fight a defensive action against the threat of 
CNT unions. This is a counter-perspective to the overall question of the CNT and UGT’s 
stances on one another in the early years of the Republic that has largely escaped the 
attention of commentators. As discussed, many writers have pointed out that the socialists’ 
legislation from government placed an impediment on the CNT’s ability to function 
according to its principles. Others have argued, and certainly not inaccurately, that the 
socialist leaders were keen to ensure that the full weight of the state’s security apparatus 
was applied against the CNT when it broke the law, whether in the labour sphere or during 
insurrections.125 This is certainly backed up by the public attitude taken by socialists over 
arrests and punishment of cenetistas, which occasionally was simply callous.126  
 
However, it must also be taken into account that on a day-to-day basis, the UGT leadership 
did not approach the question of the CNT as though they had access to force to destroy 
outright CNT unions. Rather, their primary concern was for the survival of their own 
unions, which they viewed as under threat from CNT coercions, against which they 
generally turned to measures such as sending mediators or propagandists to the area. This 
is not to argue that this was a particularly rational appraisal of the on-the-ground dynamic 
of interactions. It is the case, however, that the UGT’s leadership did not operate on the 
premise that it had the ability to destroy the CNT, but instead on the basis that it needed to 
minimize the effect of anarcho-syndicalist pressure or coercion on its grassroots.  
 
The Second Republic therefore did not bring with it any let-up in hostilities between the 
CNT and the UGT in terms of the way the two labour federations interacted as national 
actors. In fact, to the contrary, it brought hostilities between the two organizations to new 
levels through them placing themselves on opposite sides of the dividing line between 
defending the Republic and attacking it.  The CNT’s escalating confrontation with the new 
regime was inextricably linked with the anarcho-syndicalist labour federation intensifying 
its public stance of hostility towards the UGT on the national level. For its part, the 
socialist movement likewise became increasingly hostile to the CNT from early on in the 
Republic, for the converse reason that the anarcho-syndicalists’ actions were interpreted by 
the movement as being counter-revolutionary. These were the prevailing positions that the 
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CNT and the UGT held on one another at the national level during the Republican-socialist 
biennium. However, the elections of November 1933 would change the foundations on 
which these positions were based, not to mention have far-reaching consequences upon 
what role the concept of unity –and in turn the position of the CNT and the UGT relative to 
one another – would have within the Spanish left. 
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Chapter Two: Alliance Initiatives and the CNT, November 1933-October 1934 
 
Socialist and anarcho-syndicalist responses to the 1933 elections 
 
In the November 1933 elections, the right swept to power, leaving left and centrist 
Republicans and the socialists in opposition and with a substantially reduced number of 
deputies. A new government was formed, headed by Alejandro Lerroux and the Radicals, 
but backed by the more hard-line CEDA. Precisely what the Radicals’ agenda in 
government was in 1934 is open to debate; for some, it was essentially an unscrupulous 
organism that was beholden to the anti-democratic ideals of the CEDA.1 Others, most 
convincingly Nigel Townson, have suggested that the Radicals themselves sought to 
occupy a middle ground, through which a democratic state could have been consolidated.2 
What is more important here than this debate amongst historians, however, is that the 
Republicans and socialists who were deposed from power, and indeed the majority of the 
Marxist left, viewed the election result as being a harbinger of an authoritarian counter-
revolution against the Republic and the working classes. The November 1933 elections 
thus ushered in a fundamentally different era in the politics and the society of the Republic. 
The hostilities between the Republicans and the left on the one hand and the right on the 
other – with the CNT taking on both sides of the divide – entered a new, more intense 
phase.   
 
The ascent of the right to power had a particularly significant effect on the socialists. The 
experience of the years in government had left varying degrees of acrimony amongst the 
different factions of the party and union. The Caballeristas and the socialist youth wing 
were left particularly disillusioned by the experience, and after the 1933 election the 
process of their radicalization, which would continue up until the outbreak of the Civil 
War, began to gather momentum.3 The centre of the movement, led by Indalecio Prieto, 
meanwhile, was wary of the possible consequences of such an openly antagonistic stance 
towards the Republic.4 There was no overall consensus within the movement as to what its 
stance on the Republic was, neither in the immediate aftermath of the election nor on the 
eve of the October insurrection. However, what prevailed was a public stance that was 
couched in the rhetoric of revolution against the current governing forces. El Socialista 
increasingly articulated such a line in its attacks on the government,5 and Largo Caballero 
and his followers in particular made increasingly severe threats in speeches and newspaper 
articles.6  
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The coming to power of the Lerroux government had little discernible impact on the public 
positions adopted by the CNT via the pages of Solidaridad Obrera, CNT and other official 
newspapers of CNT organisms. One CNT response to the election result was the 
organization of another uprising, which took place in December 1933 and was put down by 
the authorities with little difficulty.7 However, this stand against the new government of 
the right did not mean that the CNT changed its position on the rest of the left. 
Communists and socialists alike continued to be attacked with equal vehemence by the 
anarcho-syndicalist press. Even before the November 1933 election, in the aftermath of the 
dissolution of parliament, Solidaridad Obrera revelled in the socialists’ loss of power and 
their indignant threats to revolt in the event of a victory of the right, declaring in one 
editorial that ‘they have lost their heads after losing their enchufes’.8  The revolutionary 
posturing of the socialists in the run-up to the election was roundly ridiculed, with the 
sexagenarian Largo Caballero being mockingly presented as ‘the d’Artagnan of 
socialism’.9  
 
Once the Lerroux government had been formed, the interpretation put forward was that if 
the right represented some form of fascism, then what the Marxist left had to offer was an 
equally and possibly more dangerous form of fascism. This perspective was arguably 
consistent with the anarchist principles of the movement, though this theoretical basis was 
to a large extent masked by its hyperbolic articulation. Crucially, the interpretation of the 
UGT and the socialists offered in the CNT press was a fundamental continuation of that 
which it had expressed between 1931 and 1933, even though some of the key aspects of 
the political scene around which it was based had disappeared. With the socialists out of 
government, the UGT no longer had a privileged link to the Labour Ministry. The 
socialists’ overall relationship with the Republic changed completely as a result of the 
defeat. The UGT no longer had any remit to defend the Republic by attempting to 
minimize labour conflict and endorsing the idea of a República de los trabajadores, even if 
many of its leaders did continue to counsel against confrontation with employers and the 
state. Thus two of the key motivations of CNT hostility towards the UGT – its allegiance 
to state institutions and coercive apparatus and its defence of a bourgeois capitalist regime 
– were now part of the past. However, this certainly did not mean that the actions of the 
socialists during their time in government had been forgotten. Instead, articles were 
produced that dwelt on the period of the Republican-socialist government, implying all the 
while that the socialists would return to the previous status quo if possible.10 In July 1934, 
for example, a front-page editorial in Solidaridad Obrera suggested that Largo Caballero’s 
ambition was to install an Austrian or German-style system of fascism in Spain.11  
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The development of the Alianza Obrera 
 
In the context of the apparently imminent onset of fascism that the November 1933 
election result was seen to represent amongst the left, a certain consensus emerged within 
Marxist organizations in Spain that some form of unity was required to form a defensive 
bloc. Although a pan-left unity on the national level was never achieved, talk of unity 
nevertheless did become an increasingly prominent feature of the left’s activities. The 
alliance proposal that proved to be most enduring and generated the greatest debate on the 
matter of unity of the left was known as the Alianza Obrera, an initiative spearheaded by 
the dissident communists of the Bloque Obrero y Campesino (BOC), whose main base of 
operations was Catalonia. Although the BOC remained throughout the Republic a 
movement of secondary importance in terms of its size, it nevertheless gained popularity, 
above all in Catalonia, throughout the period. The movement’s distinguishing feature was 
that its leaders’ interpretation of Marxism was much more responsive to the current 
political and social circumstances, rather than being bound by dogma or subordinated to 
the Comintern.12  
 
The BOC’s appraisal of fascism and the strategies that needed to be adopted to fight it 
were one key manifestation of this dynamism. The BOC’s militants began warning of the 
threat of the authoritarian right from as early as 1932, a threat which, in the analysis of 
Joaquín Maurín, needed to be met with a pan-left alliance, the likes of which had not been 
attempted before.13 To bloquista leaders, alliances of left-wing organizations could 
potentially be used to create sufficient collective strength so as to prevent the rise of the 
right and additionally bring about proletarian revolution. An initial pact was signed 
between the BOC, the Unió Socialista de Catalunya (USC) and the treintista Federación 
Sindicalista Libertaria (FSL) in March 1933, called the Alianza Obrera contra el 
Fascismo.14 The victory of the right in the 1933 elections made the idea of an anti-fascist 
front a far more pressing issue amongst the left. In December 1933, leaders of the BOC, 
the PSOE of Catalonia, the Catalan UGT, the FSL, the treintista unions, the Izquierda 
Comunista, the USC and the Unió de Rabassaires – which is to say virtually all the 
organizations of the left in Catalonia other than the CNT, the FAI and the Partit Comunista 
de Catalunya - signed the agreement that created the Alianza Obrera of Catalonia. In its 
founding manifesto a need to present a united front against fascism was the essential 
message.15 
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The Alianza Obrera movement began to gain momentum in early 1934 as local Alianza 
Obrera committees were set up in dozens of localities across Catalonia, and regional 
agreements were signed in Valencia, Asturias and Aragón.16 Just as important as the fact of 
the creation of these committees was the proliferation of debates on the idea of alianzas 
and frentes that occurred in the press organs and propaganda of organizations across the 
left. The BOC was unsurprisingly the most vocal in its promotion of Alianza Obrera. 
However, the debate was certainly not restricted to bloquista circles. The left-wing (though 
anti-PSOE and UGT) La Tierra, For example, firmly backed the idea of left-wing unity, 
and gave editorial space to those in favour of it to put their case forward.17  
 
The socialists’ view of alliances 
 
The socialist movement’s overall position on the question of alliances with the rest of the 
left was ostensibly in favour, but was also undercut by doubts and ulterior motives on the 
part of its national leadership. Based on the public pronouncements of Largo Caballero, 
and the general handling of the issue in El Socialista, it outwardly appeared that the 
socialists were working towards bringing about the unity of the Spanish proletariat to fight 
fascism. Largo Caballero’s publicized visit to Barcelona in February 1934 to meet with the 
leading figures involved in the Alianza Obrera also lent weight to the notion that the 
socialists were interested in participating in the alliance initiative. Largo reported back 
favourably on the initiative both through the press and to the UGT Executive Commission 
and National Committee.18 Tellingly, El Socialista reported the socialist leader to be as 
much as anything satisfied with the receptiveness to the PSOE and UGT in the region. 
Behind the scenes the UGT Executive made the divisive stipulation that the UGT regional 
secretariat in Catalonia should instruct its members to support the PSOE and not the Unió 
Socialista de Catalunya as part of its approval of the alliance in the region.19   
 
However, the national leadership of the socialists was by no means unconditionally 
committed to the spirit of Alianza Obrera. Significant figures within the National 
Committee displayed an innate suspicion towards any overtures from other organizations. 
Discussing a letter from the treintista leadership in late 1933, for example, Díaz Alor 
argued that the UGT should under no circumstances act under orders from other 
organizations, who ought to be aware that ‘they can collaborate with or follow us, but they 
should not hold the belief that we are going to follow them as they see fit’.20 Even though 
the UGT agreed to offer some support to the idea of the Alianza Obrera following Largo’s 
visit to Barcelona, there was a clear sense amongst the UGT national leadership that the 
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initiative could not eclipse the discipline of the socialist movement’s organizations.21 The 
UGT Executive feared that committing the socialist labour federation to a generalized 
alliance could lead to ‘the Unión General de Trabajadores being erased from the 
imagination of our comrades’.22  
 
In considering the question of unity and alliances, it is clear that the socialist leadership did 
not consider the CNT as any more of an important piece in the jigsaw than other 
organizations, in spite of the fact of the anarcho-syndicalist labour federation being much 
larger than the other actors of the left. Instead, the socialists retained a suspicion of the 
integrity of the CNT movement. In the UGT National Committee and the Executive 
discussions on the stance to be taken on alliances, the CNT were barely taken into 
consideration as a significant factor. This was most likely due to a combination of the 
CNT’s own position of rejecting the Alianza Obrera outright, as will be discussed later in 
this chapter, and just as importantly due to the majority of the UGT leadership’s deeply 
held distrust of the CNT movement, which does not appear to have been tempered by the 
election of the right. Immediately prior to the election and in the weeks after it, some 
members of the National Committee continued to report on the apparently violent 
tendencies of CNT militants in regions such as Aragón, viewing them as something that 
could provoke the forces of reaction and also as a threat directed at UGT activists.23  
 
However, the public impression was given off that the socialists were interested in the 
CNT playing a part in the drive towards the Alianza Obrera. For example, in a speech to 
the youth wing of the socialist movement Largo stated that he was in favour of union with 
‘anarchists’, and also praised the ‘anarchic’ spirit of the Spanish working classes that 
would lead them to reject fascism.24 During 1934 El Socialista notably desisted in the sort 
of public criticisms of the CNT that it had made throughout the earlier years of the 
Republic. The socialist press also drew attention to the CNT’s deliberations on Alianza 
Obrera as part of their June 1934 national plenum, the coverage implying that it was 
hopeful that the position of the pro-alliance regions would prevail.25  
 
In spite of the provocative statements of Largo Caballero and others, privately the socialist 
leadership were fearful of actually committing their movement to a revolutionary 
confrontation with the government. In late 1933 and early 1934 the prevailing mood within 
the National Committee was that attempts to overthrow the government would usher in an 
authoritarian regime – Trifón Gómez argued that the activities of the CNT could lead to an 
Italian or German-style fascist dictatorship, ‘as did the communists’ in these two countries 
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– and so the UGT should ensure that its members did not participate in any such protest 
movements.26 Although this position was held above all by the most reformist sections of 
the National Committee, even those factions of the socialist movement who were most 
vociferously espousing revolutionary threats over 1934 – in particular the Caballeristas – 
were at bottom unwilling to make good on them. As Paul Preston highlights, the socialist 
leaders tried to make sure the impetus towards Alianza Obrera developed within the 
cautious limitations of the outlook of the socialist leadership. Where socialists dominated 
Alianza Obrera committees, such as in Madrid, they sought to overrule any revolutionary 
initiatives by other members.27 Accordingly, the National Committee and the Executive 
became alarmed with the activities of local Alianzas Obreras when they carried out protest 
actions that had not been initiated by the UGT, such as those that took place in Valencia 
and Barcelona.28 As Preston also highlights, dissident communists involved in the Alianza 
became increasingly suspicious that the socialists’ motives for endorsing it were primarily 
to use it as a weapon in their posturing against the right rather than treating it as a genuine 
method of uniting the proletariat.29 
 
Overall, therefore, the socialist leaders’ position on the Alianza Obrera was a somewhat 
opportunistic one, based around buying into the revolutionary edge of the movement and 
the popular support it garnered, whilst at the same time attempting to subvert it to the far 
less revolutionary outlook that lay beneath the rhetoric of Largo and others. As Paul 
Heywood suggests, in 1934 the socialist leadership’s interest in alliances was 
fundamentally limited by their unwillingness to risk other organizations taking away their 
assumed position of leaders of the working classes.30   
 
The CNT’s response to alliance initiatives 
 
Nevertheless, the public stance of the UGT with regard to unity was far more attuned to the 
general mood of the rest of the left than was that which prevailed within the CNT, which 
was one of outright rejection. To an extent, this stance must be seen as a continuation of 
the organization’s previous responses to alliance initiatives made in its direction, which to 
varying degrees amounted to attempts to win the CNT’s backing for a cause other than its 
own. In 1932, for example, the virulently anti-PSOE left-wing Republicans in the Cortes 
who converged around La Tierra, in particular Eduardo Barriobero, spearheaded an 
initiative called the Alianza de Izquierdas, a more radical alternative to the Republican-
socialist government. Part of this alianza’s strategy was to gain the support of the CNT. 31 
Reflecting the anti-political principles of the movement, Solidaridad Obrera roundly 
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rebuffed the advances of the Alianza de Izquierdas, suggesting they were an attempt to 
make the CNT an ‘appendage’ of politicians, ‘just as the UGT is of the socialists’.32   
 
Even before the Alianza de Izquierdas, however, the CNT had already come into contact 
with another unity initiative, this time from the Communist Party’s activities in the labour 
movement. In line with the Comintern’s directives, communists in Spain adopted the 
strategy of co-opting workers from the grassroots of rival organizations under the guise of 
a push towards unity.33 With regard to the CNT, the communists’ initial attempt to do this 
was carried out on the eve of the Republic by the creation of CNT ‘reconstruction 
committees’ which had some success in Seville but failed elsewhere. The goal of these was 
to discredit the legitimate leadership of the CNT as ‘anarchists’ who had won control of 
the ‘glorious title of the CNT with the help of the fascist government of Berenguer’ so that 
the CNT grassroots would recognize the communists’ reconstruction committees as having 
authority over the CNT.34 Following the failure of these attempts at ‘reconstruction’ the 
communists started agitating amongst CNT and UGT grassroots for them to unite and 
reject the leaderships of their respective labour federations.35 All these efforts 
unsurprisingly met with the virulent criticism of the CNT press.36 
 
Once public discussions of anti-fascist unity, and in particular the Alianza Obrera, gained 
momentum, Solidaridad Obrera and other CNT papers were compelled to express a 
position on the matter. However, the dominant position that emanated from the CNT was 
an unflinchingly critical one. At first, the anti-alliance stance of Solidaridad Obrera 
focused on the communists themselves and sought to highlight the form of communist 
movements across the world in attempting to hijack proletarian movements for their own 
ends. Solidaridad Obrera opined that communists could not possibly front efforts against 
fascism given that the Soviet Union was ‘the first fascist [regime] in the world’.37 The 
paper warned workers not to be seduced by this alleged anti-fascist alliance initiative of the 
BOC on the grounds that ‘all workers know that the communists are nothing but a 
demagogic manifestation of the bourgeoisie and tend towards establishing a dictatorship as 
brutal and infamous as that of Hitler’.38  
 
Solidaridad Obrera also took a tone that the idea of alliances and united fronts was 
becoming increasingly ubiquitous but still essentially meaningless, with the paper 
commenting on 
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frente único for the struggle for material gains, frente único against fascism, frente único 
against dictatorships, frente único against war. This useful chorus has been transformed 
into something similar to those miraculous ointments that are useful for anything, and 
that, precisely for that reason, end up having no use at all.39  
 
The CNT and FAI’s position on the question of alliances in 1933 was thus markedly 
different from all of the other actors on the left. Whilst each Marxist organization had its 
own particular stances and strategies on the question of alliances, all espoused some 
promotion of unity. By 1933, the faísta faction’s monopoly over the CNT’s major 
committees and mouthpieces was fairly unassailable. The result was that the CNT’s public 
stance on the matter, expressed especially by Solidaridad Obrera, was the defiant belief 
that ‘in spite of pacts and agreements, the Confederación Nacional del Trabajo will never 
succumb!’40 whilst at the same time arguing that, in the words of one faísta, ‘the 
Confederation and the FAI would march at the vanguard of the proletariat’41 in the event of 
a fascist grab for power, in contrast to the bogus anti-fascist credentials of those associated 
with the Alianza Obrera.  
 
The support shown publicly by the socialists towards left-wing unity led to the CNT press 
presenting the socialists as being the most significant piece of evidence of all in favour of 
its argument for discounting alliances. For instance, in February 1934 an editorial in 
Solidaridad Obrera affirmed that ‘to offer our hand to the socialists, we would have to step 
over the corpses of Casas Viejas’, not to mention reach agreement with those who had 
masterminded the jurados mixtos.42 In the process of attacking the idea of alliance, the 
focus of Solidaridad Obrera therefore shifted to the socialists and became a part of the 
continuing attacks on them. 
 
Figures from the CNT also contributed to the ongoing debate in the pages of La Tierra, in 
most cases to reassert the idea of the CNT opposing alliances with other organizations. The 
veteran anarchist E. Mateo Soriano was one such contributor to the debate. He cited 
precedents of treachery committed by the socialists, which included not just the Ley de 
Defensa and jurados mixtos laws, but also referred to ‘the years 1917, 19, 22, 30 and 31’.43 
Opposition to any form of unity was echoed in the pages of La Tierra by amongst others 
Manuel Rivas, former General Secretary of the National Committee, for whom the only 
valid form of unity would come in the streets at the moment of revolution.44  
 
However, certain sectors of the confederal movement did not support the line expressed in 
Solidaridad Obrera, and used the pages of La Tierra to argue for the CNT to consider the 
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possibilities offered by alliances. Indeed, their contributions to the debate would be a key 
cause for the question of the CNT’s relationship with the UGT to be discussed at CNT 
national plenums in 1934. The writings of Valeriano Orobón Fernández in La Tierra on 
29th and 30th January 1934 represented the most original thinking within the CNT 
regarding the possibilities of alliance, even if they were initially loudly denounced by the 
faístas. Orobón Fernández based his ideas on the premise that fascism represented a 
uniquely serious threat to the Spanish proletariat that could not simply be dismissed by 
arguing that libertarian revolution would sweep it away. Orobón Fernández argued that the 
proletariat were aware of the threat it posed, and had, generally speaking, begun to become 
more predisposed to the idea of united proletarian action to prevent fascism and saw that 
‘the combative class union is today a question of life or death for the proletarian cause’, 
even if the convergence of grassroots around the same ideals compromised the tactical and 
organizational imperatives of individual organizations. He stressed that the fact of unity 
and the positive consequences it would bring were far more important than the precise 
mechanisms that brought it about, arguing that ‘long discussions over the process of 
approximation’ were a waste of time.45 For Orobón Fernández, anti-fascist unity and 
revolutionary unity went hand-in-hand, and the defeat of fascism could only be brought 
about through a united, revolutionary front. 
 
Orobón Fernández viewed the position of the communists as something of an irrelevancy, 
stating that ‘proletarian unity is ninety-nine percent feasible if only the CNT and the UGT 
want it’.46 This perspective undoubtedly reflected an awareness on Orobón Fernández’s 
part that had he explicitly proposed the inclusion of political organizations in an alliance he 
would have been exposed to the accusation of betraying the most fundamental principles of 
the movement. He also addressed the issue of the socialist leadership. For Orobón 
Fernández, the socialist leaders would have to prove that Largo Caballero’s rhetoric was 
genuine and act in accordance with it, rather than continue with the ‘dealings of the 
Trifones, Besteiros and Saborits against the unity of workers and revolution’.47  
 
Far from being an argument in favour of simply signing a pact with the socialist leadership 
or a cross-organizational alliance based on limited anti-fascist ends, then, Orobón 
Fernández believed that a ‘revolutionary’ form of unity in which the CNT could participate 
was possible, even if it would require a starting point of all organizations involved in it 
respecting one another’s ideological and theoretical canons.48 The basic tenets of Orobón 
Fernández’s position were repeated in the La Tierra debates by, amongst others, the 
Asturian Acracio Bartolomé, who took a more hostile line towards those in the CNT who 
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dismissed any possibilities of alliance and also placed less emphasis on the need for the 
UGT leadership to change.49   
 
However, what really proved to be the stimulus for a polemical discussion on alliances 
within the CNT was not the writings of Valeriano Orobón Fernández but a document from 
the CNT’s central region that was printed in La Tierra.50 In this document, the central 
region’s Regional Committee advocated CNT unions collaborating with other labour 
unions that were prepared to act in line with the CNT’s tactics of direct action. It also 
hinted that the matter of cooperation with other labour unions should be discussed openly 
within the CNT. The statement was interpreted by some elements of the movement as the 
region encouraging CNT unions to actively pursue alliances or even unification with other 
organizations, though the Regional Committee printed a clarification to deny this was the 
case.51  
 
The statement became one of the aspects of the discussion of alliances at the CNT’s 
February 1934 national plenum. The central region of the CNT had requested at the same 
time as it had published its piece in La Tierra that the National Committee include a 
discussion of the unity question at this national plenum.  However, from the outset of the 
plenum discussion the anti-alliance regions questioned the legitimacy of the issue even 
being considered, based on the conduct of the central region in publishing its opinions on 
the matter.52 In spite of these objections, the matter was placed on the agenda for the 
plenum and was the subject of a lengthy discussion. From the outset the question of 
alliances at this plenum was framed almost exclusively in terms of the CNT and the UGT. 
Consideration of pro-unity political parties such as the BOC was excluded from the start, 
notwithstanding occasional references to political groups that were attempting to gain 
control over the workers’ movement. The theoretical grounding shared by most cenetistas 
would ensure, both in 1934 and again in 1936, that when the organization did discuss the 
questions of alliances and unity, the parameters of these discussions would be very heavily 
conditioned by anti-political principles and convictions. The wording of the question on 
the agenda was ‘in view of the suggestions that the UGT has been making about the 
advisability of unifying working-class forces to carry out a revolutionary act, what position 
should the CNT adopt?’.53 This tendency of the anarcho-syndicalist movement to discuss 
the question of unity exclusively in terms of the CNT and the UGT would be equally 
present in the months before the start of the Civil War, and undoubtedly reflects a fairly 
unanimous, unspoken consensus amongst CNT militants that an alliance could only ever 
be even contemplated with the UGT, and not with any political organization. The 
  
53
paradoxical effect of the movement’s anti-political principles was that, even when the 
depth of anti-UGT sentiment amongst many sectors of the CNT was as profound as it was 
in 1934, the socialist labour federation was, effectively by default, the only organization 
with which any form of cooperation could be considered. 
    
The three CNT regions that argued most strongly in favour of the CNT making itself open 
to the possibility of an alliance with the UGT were the central region, Asturias and Galicia, 
with more muted support also coming from the Balearics. Prior to the national plenum, the 
centre and Galicia had both held regional plenums at which the question of alliances was 
discussed, and both accordingly had sent their delegates to the national plenum with 
express instructions to argue in favour of the CNT making some sort of move towards a 
revolutionary alliance, although both regions were fairly vague as to how this would be 
brought about and on what terms. What is perhaps most significant about the propositions 
for a closer relationship with the UGT is that they were not inspired by local instances of 
cooperation with the UGT, but rather a belief that neither the CNT nor the working classes 
as a whole could achieve emancipation without the CNT and the UGT working in tandem, 
inspired in some cases by experiences of failure on the part of some regions following on 
from the UGT refusing to work with the CNT in recent strikes and uprisings. The central 
region, for example, explained to the plenum that the reason the attempts of their militants 
to contribute to the December 1933 uprising failed was that they devoted a 
disproportionate amount of time to attempting to gain the complicity of the UGT, and were 
in many cases held back by the indecision of local ugetistas. Similarly, the CNT leadership 
in Asturias found that their efforts to gain the support of their regional UGT counterparts 
were thwarted by the national leadership of the UGT and socialist politicians. This point 
was most strongly made by the delegate for the Balearics, who argued that in spite of ‘the 
thousands of betrayals of the UGT’ the unification of their forces for revolutionary ends 
was necessary to prevent fascism.54 
 
However, the pro-alliance regions found themselves outnumbered and outmanoeuvred by 
the regions that opposed any move by the CNT towards a pro-unity position. These 
regions, it must be pointed out, represented the more traditional CNT strongholds relative 
to the central region, Asturias and Galicia. Andalucía, Aragón, Catalonia and Levante all 
argued against the CNT changing its position of flat opposition to alliances. The bulk of 
the arguing against the pro-alliance regions was carried out by Andalucía, whose delegate 
focused to a large extent on the procedural irregularity of the central region having 
managed to make the alliance question a subject of debate at the plenum. The position of 
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those regions that did engage in the debate itself to take on the pro-alliance regions was 
essentially that the CNT and the UGT’s aims were irreconcilable, and that any alliance 
would inevitably involve socialist politicians and as such would not work towards a true 
social revolution. A belief that the UGT’s leaders were not really interested in organizing a 
revolutionary front was likewise voiced.55  
 
But it was the Catalan region which made the most decisive contribution to ensuring that 
no pro-alliance position was adopted. Its delegation argued that even discussing the matter 
would represent ‘an outright negation of our principles’ and repeatedly threatened to 
withdraw from the plenum if a discussion on it did take place, a threat that turned out to be 
a hollow one. The main additional contribution that the Catalan delegation made to the 
debate was to argue that the alliance movement in Catalonia was comprised of elements 
who were the greatest enemies of the CNT.56 The conduct of the Catalan region in 
discussing relations with the UGT at the February 1934 plenum could be considered 
another manifestation of the distortions of the CNT’s decision-making process that are 
highlighted by Anna Monjo in her arguments regarding the gaps between the CNT’s ideals 
of being an open democracy and the reality of how it actually operated.57 It was able to 
counteract an open debate through attempting to interrupt procedures, ostensibly on the 
grounds of CNT principles, but in reality because it was virulently opposed to the pro-
alliance position. As will be seen in part three of the thesis, the Catalan region would once 
again take advantage of its influence and the failings of the decision-making procedures of 
the organization in 1936 to control the organization’s national-level stance on the UGT. 
  
A vote was taken at the plenum on whether the CNT should adopt a pro-alliance stance, 
the result being against such a position, with Andalucía, Aragón, Levante, the North 
(which comprised Cantabria and the Basque Country) and Navarre and La Rioja voting in 
this direction. Catalonia abstained on the grounds of its original opposition to the 
discussion taking place at all. However, a delegation was also formed to draft a public 
response on the matter of unity. There was a sense, even amongst those who opposed the 
notion of alliances most of all, including Catalonia, that the CNT needed to take a public 
stance on the matter. The AIT delegate at the plenum had also argued that such a public 
statement was necessary. The public statement that was produced argued that the CNT was 
 
willing, as always, to contribute all its forces to any revolutionary movement that works 
towards the emancipation of all the working classes, without this implying an agreement 
or pact with political parties or forces. Therefore the CNT calls upon the UGT to clearly 
and publicly indicate what its revolutionary aspirations are.58 
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The resolution gave the appearance, then, of an organization whose majority did not hold 
the belief that the CNT and the UGT had irreconcilably different goals and did not believe 
that seeking to reach a set of common goals with the UGT amounted to a total negation of 
the CNT’s principles, which was precisely the prevailing view expressed at the plenum and 
which had been endorsed by the vote on the question of alliances. This very observation 
was made by the Asturian delegate at the following national plenum, held in June 1934.59  
 
Accounts of the alliance discussions that took place amongst the left in the months prior to 
the October 1934 uprising have tended to take the plenum’s resolution at face value, 
implying in the process that the CNT’s leaders were inclined towards an alliance with the 
UGT during these months.60 However, the resolution of the plenum cannot be considered 
outside of the context of the actual decision-making process and debate on alliances that 
took place at the February 1934 plenum, which was fundamentally more important as it 
represented the actual stance of the CNT’s leaders towards the UGT. Although a statement 
indicating a willingness to work with the UGT had been released, a continued position of 
viewing all alliances as contradictory to CNT principles and a shared CNT-UGT revolution 
as being impossible prevailed. It is difficult not to see that the publication of the above 
statement as an attempt to present the CNT as not being opposed to the notion of unity that 
was gaining momentum in these months – or at the very least act as a salve for the pro-
alliance regions of the Confederation – and in the process attempting to deflect attention 
towards the UGT by suggesting that the ball was in the UGT’s court on the matter of 
alliance, whilst at the same time ensuring that the CNT could remain opposed to alliance 
initiatives. As much as serving ‘to gloss over disagreement’ as Julián Casanova argues the 
February 1934 plenum agreement did, the resolution was also a veneer of pro-unity 
sentiment that masked the deeply anti-alliance instincts of the CNT regions, and above all 
Catalonia, that held the most sway within the organization at the national level.61 This 
confusing outcome to the plenum based around a public statement that indicated one thing 
and a dominant internal current of opinion that indicated quite another foreshadowed how 
the question of unity would also be dealt with in the months leading up to the Civil War.   
  
Although the February 1934 plenum was intended to put an end to the diverging opinions 
on alliances and bring about a unanimous position on the matter, at least until a national 
congress could be held,62 the question of alliances resurfaced at the very next national 
plenum, held in June 1934. This time, however, the circumstances of the matter being 
raised were very different. For barely a month after the February 1934 plenum the 
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cenetistas of Asturias had entered into a pact with their UGT counterparts, a development 
that was viewed by many other sectors of the CNT as sufficiently grave as to warrant the 
Asturians being called to account at a national plenum. The pact’s overriding goal was 
articulated as being the bringing about of social revolution in Spain through the overthrow 
of the current bourgeois-capitalist regime. The pact outlined the basic structuring of this 
revolutionary alliance, which would take the form of local committees across the province 
that would liaise with an executive committee, all of which would be comprised of 
members of the CNT and the UGT. The pact was, then, an enormous departure from the 
dominant stance of the February 1934 plenum.63 
 
At the June plenum the Asturian delegation made a highly unapologetic defence of their 
decision to enter into a pact with their UGT counterparts. The delegation pointed out that 
the Asturian CNT had a record of attempting to bring about unity with the UGT since as 
far back as the 1919 national congress, and also rejected outright the notion that alliance 
with the UGT amounted to a rejection of the CNT’s principles, or that it represented a 
dalliance with politicians, arguing instead that in view of current circumstances a pooling 
of CNT and UGT strength was the only way that any of the CNT’s goals could possibly be 
fulfilled. To lend weight to this line of argument, the delegate proceeded to highlight that 
in every region of Spain the CNT was either a minority force relative to the UGT, or in the 
case of regions such as Catalonia, was in the process of losing public support. Although the 
formal decision made at the plenum was that the Asturian CNT had broken the agreement 
of the previous plenum, it did not modify its stance and persevered with the pact.64 
 
The entrenched anti-alliance position of many sectors of the movement was revealed by 
their scrutiny of the Asturians. It would appear that some delegations even believed that 
the Asturians having signed up to an Alianza Obrera in Asturias had meant that they had 
split from the CNT altogether. It was formally agreed that Asturias had broken the 
agreement of the last plenum by entering into an alliance with the UGT. Catalonia was 
amongst the regions that most eagerly sought to censure the Asturians. In light of this 
outcome, and given the basic content of the Asturian pact, the true outcome of the 
February 1934 plenum – as opposed to the face-value outcome as suggested by the public 
statement released on the back of it – is worth re-visiting. The Asturian Alianza Obrera 
pact had as its first point the ‘triumph of the social revolution in Spain’. The pact also 
presented itself as representing ‘an agreement of the working class organizations to 
coordinate their action against the bourgeois regime and abolish it’. In its fundamental 
aspects, then, the pact corresponded to the type of joint CNT-UGT action that the 
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statement of February 1934 had said the CNT would support.65 That regions such as 
Andalucía, Catalonia and Aragón would oppose the pact, focusing on very specific aspects 
of the wording such as its commitment to ‘socialist and federalist principles’ – 
undoubtedly an attempt to reconcile socialist and anarcho-syndicalist principles as closely 
as possible – demonstrates that, to the anti-alliance regions, and in spite of attempts to 
make appearances to the contrary, these regions were opposed to cooperation of any sort 
with the UGT for instinctive, sectarian reasons as much as ones of theory and principle.66   
 
Although it was also agreed that a national congress would take place as soon as possible 
so that the CNT could reach a final decision on alliances, the June 1934 plenum marked 
the last significant internal discussion of alliances and the UGT within the anarcho-
syndicalist movement until 1936. As has been seen, there was a highly entrenched 
opposition from its key regions to the notion of entering into an agreement with the UGT, 
and through the decision-making process this became the official stance of the 
organization. It was a stance that fitted in perfectly with the positions that had hitherto been 
adopted on the matter by CNT and Solidaridad Obrera, both of which continued their 
criticisms of all alliance initiatives, the socialists and the UGT, throughout the summer of 
1934.  
 
CNT-UGT cooperation in Madrid and Zaragoza 
 
A further complicating factor in the conflicting positions on alliances, in particular for the 
CNT in light of its prevailing stance of committed opposition to them, was the fact of some 
CNT and UGT unions in different locations in Spain cooperating with one another in 
labour conflicts and protest strikes. In both Madrid and Zaragoza during 1934 CNT unions 
entered into strikes jointly with their UGT counterparts, something that would have 
seemed unthinkable in these cities just a year previously. However, although these 
initiatives generated some celebrations of the idea of worker unity, none of them was 
viewed by either the socialists or the anarcho-syndicalists as heralding any possibilities for 
further ties between the CNT and the UGT. 
 
The construction strike that began in the capital in February 1934 brought about a 
somewhat surprising convergence of CNT and UGT unions. Prior to this moment, relations 
between the CNT and the UGT in this sector had been deeply acrimonious since 1931. The 
CNT had repeatedly attempted to carry out strikes which the UGT attempted to undermine, 
and there were what amounted to turf wars over which union represented workers at 
  
58
particular construction sites. However, in an illustration of the growing disillusionment of 
many UGT members at the pace of reform, from late 1933 some UGT workers in the 
construction sector began to participate in CNT-led conflicts. A general strike began in the 
construction industry in February 1934, once again over the dismissal of workers. The 
strike was convoked jointly by the CNT and the UGT, the latter of whose members seem 
to have been keen to enter into the conflict in spite of the reticence of their leaders. After 
initial attempts at direct negotiation between employers and representatives of the CNT 
and UGT failed, the Labour Ministry stepped in and imposed a solution that included new 
working hours for the industry. During the strike joint public meetings of CNT and UGT 
construction workers were held, at which orators from both unions spoke. CNT and UGT 
representatives also attended the negotiations with employers and the government together, 
and joint statements were released by the strike committees of the two unions.67 
 
A few months later, a general strike broke out in Zaragoza. It would prove to be one of the 
longest and most intense general strikes of the Republic. The CNT and the UGT struck 
jointly throughout. As the CNT press continued publishing articles that discounted the idea 
of the Alianza Obrera or attacked the UGT, its members in the Aragonese capital were 
joined with the UGT against the local authorities. That such a convergence of CNT and 
UGT would occur in Zaragoza was all the more remarkable given that since 1931, the two 
labour federations had been in near perpetual conflict. The CNT on the one hand had 
viewed the UGT as having connived with the local authorities on several occasions to 
provide strike breakers in CNT conflicts,68 whilst the local UGT leaders viewed 
themselves and their members as living in continual fear of attack from violent 
anarchists.69 Now, however, the CNT and UGT were cooperating in the Aragonese capital, 
united against the repressive actions of the Civil Governor. 
 
The strike, called initially by the CNT to protest the arrest and torture of cenetistas by local 
security forces, became a joint initiative as a result of the equally draconian measures 
adopted against the CNT and the socialists by the Civil Governor, whose response of 
declaring the strike illegal and launching a campaign to replace strikers caused the strike to 
become indefinite. The strike remarkably held until mid-May. During that time, the 
strikers, both in the CNT and the UGT, were resolute in their position – it appears there 
was an enormous amount of popular support for the strike, fed by anger at the authorities 
and employers – just as the local authorities and then the national government remained 
intransigent towards the strikers. Police reinforcements were sent in, workers were arrested 
and beaten whilst in detention, and decrees were made to prevent workers gathering in 
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public. The length and steadfastness of the strike led to the conflict capturing the 
imagination and support of the working-class public across Spain. The welfare of the 
strikers and their families became a national concern. As they began to run out of food by 
the middle of April, CNT and UGT organisms in other cities organized efforts to take in 
the children of those involved in the strike. In what became the abiding symbol of the 
conflict, thousands of children were shipped across Spain to be cared for by working-class 
families in other cities. As the level of public attention towards Zaragoza increased, the 
Civil Governor came under increasing pressure to drop the heavy-handed tactics he and the 
local security apparatus had adopted. A settlement was negotiated with the CNT and UGT 
strike committees which reversed the earlier fines and guaranteed the strikers their 
previous jobs back.70 
 
However, the fact of definite pieces of CNT-UGT cooperation did not affect the overall 
stance that the CNT presented on either the UGT or the idea of unity, and nor were these 
events interpreted in the socialist press as being a starting point for closer CNT-UGT ties 
in the immediate future. In Madrid, although the CNT and UGT unions involved did agree 
to strike jointly with joint demands, the cooperation was largely pragmatic and 
circumstantial rather than being motivated by a desire by either labour federation to foster 
a broader form of unity. Although Solidaridad Obrera and El Socialista did mention that 
the CNT and the UGT had entered jointly into the construction dispute, including 
publishing their joint press releases and reporting details of the joint public meetings held 
during the conflicts, no significance or celebration was attached to this cooperation. 
Instead, the emphasis rested on highlighting the intransigence of the employers in the 
disputes. Neither the CNT nor the UGT press were interested in attaching any significance 
to these instances of cooperation. It was a similar story with the socialist and anarcho-
syndicalist coverage of the Zaragoza general strike. Of course, both El Socialista and 
Solidaridad Obrera were effusive in their praise for the strikers and their families. Much 
was made by both papers of the solidarity between workers, in facing down the reactionary 
stances taken by the local authorities in the city. However, the coverage in El Socialista 
and Solidaridad Obrera neither lauded nor attributed any particular significance to the fact 
of the CNT and the UGT working together. Instead, the papers in their reporting of the 
Zaragoza general strike referred simply to the courage and solidarity of ‘workers’ rather 
than organizations. There appears to have simply been no interest on the part of the CNT 
or socialist press to draw attention to grassroots cooperation between their members.71 And 
nor did such events engender any wider goodwill in terms of the CNT’s overall public 
stance on the UGT; although Solidaridad Obrera was suspended before the conclusion of 
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the Zaragoza strike and until the end of June, upon its return to publication it resumed 
precisely the same hostile line against alliances, the socialists and the UGT that it had been 
producing previously.72 
 
Overall, and in spite of isolated instances of cooperation between CNT and UGT unions, 
the stance that prevailed within the CNT as a national movement since the end of 1933 on 
the matters of alliances and how to respond to the rise of the right led the organization to 
occupying a position of isolation relative to the rest of the left. Whereas by the autumn of 
1934 all other organizations on the left publicly viewed some form of alliance against 
fascism as being necessary, the CNT was as hostile as ever to all other proletarian 
organizations. In no small measure as a result of this, as will be seen in part three of the 
thesis, during the October insurrections the anarcho-syndicalist labour federation as a 
national actor appeared deeply impassive. The CNT, which had repeatedly proclaimed 
itself to be the only truly revolutionary movement in Spain, would fail to participate in 
what was by some distance the most significant moment of class struggle that had occurred 
in Spain for decades. 
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Chapter Three: Constructing a Rival: CNT and Socialist Discourses, 1931-1934 
 
Thus far this thesis has examined the CNT’s relationship with the UGT through 
considering the formal decision-making mechanisms of the two organizations, as well as 
through the articulation of opinions on the other labour federation in the main press organs 
belonging to the two labour federations. With regard to the CNT’s expression of a stance 
on the UGT and vice versa through press and other propaganda, this has been restricted to 
a focus on how a stance was formed in relation to ongoing political and social events. So, 
for example, the CNT’s stance on the UGT as outlined so far has been that the UGT was 
seeking to destroy the CNT and expand itself through the use of the legislative and 
coercive apparatus of the state. The socialists, on the other hand, interpreted the CNT’s 
activities as counter-revolutionary as they were seen to be attacking the Republic and 
doing the bidding of the reactionary right. 
 
A more detailed study of the anarcho-syndicalist and socialist press reveals that the 
hostilities between members of the two organizations went far beyond an interpretation of 
current events, and were in fact an articulation of a series of rigid and entrenched beliefs 
regarding the integrity and intentions of the active members of the opposing movement. 
Some aspects of these beliefs were grounded in the conflicting theoretical perspectives that 
separated the socialist and anarcho-syndicalist movements. To an extent, the hostilities 
between the CNT and the UGT based around these differences have been touched upon by 
historians and contemporary commentators.1 It is known, for example, that the CNT, in 
line with its anti-political principles, deplored the UGT’s links with the PSOE and 
endorsement of politics and its use of paid union officials, not to mention its support for an 
‘authoritarian’ state. Consequently, it was common for editorials in CNT papers to refer in 
passing to the UGT in such terms as ‘the workerist appendage of the Socialist Party’,2 or 
even for Solidaridad Obrera to devote whole articles lampooning the connections between 
the PSOE and the UGT under sarcastic headlines such as: ‘It seems that the UGT is not the 
same as the Socialist Party’.3 Related to this, writers have also pointed out the anarcho-
syndicalists’ disdain for the socialists’ habit of accepting paid positions, both inside their 
organizations and in government posts, with the accusation of enchufismo being made 
repeatedly.4 Criticisms based on such differences were expressed in the CNT and socialist 
press throughout the first years of the Republic and served as a staple form of ammunition 
through which hostilities between the organizations could be perpetuated.  
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However, there was also another layer of discourse between these more tangible 
differences that separated the CNT and the UGT and to a significant extent facilitated their 
ongoing hostilities. Chris Ealham has rightly highlighted how aspects of CNT discourse 
during the Republic mirrored those of the communists during the ‘Third Period’, such as 
the use of the term ‘social fascist’.5 However, CNT discourse on the UGT was not merely a 
regurgitation of the negative epithets deployed by the communists. This layer of discourse 
revealed a highly emotive set of assumptions and beliefs about the opposing labour 
federation, grounded in notions and qualities such as ‘treachery’. This aspect of cenetistas’ 
understanding and representation of the UGT and vice versa has been examined in far less 
detail by historians, perhaps because it was based around such visceral, subjective concepts 
rather than more readily identifiable aspects of left-wing theory and practice.6 However, as 
will be demonstrated in this chapter, this side of cenetistas’ and ugetistas’ understandings 
of one another was absolutely crucial in the Second Republic; not only did it constitute a 
highly significant proportion of how the two organizations attacked one another in public, 
but it also represented the articulation of a deeply entrenched mentality on the part of 
militants towards one another that cut substantially deeper than mere events or ideological 
or practical differences. 
 
Before examining the representations of the CNT and the UGT as constructed by the 
discourse of the two organizations’ press organs, it would be worthwhile first to consider 
briefly how this discourse was created, disseminated and accessed by members of the two 
labour federations. Both the socialist movement and the anarchist and syndicalist currents 
of which the CNT was primarily comprised had a long and established tradition of 
newspaper publication that stretched back into the nineteenth century. The ability to 
publish and distribute a newspaper that fought an organization’s ideological corner and 
provided an orientation to its members and also convinced others to join the movement 
was of fundamental importance to most political groupings. The CNT and the PSOE-UGT 
were no different.7 At all times throughout its history, a top priority of the CNT was to 
maintain the publication of a newspaper, with Solidaridad Obrera having been the 
movement’s key publication since 1907.8 The principal functions of the CNT and the 
socialists’ official newspapers were to put forward the movement’s ongoing interpretation 
of current events, promote the organization amongst workers, and also provide practical 
information to members in the form of publishing official notifications produced by 
official bodies across the hierarchy, from union juntas to the leading committees. All these 
functions were central to allowing the CNT and the UGT to be able to mobilize their 
current memberships and gain new supporters.   
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Solidaridad Obrera was in practice the key daily national-level vehicle of expression for 
the CNT, in spite of the fact that the newspaper was controlled by the Catalan region. 
Although CNT began publication in 1932, ostensibly as the CNT’s new national 
newspaper, Solidaridad Obrera was far more strongly established and thus continued to be 
more influential.9 The paper’s Catalan origin both reflected and to a significant extent 
perpetuated the dominance of the Catalan region’s dominance over the movement as a 
whole. The paper’s editorial board and main team of writers were chosen through a ballot 
at Catalan regional plenums.10 Its main body of staff and opinion-piece writers was thus 
drawn overwhelmingly from the Catalan region. A significant proportion of the paper’s 
content – though generally not its main opinion pieces and editorials – was created by 
contributions sent in by CNT militants operating at the grassroots level, relating to their 
own specific sphere of activities. Such items were for the most part reports by union juntas 
on the activities of their union, or by local federations on the activities of the CNT in the 
locality. The study of the CNT’s discourse on the UGT in this chapter is drawn as much 
from these types of article as it is from the paper’s main opinion pieces, in part to illustrate 
the grassroots’ perspective on the UGT. The cenetista construction of the UGT that is 
highlighted in this chapter and the mentality it represents was repeated as recurrently by 
local militant contributors to the paper as it was in the main opinion pieces written by the 
paper’s writers. Articles that examined local activities outside of Catalonia were often 
written by local militants from the area in question. Solidaridad Obrera unsurprisingly had 
its highest readership levels in Catalonia, and had a peak average circulation of 46855 in 
August 1931,11 but was also available outside of the region, being distributed to towns 
across the country where there was a CNT local federation.12 Given that the focus of this 
thesis is on CNT-UGT interactions in Catalonia, and given also that Solidaridad Obrera 
was the most important and widely read of the CNT’s papers, it has been used as the 
primary source of study for CNT discourse on the UGT. Nevertheless, an examination of 
this paper is complimented by examples from the Madrid-based CNT, as well as some of 
the CNT’s other regional papers – most of which were relatively short-lived – to illustrate 
the continuity in discursive themes between the different papers.13 
 
Examining a ugetista discourse is more problematic, given the substantial overlap between 
the PSOE and the UGT. It would be worth clarifying what distinction, if any, can be drawn 
between a ‘socialist’ discourse and a discourse that could be attributed specifically to the 
UGT. The UGT lacked a widely-read publication that was presented as the official 
mouthpiece of the UGT and the UGT alone. The socialist movement had more newspapers 
linked to it than did the CNT, in the form of regional newspapers holding pro-socialist 
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positions, often because they were either owned or edited by members of the PSOE.14 The 
main official publication of the socialist movement was El Socialista, which had an 
average circulation during the Republic of approximately 40000 copies.15 It would be 
impossible to differentiate whether an editorial or a piece of reportage on the CNT in the 
paper could be attributed solely to either the PSOE or the UGT, and as such it would be 
impossible to identify in the pages of El Socialista what could definitively be classed as 
discourse specific to the UGT. But the UGT did have a select range of its own 
publications, in particular the Boletín de la Unión General de Trabajadores. The Boletín 
was a monthly publication that did not go on general sale in the same way that a daily 
newspaper such as El Socialista would. Rather than make an artifical distinction between 
‘socialist’ and ‘UGT’ discourse, this chapter will examine ‘socialist discourse’, it being 
understood that a UGT discourse that was differentiated from general socialist discourse 
cannot be satisfactorily identified, though the chapter will draw in particular on articles 
published in the Boletín.  
 
The CNT’s construction of the UGT hierarchy 
 
The overall picture of the UGT hierarchy presented in the CNT’s discourse divided the 
UGT into three basic categories, namely national leaders and ordinary workers, and also a 
more hazily defined middle category of union leaders who operated the UGT’s 
organizational machinery and also had some form of local authority within the movement, 
but who did not hold the most important leadership posts. It was the two levels of 
leadership that were most often dwelt on within the CNT press. On the national level, 
Francisco Largo Caballero was unsurprisingly the most frequently depicted UGT leader. 
Largo made almost daily appearances in the CNT press, often being the subject of 
editorials but even more frequently being referred to in passing in the course of discussing 
other aspects of the UGT’s activities, whether on the national level or in individual 
localities. These references were virtually always critical in nature.16  
 
Attacks on the Labour Minister drew on several themes, all of which reflected the 
criticisms made on either the UGT as a whole or of its leadership in general. The issue of 
Largo Caballero’s collaboration during the dictatorship was one theme that was referenced 
with particular regularity; it was certainly not uncommon for articles to introduce Largo 
Caballero in such terms as the ‘ex-counsellor of the Bourbons’17 at some point when 
discussing his activities in the present.18 Articles in the CNT press were quick to suggest he 
was personally responsible not just for the repression of CNT unions and their activities 
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through collaboration with the bourgeoisie and repressive laws, but also for the hardships 
suffered by the Spanish working classes in general. When CNT unions were closed by the 
authorities, it was often attributed to factors such as ‘Largo’s hatred of the CNT’.19 His 
activities as Labour Minister ‘were more evil’ than those of any of the other members of 
the government.20 It would not be an overstatement to suggest that the CNT press were 
obsessed with the Labour Minister, depicting him as having a hand in every misfortune the 
CNT – and indeed the working classes – suffered during the years of the Republican-
socialist government. In CNT discourse, Francisco Largo Caballero effectively served as 
the personification of the UGT. It was Largo who was presented as having personally 
devised a plan to destroy the CNT for the benefit of the UGT. And because the UGT as a 
whole was seen as ‘Largo’s edifice’21 his aims were by extension those of the entire 
organization. Like many of the elements of the anarcho-syndicalists’ discursive 
construction of the UGT and its members, criticism of Largo was recurrent in the CNT 
press even before the Republic. Although prior to April 1931 he occupied no ministerial 
position, the attacks were fundamentally based on the same notions of his collaboration, 
his thirst for political power and his hatred of workers and the CNT.22 
 
Other national UGT leaders played a supporting role to Largo in CNT discourse, and were 
presented as embodying the most self-serving and exploitative aspects of Spanish 
socialism. There was a grouping of roughly half a dozen socialist figures, the majority of 
whom currently or previously held high-level positions within the UGT, whose names 
were widely known as the leading figures of the socialist labour federation. In particular 
and in addition to Largo Caballero, the figures of Julián Besteiro, Andrés Saborit, Trifón 
Gómez, Wenceslao Carrillo and Manuel Cordero were the most publicly identifiable. As 
with Largo, this coverage was always critical. Cordero, in his capacity as editor of El 
Socialista, had committed ‘low and vile acts’23 and was lampooned for holding ‘ten or 
twelve posts’ as was seen to be typical of enchufista socialists.24 Julián Besteiro, 
meanwhile, spoke ‘like a perfect bourgeois’.25 As with the attacks on Largo, this depiction 
of the UGT elite was equally present prior to the Republic.26  
 
The role afforded to Trifón Gómez was slightly different, as his primary sphere of 
activities was related more strictly to the labour movement in his capacity as leader of the 
UGT’s rail workers’ federation. Throughout the Republic the CNT’s Federación Nacional 
de la Industria Ferroviaria (FNIF) was constantly at loggerheads with the UGT’s Sindicato 
Nacional Ferroviario (SNF). The FNIF led various strikes across the country during the 
Republic, which were largely opposed by the SNF, in part due to the highly cautious, 
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reformist leadership of Trifón Gómez.27 The substantial coverage afforded to the railways 
in the CNT press inevitably led to the socialist labour leader making more frequent 
appearances within it.28 Trifón Gómez was depicted as the embodiment of the socialist 
labour leader who sought to ‘betray’29 workers through his reformist stance and his 
collaboration with the bourgeoisie.30  
  
In the mindset of cenetistas these individuals constituted an elite grouping of ‘leaders’ who 
were responsible for the reprehensible actions of the socialist movement from government. 
In September 1934, for example, CNT appraised the viability of alliance initiatives, and in 
so doing concluded that the socialist motives for calling for anti-fascist unity emanating 
‘from those who sowed police terror and massacred the working people’ could not be 
believed ‘if we bear in mind what the socialist leaders are and have been’.31 Often this 
controlling class of the UGT was pointed out to the readership of CNT newspapers by way 
of calling on the names of these standout figures, the link between the names and their 
crimes taken to be automatically made by readers. The UGT as a national actor was 
controlled by ‘the Corderos’32 who had created a ‘Cordero-style República de 
trabajadores’.33 Emphasising that workers themselves should control the struggle against 
capitalism and not submit to a class of leaders, cenetista employees of the Barcelona bus 
network argued that ‘emancipation is in us and not in their Largo, Cordero etc’.34 The 
activities of the ‘Unión General de Traidores [General Traitors’ Union]’ were the work of 
‘individuals of the moral calibre of the Largos, Prietos, Saborits, Corderos, etc’.35 Overall, 
then, the distrust exhibited by cenetistas towards the national leadership of the socialist 
movement cut very deep; it was not merely that they were seen to have adopted an 
erroneous agenda in their capacity of leaders of the organization, but rather – and much 
more emotively – that they were simply irredeemably corrupted, anti-CNT and anti-
worker. Although this perspective was based in part around the anti-political principles, 
specifically the rejection of figures who exerted a political control over an organization, to 
which the anarcho-syndicalist movement adhered, it is evident that these attacks were 
much more than a mere articulation of anti-political theory, and were every bit as much 
grounded in suppositions of a lack of integrity and an instinctive loathing. 
 
However, if a clique of half a dozen individuals was seen ultimately to exercise overall 
control over the socialist labour federation for their own interests and for anti-worker ends, 
then their orders were carried out across the country by a far larger, nameless army of 
‘leaders’ who formed the next significant cadre in the CNT’s representation of the UGT 
hierarchy. This class of dirigentes conformed to the idea of the UGT’s union entities and 
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industrial federations being controlled by self-interested bureaucrats who took control of 
labour disputes out of the hands of workers, usually with the result of them suppressing 
workers’ inclinations towards striking and colluding with employers and authorities to the 
detriment of the workers themselves. This type of leader would frequently appear in 
reports in the CNT press in which the CNT and/or the UGT were involved, such as those 
outlined in chapter one.36 Again, such a perspective existed in CNT discourse prior to the 
Republic, though was understandably expressed less frequently due to the more limited 
occurrence of labour conflicts prior to April 1931.37 In such reports, workers were often 
‘miserably tricked by the socialist leaders’ who inhabited their local Casa del Pueblo, as 
was the case of construction workers in Zamora.38 The strike of graphic arts workers in 
Madrid of 1934 had been initially undertaken by the CNT and the UGT together, when ‘the 
leaders of the socialist sector, in the middle of the struggle, and without consulting 
anybody and especially not the strikers, declared the conflict resolved’.39 As will be 
elaborated on later in this chapter, deceived workers were often presented as ‘abandoning 
the UGT leaders’ after those leaders had stifled their conflicts with employers.40 The 
attitude exhibited by editorial writers and local militant contributors alike revealed the 
basic mindset that the individuals who ran the UGT were fundamentally motivated by a 
desire to deceive the working classes, rather than it simply being the case that the UGT 
pursued an erroneous strategy in industrial relations.   
 
The final grouping within the UGT hierarchy was ordinary workers. To a significant 
extent, ordinary UGT members presented a problem for the CNT press. To fully 
understand why, it is first necessary to be aware that, crucially, in the eyes of cenetistas, 
the CNT and the working classes were synonymous. It was repeatedly stated in editorials 
and local militant contributions that ‘authentic workers’41 would ultimately realize that the 
CNT was the only organization to which they could belong.42 Furthermore, in CNT 
discourse ‘the working classes’ and synonymous terms were often substituted for ‘the 
CNT’ when dealing with the subject of the conspiracy against the CNT. For example, on 
some occasions Largo Caballero’s agenda from the Labour Ministry was designed to 
destroy the CNT; but on other occasions it was the working classes who were ‘victims of 
the dictatorship exercised by Largo Caballero from his throne at the Labour Ministry’.43 
Furthermore, the proletariat was often the subject of the most effusive praise in the CNT 
press for its revolutionary capacity, as was the CNT itself.44 As will be discussed 
throughout the thesis, this assumption of CNT-working class synonymy was a deeply 
significant factor in determining how cenetistas – especially in Catalonia – interacted with 
UGT counterparts. 
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However, this belief also created the need to explain why some workers did gravitate 
towards the UGT. To a large extent, this was carried out through the concurrent belief, 
outlined above, that ordinary workers were ‘tricked’ by UGT leaders. As a result, some 
cenetistas simply believed that it was the case that UGT workers would come to their 
senses and see the UGT and its leaders for the intrinsically corrupt collective that they 
really were. A call by rail workers in Utrera, Andalucía, to their UGT counterparts through 
the pages of Solidaridad Obrera sums up this attitude when presented in its most 
aggressive form. The authors called on their members to ‘try and win over and rescue our 
brothers in the UGT’. Addressing UGT members, they then asked of them:  
 
Can you in the UGT be proud of your leaders? No, no and no. Only enchufistas and those 
who aspire towards it militate in the Unión General de Trabajadores; the rest of them are 
esquiroles. Those who have not already abandoned their treacherous ranks, you must be 
ashamed and regretful of your actions as workers.45 
 
The CNT press attempted to reinforce this idea with an aggressive promotion of the notion 
that the UGT was on the brink of collapse as a result of workers abandoning the 
organization for the CNT,46 a claim that was equally made prior to the founding of the 
Republic.47 Such cases were often given prominent position within the CNT’s national 
papers, even if the numbers of members involved were relatively small. One such example 
is provided by a report from 30th November 1932 edition of CNT, regarding the defection 
of UGT members in Motril, Andalucía, from the UGT to the CNT, which was given a 
prominent position on the second page of the edition under the heading ‘the decomposition 
of the UGT’. According to the report, three prominent cenetistas from Granada took the 
decision to visit Motril to attend a UGT assembly in the town. The three immediately met 
with the opposition of the organizers of the assembly, described as ‘the dozen lackeys of 
the socialist ministers who represent the badly depleted remains of the fossilized [Socialist] 
Party’. The socialist leaders managed to gain the backing of the Mayor to prevent the 
cenetistas speaking at the meeting. However, the workers gathered at the meeting 
demanded that the three be allowed to speak, and the demands of the authorities and the 
socialist leaders were disregarded. The cenetistas then proceeded to address the meeting, 
and after doing so ‘several men from Motril, who having been fervent militants of the UGT 
and the Socialist Party’ acknowledged the erroneous nature of their old ideological 
principles. A mass conversion of the audience took place; ‘in the Motril Casa del Pueblo 
more than six thousand UGT membership cards were torn up and burned’. The retelling of 
the incident thus conformed perfectly to the notion that although socialist leaders may have 
attempted to work with the authorities to hold back the CNT, the masses would 
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spontaneously and freely back the CNT against such manoeuvres and ultimately abandon 
the UGT for the CNT.48   
 
Other incidents of workers abandoning the UGT for the CNT were presented in blunter, 
less elaborate terms, which nevertheless celebrated the victory of the CNT over the UGT 
which such incidents were seen to represent. In October 1932 the UGT membership of the 
village of Cala, Andalucía, abandoned the socialist labour federation en masse to join the 
CNT. The event was met with fanfare from Solidaridad Obrera, with the incident 
occupying a prominent spot on the back page. The defection in this single village was 
presented as being ‘another proof of the disappointments that the Spanish proletariat has 
been suffering at the hands of the UGT’. The article went on to explain that workers across 
Spain were abandoning the UGT and ‘fleeing to our revolutionary labour federation 
because it is clear that the Unión General de Trabajadores does not represent the 
aspirations of the workers’.49 At times, the assertion that workers were abandoning the 
UGT for the CNT was placed in more general terms that were not connected to any 
particular event. For example, on 3rd June 1932 Solidaridad Obrera published an article on 
its front page that addressed ‘the crisis of the UGT’. The editorial declared that ‘the 
working multitudes are abandoning [the UGT], emancipating themselves from the tutelage 
of their leaders, who are comfortably aligned with the new regime’.50 
 
The UGT and treachery 
 
Working in tandem with these constructions of the different groups within the UGT was a 
simultaneous understanding of what was the UGT as a whole’s most fundamental quality. 
In anarchist and syndicalist discourse, the most essential quality of the UGT and the 
socialist movement was treachery, perpetuated against both the CNT and the working 
classes. The accusation of treachery was made repeatedly in editorials in the CNT press 
and by CNT militants. Of course, on one level accusations of treachery or betrayal of the 
CNT and the working classes were made in direct relation to the present-day activities of 
the socialist leadership, with regard above all to the initiatives launched from government. 
However, it is important to recognize that such incidents were interpreted by many 
cenetistas – and were certainly presented in this fashion by the CNT press – as being 
merely the present-day manifestation of a virtually unbroken line of treachery. For 
example, in focusing on the activities of the UGT in Extremadura in 1932, Solidaridad 
Obrera prefaced its commentary by asserting  
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that Largo Caballero, Cordero, de los Ríos et al go united with the parties that defend 
property, capitalism and the state to take on the just and human popular aspirations is not 
a secret to anybody. It is not once, twice nor three times, but hundreds of times that the 
social fascists have shamefully betrayed the Spanish proletariat.51  
 
The Primo de Rivera dictatorship was one key period that was recurrently referred to in the 
CNT press throughout the Republic by militants on all levels of the organization’s 
hierarchy who wrote in the paper to demonstrate the previous record of treachery against 
the working classes of the socialists and the UGT leadership. Unsurprisingly, Largo was 
most commonly used in discussing the UGT’s collaboration, undoubtedly due to a 
combination of his ubiquitous presence in the paper and the fact that he held the most high-
profile post under Primo de Rivera. Entire articles were devoted to outlining Largo’s role 
as a counsellor of state during the 1920s, published under large-print headlines such as 
‘Largo Caballero and Primo de Rivera’,52 whilst many others made passing references to 
this collaboration. There is no question that the goal of such articles was to add to the ranks 
of the ‘many [who] still remember how the socialists acted during the six and a half years 
that this regime lasted for’.53  
 
Whilst there was undoubtedly a strong element of such references to the Primo de Rivera 
dictatorship serving as a smear attack on the UGT due to the activities of the socialists 
from government in the present moment, there can be no doubt that they were also part of a 
belief that, throughout its history, the UGT had always played a role of holding back the 
working classes. A front-page editorial published in Solidaridad Obrera in July 1934 
provides one of the most complete manifestations of this interpretation. The point that the 
editorial sought to make was that the revolutionary rhetoric emanating from socialist 
leaders such as Largo Caballero in these months was entirely hollow and merely designed 
to preserve the socialist movement now that it was out of government. However, in part to 
substantiate this position, the bulk of the editorial entailed narrating the history of the 
socialist movement since the 1910s. The historical account began with the events of the 
summer of 1917, when ‘Spanish socialism was taught an important lesson’. As a result of 
the ‘cowardice that their leaders displayed that year the UGT was left reduced to such an 
emaciated labour federation that it strongly resembled a skeleton’. The account then moved 
on to the Primo de Rivera era, a period which, as mentioned, the CNT press tended to 
dwell on when discussing the UGT: ‘The Primo de Rivera dictatorship saved Spanish 
socialism. Lacking scruples, its leaders clung on [to it] like limpets’. The approach of 
‘flattering’ the dictator was the ‘only path through which it [socialism] could expand’. This 
history of the Spanish socialists then arrived at the Republic, in which ‘the socialists 
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attempted to continue making use of the monopoly that the dictator had granted them’. In 
the view of cenetistas, then, the overall history of Spanish socialism was a mixture of 
cowardice in the face of revolution, mixed with collusion with reactionary elements and 
abuse of power to fulfil an overriding goal of expanding the reach of the movement’s 
organisms.54 
 
This interpretation of the socialists’ historical role within Spain drew the cenetista militants 
who contributed to the CNT press – and of course the writing and editorial staff of the 
movement’s papers – to hold and project a basic mentality that the UGT always had been 
and always would be treacherous. References to a timeless past of socialist misdeed and 
treachery spanned the majority of types of article published in Solidaridad Obrera, CNT 
and other CNT papers, including front-page editorials, reports of the activities of socialists 
in individual localities – both those produced by the papers’ central writing staffs and those 
submitted by local contributors – and reportage on political events.55 This belief in 
treachery as being an intrinsic and timeless quality of the UGT modus operandi was a 
direct continuation of a belief that was regularly expressed prior to the founding of the 
Republic.56 It was not uncommon for either the UGT as a whole or the socialists in general 
to be referred to in such terms as ‘eternal enemies of the Confederation’57 or as ‘eternal 
traitors’.58 Likewise, grassroots-level confrontations between cenetistas and ugetistas 
would give the CNT press occasion to loudly proclaim ‘eternal socialist treason’,59 or that 
‘the record of the UGT was always to betray the working class’.60 These references to an 
eternal yesterday of deceit by the socialists reveal, in the mindsets of those who controlled 
production of the CNT’s discursive output,  just how deeply treachery was viewed as an 
intrinsic quality of socialism as a movement and as a doctrine. It was not merely the case 
that Spanish socialists had at various points betrayed the CNT movement; this treachery 
was in fact an obligatory and inevitable element of socialist activity. Such assertions must 
be regarded as qualitatively very different from an objective refutation of socialist ideology 
and methods. 
 
It is important to emphasize that the discursive construction of the UGT that has been 
outlined here cannot be dismissed as simply being a propaganda line against the socialist 
labour federation that was controlled by the editorial and writing staff of the movement’s 
newspapers. As mentioned, a substantial amount of the content of CNT papers was 
produced by grassroots-level militants. In every issue, Solidaridad Obrera, CNT and other 
CNT newspapers contained reports on the activities of the CNT and other items of interest 
to the working classes from localities across the length and breadth of Spain. Contributions 
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from grassroots cenetistas displayed the basic mentality, outlined above, that the UGT as 
an organization simply stood for treachery. When references to ‘treachery’, ‘traitors’ or 
some other ‘eternal’ characteristic appeared in the CNT press, as often as not they were 
contained within contributions from grassroots militants rather than editorials. 
Furthermore, local contributions to anarcho-syndicalist newspapers reveal that militants at 
this level often endorsed the ‘political’ arguments against the UGT, such as that the 
jurados and legislative initiatives were designed to destroy the CNT, and these freely 
mixed with this underlying anti-UGT mentality, as well as the entrenched belief in a 
synergy between the CNT and the working classes.  
 
A report on Monzón, Aragón that appeared in Solidaridad Obrera in August 1931 serves 
as an example of the overall interpretation of the UGT’s agenda that was expressed by 
local militants in their depiction of events within their own locality. The incident the piece 
ostensibly reported on related to alleged attempts by employers in the sugar industry to 
force workers to join the UGT. The language adopted in the report firmly framed the 
incident in national terms. ‘The ugetistas, allies of Lerroux,’ it began, ‘are trying to convert 
the towns of the Ribera del Cinca into a fiefdom of the UGT’. The piece outlined the 
agenda of the UGT as a whole: ‘from power [the UGT] practices the annulment of the 
class struggle and advocates class integration, preparing the stages of the fascistization of 
the state, of fascist infiltration in the social, economic and industrial life of Spain’. The 
militant also asserted a synonymy between the CNT and the working classes. Having 
established the threat that the UGT posed not just in Monzón but across all of Spain, the 
author asserted that the socialist labour federation would be unsuccessful because ‘the 
compañeros of the Comarcal Federation [of the CNT] watch over the interests of the 
workers and educate their revolutionary development’. Moreover, ‘the workers of Monzón, 
as in the rest of Spain, are convinced that there is only one revolutionary organization: the 
CNT’.61 
 
Socialist discourse on the CNT 
 
It is of course important to be aware that the socialists themselves produced a discourse on 
the anarcho-syndicalist movement throughout the Republic. El Socialista and the Boletín 
de la Unión General de Trabajadores often printed editorials on the activities of the CNT, 
and there were even more frequent passing references to ‘anarchists’ and ‘syndicalists’. 
This discourse was no less critical – even if much less vitriolic in its articulation – and in 
fact mirrored many of the themes articulated in CNT discourse on the UGT. For example, 
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ugetistas recurrently expressed the belief that the CNT was founded on a dishonest 
minority exploiting an often misguided proletariat. One explanation given for the CNT’s 
membership base by the socialists, particularly with regard to Catalonia, was that those 
who joined the CNT were illiterate or in some other way lacking the education that would 
allow them to realize their error in joining an anarcho-syndicalist union. For example, 
writing in the Boletín de la Unión General de Trabajadores, Salvador Vidal Rosell, one of 
the key socialist figures in Catalonia, explained that ‘textiles in Catalonia has always been 
one of the bastions of the anarchists, due to the enormous percentage of illiterates’ within 
the industry.62  
  
However, the CNT’s membership base was not merely a product of ignorance, but also of 
coercion carried out by cenetista militants. To understand this element of the socialists’ 
representation of the CNT, it is first necessary to establish the nature of the individuals 
who ran the CNT, as constructed in UGT discourse. Where for the CNT the UGT was run 
by a class of dirigentes who duped workers into joining the UGT, for the socialists the 
CNT was run by a gang of violent pistoleros who used threats and force to coerce 
individuals into the CNT.63 On one level, the CNT was seen as being an organization that 
facilitated pistolerismo by allowing individuals to join its ranks whose interests did not 
extend beyond violence, whether it be on behalf of a union or an employer. This in itself 
‘made it impossible’ for the CNT ‘to represent the honourable working class’.64 At the 
same time, however, the socialist press was littered with references to ‘the pistoleros of the 
anarchist Confederation’ who waged a campaign of violence against both their opponents 
and ordinary workers.65 Those who followed the CNT’s protest actions were condemned to 
‘playing the sad role of victim, complying with meek diligence when faced with the pistols 
of the foremen of syndicalism’.66 The socialist press were at pains to stress that the UGT 
would never adopt coercive methods to make workers join their organization, however 
much it was in the best interests of these workers to join. Instead, this tactic was 
emphasized as being the preserve of the anarcho-syndicalists.67 
 
Socialist discourse again mirrored that of the anarcho-syndicalists in the critically 
important respect that it argued a synonymy of the UGT and the working classes. It was 
stressed in the socialist press that ‘class-conscious workers’ would inevitably follow the 
UGT, just as the CNT claimed that ‘authentic’ or ‘revolutionary’ workers would join the 
CNT.68 Such remarks made it clear that support for anarcho-syndicalism amounted to at 
best a lack of class consciousness, and perhaps even false consciousness. This belief in the 
UGT being the true representatives of the working classes was accompanied by an equally 
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strong belief in the innate superiorty of the UGT as an organization. The Boletín de la 
Unión General de Trabajadores once alluded, for example, to ‘the superiority of the Unión 
General de Trabajadores. A superiority and competence that they have never, not even in 
the heyday of anarcho-syndicalism, managed to equal’.69  
 
Like the CNT in their discourse, the socialists argued that the CNT was an historically and 
intrinsically anti-worker entity. On one level, there were immediate antecedents that were 
called upon to discredit the CNT. In the first months of the Republic, attempts were made 
to attack the CNT for its actions in the final months of the Monarchy. The accusation was 
made on several occasions that the CNT had not only failed to participate in efforts to 
overthrow the old regime, but had actively sabotaged efforts to overthrow it, in the form of 
publishing an article in Solidaridad Obrera in November 1930 that contained details of the 
developing conspiracy against General Berenguer. The goal of the accusation was to 
suggest that the CNT backed in some form the monarchy and had attempted to stop its 
overthrow.70 This accusation of support for the old, anti-worker regime mirrored the 
references made in the CNT press to the collaboration of the UGT with Primo de Rivera in 
the important respect that both accusations attempted to use the past activities of the 
corresponding labour federation as proof that they were backers of the repressive old order 
and as such anti-worker entities. 
  
However, in the historical narrative of the labour movement as contained in socialist 
discourse, the activities of the CNT press in November 1930 were merely one of the more 
recent in a succession of past attempts to derail the cause of the working classes. The 
history of the organization of the working classes was essentially presented as one in which 
anarchists and syndicalists had always played an interfering role. Indeed, anarchism itself – 
which, it must be stressed, socialist discourse identified the CNT as its present-day 
organizational force – was an anachronism that ought to have been supplanted by the 
theoretically superior socialist movement. Anarchism persisted in Spain in the form of the 
CNT, when it should ‘no longer exist except in museums of historical artifacts’.71 
Anarchism and the CNT were thus condemned to playing a retardant role throughout 
history and into the present. An extensive history of the UGT published in the Boletín de la 
Unión General de Trabajadores provides the most comprehensive example of this reading 
of the role of anarchists – including the CNT – in the Spanish workers’ movement. For the 
nineteenth century, anarchists were attributed a role of attempting, without success, to 
sabotage the establishment of socialist organizations in Spain. Prior to the foundation of 
the UGT, ‘anarchists, who later called themselves libertarians, syndicalists and today 
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libertarian communists’ had attempted to fight employers without creating a strong 
organizational structure, and as a result encountered ‘continual defeats’. A change of 
tactics and strategy was necessary, ‘and this mission was that which the Unión General de 
Trabajadores came to fulfil’. In spite of this, these anarchist groups continued to harass the 
UGT. Anarchism, then, was presented as a historically nefarious parallel movement to that 
of the UGT, which should have faded away long ago but unfortunately had not.72 
 
Undoubtedly in part to substantiate these ideas of the anarcho-synidcalist movement being 
a malign anachronism, the socialist press was keen to present the CNT’s activities as being 
indicative of an organization founded on a fundamentally flawed set of ideas, as a result of 
which it lurched from one failure to the other.73 This mirrored the CNT press’s own claims 
that workers were abandoning the CNT in droves.74 At times the focus of attention centred 
on age-old practical differences such as the question of the ongoing accurement of a strike 
fund, but unsurprisingly the main issue at stake was the role of arbitration bodies. For 
example, the Boletín de la Unión General de Trabajadores highlighted in August 1931 the 
course of a conflict in the Barcelona metal industry by the ‘anarchist union’. The 
publication made a point of comparing the pay settlement the CNT had achieved after a 
strike that had lasted for a month, noting not just that it was a far lower amount than they 
had initially demanded, but that it represented a lower rate of pay for most categories of 
worker in that industry than their counterparts in Madrid – which is to say UGT members – 
were being paid.75 Similarly, in November 1931 the CNT’s textile union in Valencia was 
ridiculed after it capitulated to employers after fourteen weeks of conflict. This ridicule 
took the form of printing a letter sent to the employers by the union, which, although 
claiming the union’s request for talks did not amount to ‘a confesion of cowardice or 
exhaustion’ seem to suggest that the union wished to back down.76 
 
Conclusions 
 
Overall, then, over the course of the period between the founding of the Republic and 
October 1934, the CNT and the UGT through their publications wrote copious amounts on 
one another. Their competing interpretations of one another took the form of fairly 
elaborate and repeatedly expressed constructions of the rival labour federation. In the case 
of the CNT the articulation of its interpretation of the UGT pervaded all levels of the 
CNT’s journalistic output, from front-page editorials all the way down to local union 
notices; moreover the CNT press gave disproportionate coverage to relatively minor events 
simply because they involved the UGT. Crucially, the discursive output of both the 
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anarcho-syndicalists and the socialists on one another was not based particularly often 
around a critical application of their theoretical tenets. Rather, theoretical differences were 
articulated through vitriol, if they were articulated at all; much of the discourse was instead 
firmly in the realm of attacking the integrity of the other movement. The overriding feature 
of the discursive output of the two movements was their positioning of the other labour 
federation as having no legitimate role amongst the Spanish working classes, and indeed 
being a purely malign entity that prayed upon them, a judgement that, though inspired by 
theoretical premises, should not be assumed to be a logical or inevitable result of them. It 
would not be inaccurate to characterize these discursive outputs as being as much 
representative of a mentality held by either group on one another as they were an 
expression of theoretical or practical differences. As will be seen later in the thesis, for 
many militants of both organizations these mentalities would ultimately prove to be 
impervious to being modified by changes in political and social circumstances. 
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Chapter Four: Catalonia and the Second Republic, 1931-1934  
 
Part one of the thesis examined the national level of the CNT’s interactions with the UGT. 
Part two of the thesis will turn its attention to the question of the CNT’s interactions with 
the UGT in Catalonia. As was established in part one, the Catalan region was a key player 
in determining the CNT’s national-level stance on the UGT through its participation in the 
organization’s decision-making process and its control of Solidaridad Obrera. However, in 
addition to the national level of CNT-UGT interactions, it is also crucial to consider how 
the CNT and the UGT interacted in specific regional contexts, both because different 
regions had their own social and political particularities, and also because it was at this 
level that the national level of relations intersected with CNT and UGT unions and 
militants interacting with one another in the workplace. 
 
Catalonia represents a particularly intriguing area in which to examine CNT-UGT 
interactions in the Second Republic. There was a great disparity of strength between the 
two organizations here. For the CNT, Catalonia was its stronghold and birthplace; for the 
UGT Catalonia represented a failure of the organization to connect with the most 
proletarian region of the country. As will be highlighted in this part of the thesis, the CNT 
in Catalonia viewed the Catalan UGT as being of an even more reactionary stripe than it 
believed the rest of the UGT to be; this in turn had a profound impact on how CNT 
militants interacted with the UGT on the ground. 
 
The Republic in Catalonia 
 
The political scene of Catalonia was different from the national political level, primarily 
due to the different institutions that had a governmental role in the region and the different 
set of actors that dominated in the region. These were in turn a result of long-standing 
economic, social and cultural differences between Catalonia and the rest of Spain. Aside 
from the CNT and anarchism’s unique role here, undoubtedly the most prominent features 
of Catalan political and social life during the Second Republic were the fact of the region 
having political autonomy of one form or another during the Republic (with the exception 
of the period between October 1934 and the 1936 election), and the dominance throughout 
of the Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya. 
 
The ERC was a movement that was quite different from the Republican parties of the 
national political scene. Aside from the obvious dimension of its Catalan nationalism, as a 
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party it was also much more populist than Republican parties elsewhere. The ERC sought 
to appeal at the ballot box as much to Catalonia’s working classes as it did to the middle 
classes, even if its politicians were drawn principally from urban professionals. Courting 
the CNT was a particularly important method of attempting to fulfil this aim, with various 
claims being made regarding how in the future the ERC would take various steps to 
alleviate poor social conditions and allow worker organizations to operate freely. Its 
attempt to have such a broad appeal had two principal results. Firstly, it ensured that the 
movement was highly popular, both in the final days of the monarchy and in the 1932 
Generalitat elections. Secondly, it meant that the party inevitably had to garner support 
based on a programme of sentiment rather than specific policies, and also set itself the 
rather difficult task, once in power, of bringing about the changes it had championed.1  
 
The ERC swept to victory in the April 1931 municipal elections, gaining a share of the 
vote far beyond the expectations of even its own leaders. Francesc Macià’s first decisive 
move after the election result was to declare Catalonia a Republic within a federal Spain, a 
move that was then retracted just a few days later following negotiations with the 
Republicans in Madrid. Though that particular difference of opinion ended amicably 
enough, it foreshadowed things to come over the course of the Republic in the respect that 
the precise division of jurisdiction between Madrid and Barcelona was the subject of 
ongoing disagreements, and where Madrid’s power ended and the Generalitat’s began was 
in practice never precisely defined.2 Amongst other things, this uncertainty and rivalry had 
repercussions on the CNT and the UGT in the region due to both the central government 
and the Generalitat both making conflicting claims to the handling of labour conflicts in 
Catalonia, not to mention their own preferred labour federation. 
 
Aside from this grappling with Madrid, the ERC was faced with a further quandary 
following the establishment of the Republic, which was how to fulfil the expectations 
placed on it as a result of the very broad campaign message and the sweeping changes it 
promised to various sectors of Catalan society. As Rider points out, the ERC had two 
possible areas on which it could focus. It could either invest its efforts into creating the 
institutions of an autonomous Catalonia, or it could address the social issues to which it 
had alluded in the build-up to the elections. In the event it chose the former. This would 
have enormous repercussions with regard to its relationship with the CNT, in light of the 
overtures it had made to the anarcho-syndicalist movement. At the same time, however, 
progress was made, albeit slowly, in creating the institutions of autonomy, and each step of 
the way the ERC’s popularity was reaffirmed. Macià created a provisional government, 
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formed from elements of the majority of the Republican and socialist parties in Catalonia.3 
The process to create more permanent autonomous institutions then began. Within 
Catalonia, the process ran relatively quickly. However, the process then became severely 
bogged down when the Cortes in Madrid got its hands on the draft statute. A diluted 
version of the statute was approved there in September 1932.4 The first and only regional 
election of the Second Republic was then held in November 1932, at which the ERC won 
an impressive absolute majority of sixty-one out of eighty-five seats.5  
 
The timing and results of elections in Catalonia, in which a left-Republican party 
dominated all the way up until October 1934, thus created a key difference between the 
regional political sphere of Catalonia and the national level of politics. In Catalonia, going 
by the regional election at least, there was no rise of the right. Power was held throughout 
by parties with fundamentally Republican ideals, a fact that would place the regional 
government on a collision course with the state in October 1934. However, this broader 
success in the march towards autonomous institutions – or at the very least the continued 
popularity of the ERC in spite of the obstacles encountered along the way – could not 
change the fact that the ERC had neither a specific plan nor the administrative mechanisms 
at its disposal to make the sort of social and labour reforms that would have matched the 
expectations of the CNT, whose membership base and leadership had been so closely 
courted by the ERC in early 1931.6 
 
Initially the ERC leaders were happy to make concessions to the CNT. Its crackdown on 
the Sindicatos Libres and its agreement with the CNT transport union in June to create a 
CNT closed shop at the Barcelona port, which will be discussed in the next chapter, are 
two key examples of this.7 However, relations between the CNT and the ERC had become 
fairly acrimonious by the end of 1931. One of the key reasons for this was the flurry of 
CNT strikes that swept the region during the first year of the Republic and the ERC’s 
response to them from its new position of power. Whilst during the monarchy the CNT’s 
actions were viewed by the ERC as being a just response to a corrupt regime, the ERC was 
now itself the regime. In this new role, the party sought first and foremost to maintain 
order.8 At the same time, civil governors of Barcelona, in particular José Oriol Anguera de 
Sojo, were more than willing to deploy the forces of order against CNT pickets.9 In so 
doing, the ERC and the Generalitat, in the eyes of the CNT, had turned their back on the 
working classes and the CNT, choosing to defend its institutions once it had power rather 
than come good on the promises it had made to the working classes. As was the case with 
the relationship between the CNT and the Republican-socialist government on the national 
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stage, once a precedent of confrontation between the CNT and the Generalitat and the ERC 
was established, there was no turning back.10 By August L’Opinió, the ERC’s main 
mouthpiece, had begun to attack the CNT’s propensity for strikes, and would only become 
more critical as the months passed.11 At the same time the CNT through Solidaridad 
Obrera attacked the Generalitat, the civil governors and the ERC with ever more severity. 
 
The CNT in Catalonia 
 
Catalonia was unquestionably the CNT’s heartland, though this is not something that can 
be understood simply by looking at the raw membership figures of the Confederation 
alone. As anarchists and syndicalists frequently asserted both during the 1930s and in the 
long years of exile afterwards, the CNT considered itself, and was considered by many 
workers in Catalonia themselves, to have gone beyond the confines of simply being a 
labour union. 
 
A significant factor in forging the CNT’s popularity in Catalonia was the role of the 
organization in defending working-class interests in the critical periods of the industrial 
expansion brought about by World War One and the post-boom stagnation. As Angel 
Smith argues, the organization’s steady growth in popularity, starting from approximately 
1916, and culminating in a huge surge in members in 1919, was grounded firmly in its 
ability to organize workers and defend their interests in the context of an escalating cost of 
living and in the face of deeply intransigent employers.12 Under the leadership of Ángel 
Pestaña and Salvador Seguí, CNT unions in this period staged some highly disciplined, 
arduous strikes which gained the widespread backing of the region’s urban workers, 
scoring some notable victories in the process. Above all, the La Canadiense conflict of 
1919 cemented the CNT’s reputation as the defenders of the working classes. Starting as a 
dispute centred around the dismissal of a handful of employees at the La Canadiense 
electric company, there would be a steady escalation over the following month to the point 
where nearly three-quarters of Barcelona’s industry was brought to a standstill. The 
conflict represented both the greatest show of union mobilization and working-class 
solidarity Spain had seen, and also ushered in an era of unprecedented repression and 
reprisals by the authorities. The conflict was both the moment when the CNT would come 
to be viewed as representing the industrial working classes of Barcelona and also when the 
notion that governments and employers would stop at nothing to destroy the CNT would 
truly emerge.13  
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Chris Ealham and Nick Rider have made the crucial contribution to our understanding of 
the labour movement in Barcelona of illustrating and explaining the depth of the CNT’s 
ties with the working classes through its integration into the cultural and social networks of 
working-class Barcelona, and, just as importantly, its willingness to address concerns – 
prior to the faísta dominance of the organization, at least – that arose outside of the 
workplace but were crucial to everyday working-class life. Rider demonstrates, for 
example, that the CNT became involved in particular with supporting rent strikes in 
Barcelona and campaigning against the conditions of housing provided by slum 
landlords.14 Similarly, Ealham highlights the importance of the CNT’s efforts to mobilize 
the unemployed and initiatives such as the creation by the Barcelona construction union of 
a Commission for Economic Defence to campaign for the working classes’ concerns over 
costs of living.15 These initiatives were carried out through committees that were based in 
the hearts of working class districts, and were thus a focal point within them rather than an 
abstract bureaucratic entity.16 Such practices took the CNT beyond being simply a vehicle 
for negotiating bases de trabajo and placed it at the centre of workers’ everyday concerns.  
 
Ealham also illustrates that such integration into the everyday life of working-class 
Barcelona allowed the CNT to be kept alive during the Primo de Rivera dictatorship, 
through its militants meeting in such institutions as the social and cultural clubs known as 
ateneus. This allowed the CNT’s militants to re-found its unions quickly, and the rapidity 
of the remobilization is a reflection of the commitment of the movement’s militants and the 
extent to which they were integrated with the Barcelona working classes.17 
 
Whilst recognizing the unique manner in which the CNT was embedded into the social 
structures of working-class Barcelona and other industrial towns in the province, however, 
it is also important to recognize that its periods of membership growth and decline were 
very rapid. This can be attributed to the phenomenon of what might be termed more 
‘passive’ workers flocking to the CNT as it came out into the open. The Republic brought 
with it in Catalonia highly significant proportions of workers – sometimes over half of the 
workers in some unskilled industries – joining the sindicatos únicos. Regardless of what 
claims the Catalan UGT might have made about workers being coerced into joining the 
CNT, which will be discussed in this part of the thesis, such a mobilization simply could 
not have been propelled primarily through intimidation. Crucially, however, joining the 
CNT as it was preparing to redress grievances from the 1920s was one thing, but staying 
with the organization into the darker years of 1933 and 1934 was another matter. As Anna 
Monjo highlights, there was a fundamentally different level of involvement of ordinary 
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workers – those whose commitment to the organization did not extend beyond acquiring a 
membership card, or in some cases attempting to organize a CNT section in their 
workplace – in the anarcho-syndicalist movement in Catalonia compared to that of the 
organization’s committed militants.18 And as Eulàlia Vega argues, these ordinary workers 
often did not live up to the expectations of the organizing militants in terms of their 
commitment to the organization.19 The decline in membership levels over these years 
certainly reflected – in addition to the repression suffered by the movement – that a 
significant proportion of workers were happy to back the CNT when it was on the 
ascendant, but less interested in the movement in more difficult times.     
 
A final factor in considering the extent of the links between the CNT and the Catalan 
working classes is the role played by the propaganda output of the CNT press and the 
organization’s militants. The CNT’s propaganda was more than equal to the task of 
creating its own mythology for the movement; as Casanova argues convincingly, rhetoric 
became an increasingly central prop to the CNT’s attempts to mobilize workers during the 
Republic.20 One of the most crucial facets of this, outlined in chapter three of this thesis, 
was the linkage made by the CNT through its press between itself and the working classes; 
Solidaridad Obrera, the paper of the Catalan CNT, was at the very forefront of making this 
argument that the CNT was the organizational embodiment of the working classes. As such 
it is difficult to know precisely where the genuine popularity of the movement stopped and 
the self-mythologizing began. 
 
The bulk of the CNT’s membership base in Catalonia was drawn from the unskilled sectors 
of Barcelona – with semi-skilled and skilled blue-collar and also lower-level service sector 
jobs also occupying an important secondary position – and also the working-class 
populations of the industrial towns of Barcelona province. In the period prior to the onset 
of decline, the largest unions in Barcelona were the construction union, with 24000 
members in June 1931; the textile union, with 30000; the metal workers’ union, with 
30000; and the transport union, with 18000 members. Even as the CNT in Catalonia had 
shed a third of its membership by early 1933, these sectors continued to be the biggest 
unions, with each continuing to have at least 10000 members even in late 1933. Certain 
non-industrial sectors also had a large proportion of workers affiliated to the CNT for a 
time. For example, at one point there were 7000 shop workers, though this figure had 
plummeted to just 1000 by March 1933. Likewise, there were 8000 Barcelona-based 
graphic arts workers in the organization in 1932.21 Outside of Barcelona, the key industrial 
towns of the province, such as Terrassa, Badalona, Sabadell and Manresa, had similarly 
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large proportions of the local workforce belonging to the CNT, with the unskilled sectors 
likewise dominating their membership figures. Many smaller towns in the province also 
had membership figures in the thousands, though it is more difficult to break down these 
figures into individual industries.22 Outside of Barcelona province, the CNT’s presence 
was much less strong. 
 
The broad outlines of the CNT’s changes in membership levels in Catalonia have been 
touched upon in chapter one. Indeed, as discussed, the rapid rise and subsequent decline in 
membership levels were most pronounced of all in Catalonia. The overall membership of 
the CNT in Catalonia had a peak of 291150 in June 1931; by March 1933 it was 202354, a 
figure that does not take into account the further substantial losses inflicted through the 
formal departure of the treintistas.23 In absolute terms the greatest losses were suffered by 
the largest unions in Barcelona; the construction union had fallen to 10000 members by 
March 1933, while the textiles union had dropped to 20000 members. The BOC’s unions 
also began to make in-roads into several industries, to the irritation of the CNT, most 
notably shop workers and power workers, as well as expanding in Gerona and Lleida 
following the expulsion from the CNT of unions led by bloquistas.24 In proportional terms, 
these declines were matched and sometimes surpassed in smaller unions and in industrial 
towns outside of Barcelona. The membership of the CNT in Badalona, for example, fell 
from a peak of 13888 in June 1931 to 2860 in March 1933.25   
 
The UGT in Catalonia 
 
Judging the fortunes of the Catalan UGT is a more difficult task than examining the CNT 
in the region, due to a combination of the movement leaving much less in the way of 
documentation behind and the lack of research that has been carried out into the socialist 
labour federation in Catalonia. Whilst it cannot be denied that the Catalan UGT was on the 
fringes of the labour movement in Catalonia for much of the Republic, it would be to the 
detriment of the historiography of the period to ignore the movement for a whole host of 
reasons. For one thing, doing so impedes the ability to understand the growth of the UGT 
in Catalonia during the Civil War. It also means that a sector of the Catalan workers’ 
movement whose affiliation was in the tens of thousands, and moreover whose numbers 
grew throughout the period, as will be examined in this part of the thesis, is missing from 
analysis of the subject area. 
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In the absence of analysis of the Catalan UGT, the CNT’s own perspective on the socialist 
labour federation in the region seems to have been adopted by some historians.26 As will be 
examined in more detail in the next three chapters, this perspective was essentially that the 
UGT represented a rump of the reactionary elements of the urban workforce in Catalonia, 
and in the Second Republic was a haven for the pistoleros and yellow workers of the 
Sindicatos Libres. An evolution of this view with regard to the Civil War, endorsed by 
some historians such as Stanley Payne, was that the Catalan UGT became a refuge for the 
petite bourgeoisie of the region as they sought protection from the CNT’s social 
revolution.27 Research produced by David Ballester and Pere Gabriel has demonstrated that 
individual aspects of the CNT’s attacks on the UGT are inaccurate. Gabriel’s research into 
the Catalan UGT demonstrates that it was substantially larger than is often acknowledged28 
– the CNT repeatedly claimed that the UGT in Catalonia was miniscule – while David 
Ballester’s work reveals, among other things, that the Catalan UGT was not simply a 
continuation of the Sindicatos Libres.29 However, neither Gabriel nor Ballester in their 
writings seek specifically to address the CNT’s own interpretation of the Catalan UGT. 
The following chapters of the thesis will demonstrate that to a very significant extent the 
CNT’s portrayal of the Catalan UGT as an entity that acted as an agent and a vessel for the 
forces of reaction and that was instinctively rejected by workers does not stand up to 
scrutiny, and that as such the general position that the Catalan UGT occupies in the 
historiography is in need of reassessment.  
 
In Barcelona, the organization was formed of a combination of unions that catered to a 
specific skill-set, as well as some unions, considerably smaller than those of the CNT, 
which catered to the unskilled sectors that formed such a large proportion of the Barcelona 
workforce. The details of unions from Catalonia that entered the UGT provide some 
indication of this trend. Of the fifty-four UGT unions based in Barcelona whose entries to 
the socialist labour federation were recorded by the Executive Commission between April 
1931 and October 1934, a significant proportion catered to one relatively specific trade.30 
Often these sorts of UGT unions in Barcelona represented the more skilled occupations 
within such fields, such as masons in the construction industry or electricians, though it 
would be an error to view the UGT’s unions in Barcelona as simply representing that of a 
labour aristocracy who wanted to separate from their counterparts. There were also UGT 
unions which, whilst catering to a specific occupation, did not cater to an especially skilled 
one. This was the case with the various unions that comprised the organizations of the port 
federation, which were split according to the goods that the workers handled in the loading 
and unloading process.31  
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However, the UGT unions of Barcelona and Catalonia were certainly not only comprised 
of entities that represented individual occupations, whether of a skilled nature or otherwise. 
A large proportion of the UGT’s unions in Barcelona were either broad and industrial-
based, such as its metal and textile unions, or covered a limited set of occupations in which 
there was a significant number of workers, such as barbers and bakers. Indeed, the UGT 
tended to have established unions in Barcelona in these areas prior to the Republic. 
However, these unions, especially the ones that catered for the most unskilled sector of the 
workforce, such as in the construction and textile industries, were generally much smaller 
than their CNT counterparts in 1931. For example, while the UGT’s bricklayers’ union had 
only a few thousand members, the CNT’s construction union had a peak of 24000. UGT 
unions tend to have been numerically stronger in the service sector, catering to semi-skilled 
and unskilled workers as much as the skilled. For example, although the UGT’s bakery 
union was, with approximately 200 members, smaller than the CNT’s own, it was 
nevertheless a stable union, representing a field of workers which, though not as unskilled 
and beset by unemployment as construction workers, did suffer low pay and fairly torrid 
working conditions. The UGT in Barcelona also had unions for waiters and grocery store 
workers, occupations which were similarly outside the immediate orbit of unskilled 
industrial labour but certainly important sectors of the Catalan workforce.32  
 
The final category of employment that the UGT had in Barcelona and Catalonia was that 
of clerical and administrative workers, a group that had traditionally remained outside of 
the labour federations until the Second Republic. In fact, during the Republic, especially 
from 1933 onwards, non-professional white-collar workers were one of the most 
significant groups of new entrants to the UGT in Catalonia. The entry of the Barcelona 
bank workers’ union into the UGT in early 1934 brought with it nearly 3000 new members 
to the organization, the largest single union entry into the organization from Barcelona 
prior to October 1934. Pharmacy workers and local government employees also provided 
significant influxes of members to the Catalan UGT from 1933 onwards. This white-collar 
sector was one in which the CNT in Catalonia had not managed to achieve a significant 
foothold, and this would continue to be the case throughout the Republic.33   
 
Overall, although the UGT was small relative to the CNT in Barcelona during the first 
years of the Republic, it nevertheless had an organizational presence in the majority of 
industries and skill levels in the city. Admittedly much of its membership was either 
organized in niche professions or sectors in which the CNT had little influence, such as 
amongst office workers; but it also had unions, albeit generally small ones, in the industries 
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dominated by the CNT’s sindicatos únicos. Had it not done so, and had it been comprised 
of unions of skilled, niche professions, there would have been far less scope for 
antagonism between the CNT and the UGT in the city. 
 
The overall trajectory of the Catalan UGT between 1931 and 1934 is a curious one of weak 
and split leadership that was accompanied, against all odds, by a modest growth. The 
movement in Catalonia had been dogged by splits at leadership level since before the 
Republic. One of the key dividing lines was the question of allegiance to the PSOE. On the 
one hand there were arch-PSOE loyalists, and on the other there were those who sided with 
the Unió Socialista de Catalunya, whose most fundamental difference with the PSOE was 
its pro-regionalist stance. The USC was a larger party than the tiny Catalan PSOE; in spite 
of efforts made within Catalonia to reconcile the two, the socialist leadership in Madrid put 
a halt to any rapprochement, leading in July 1934 to the UGT unions that were loyal to the 
USC, totalling approximately 20000 members, breaking from the UGT to form the Unió 
General de Sindicats Obrers de Catalunya (UGSOC).34 The pro-USC unions constituted a 
significant proportion of the Catalan UGT, including the entire Barcelona Local 
Federation; as such the split left the UGT itself significantly reduced in size. Reconciliation 
would come about in April 1936.35  
 
Given the infighting that took place amongst those involved at the top of the UGT in 
Catalonia, it is surprising that the organization actually grew during the Republic. The 
socialist labour federation had just under 17000 members in Catalonia in October 1931, but 
by April 1934 it had nearly 45000.36 Whilst this still did not make the Catalan UGT as big 
as the CNT in the region, it must be placed in the context of the Catalan CNT losing a third 
of its membership during the same period. Whilst the CNT in Catalonia experienced an 
initial explosion in membership followed by a longer-term decline, the Catalan UGT by 
and large grew at a steady rate. There are no reliable figures for the CNT’s membership in 
1934, but given that it was down to 200000 in March 1933, it is not unreasonable to 
assume that its membership levels were even lower by the spring of 1934. The disparity in 
membership between the CNT and the UGT in Catalonia in this period therefore shrank 
considerably.         
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Chapter Five: CNT Direct Action and the Marginalization of the Catalan UGT  
 
It should by this point be clear that between the beginning of the Republic and October 
1934, the basic position expressed publicly by the CNT regarding the UGT was one of 
outright opposition phrased in terms of accusations of treachery, plans to destroy the CNT 
and attempts to manipulate the working classes at the behest of the bourgeoisie. The 
Catalan CNT’s stance on its socialist rival in the region was not merely a straightforward 
re-articulation of the national-level stance adopted towards the UGT. The cenetistas of 
Catalonia adopted a uniquely hostile position over the Catalan UGT. This opposition to the 
UGT did not only manifest itself in the form of vitriolic propaganda attacks on the UGT, 
but also took the form of physical measures that were carried out to prevent the 
establishment of UGT unions in the region.  
  
An examination of this campaign against the UGT is the principal focus of the following 
two chapters. This chapter will examine what might be termed the ‘practical’ side of the 
CNT’s attempts to marginalize the UGT in Catalonia, in the form of highlighting the 
combinations of threats, boycotts and other forms of mobilization against the Catalan UGT 
that were attempted by the CNT. The subsequent chapter will then examine the discursive 
construction of the Catalan UGT that underpinned the CNT’s attempts to marginalize the 
socialist labour federation in the region, as well as examine how far this construction 
reflected both the reality of the Catalan UGT and also to what extent it represented a 
satisfactory explanation of why CNT and UGT entities in the region came to blows.   
 
The practical dimensions of the marginalization of the Catalan UGT 
 
The newspapers of the Catalan UGT during the first years of the Republic, as Nick Rider 
points out, dedicated an extremely large proportion of their column inches to criticizing the 
activities of the CNT in the region.1 The majority of this criticism, anchored firmly in the 
notions of violent ‘anarchists’ and ‘syndicalists’ that were discussed in chapter three, 
centred on accusations of the Catalan CNT systematically trying to exclude and 
marginalize the Catalan UGT and other unions from operating in Catalonia. The Catalan 
UGT’s papers repeatedly cried foul over instances of CNT unions and activists organizing 
boycotts against UGT unions, of collusion with employers to effect the removal of 
ugetistas from workplaces and of outright, unprovoked threats of violence against UGT 
activists and ordinary workers. The first issue of La Internacional, the Catalan UGT 
newspaper launched in June 1931, coincided with a violent altercation between cenetistas 
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and ugetistas at the Alena wood panel factory; the paper’s extensive and indignant 
coverage of the event set out its central message on the CNT from its very first issue. The 
incident was presented as part of a widespread trend of workers ‘being coerced and 
attacked by those from the CNT, who wish to impose their will through any means on 
Catalan workers’.2 CNT-UGT hostilities in Catalonia were for the Catalan UGT 
fundamentally a question of freedom of workers to choose their union affiliations. The 
struggles between the CNT and the UGT at the Barcelona port, for example, which was the 
most high-profile battleground between the labour federations in the region, ‘boils down to 
an attack against freedom of union affiliation through the violent coercion of the CNT and 
the defence of it by the UGT’.3  
 
Not all incidents reported in the Catalan UGT’s newspapers were the clear-cut cases of 
anti-UGT violence that they were reported to be. The example of the Alena factory, as will 
be seen in chapter six, was one such case of the Catalan UGT accusing the CNT of violent 
intimidation when in reality the event was far more complex. Nevertheless, although the 
press of the Catalan UGT presented virtually all CNT activity in the region as being 
directed at imposing itself on workers, there were unquestionably numerous cases of CNT 
militants and organisms in Catalonia attempting to use force, intimidation and rhetoric to 
try and neutralize their UGT rivals. To provide just one general example here, before going 
on to examine the specific ways in which CNT organisms attempted to sideline grassroots 
UGT rivals, the ugetistas of Mataró were subject to various forms of intimidation 
throughout the Republic. In addition to regular articles published in La Internacional on 
the subject,4 the UGT’s local gas, water and electricity union sent a telegram to the Civil 
Governor in August 1932 to complain about ‘outrages committed by extremist elements in 
public meetings and against our comrades’.5 This message followed on from similar 
complaints made by the leaders of the local UGT to the Executive Commission in May 
1932 following attempts made by the CNT in the textile industry, which included a strike, 
to force workers to leave the UGT and join the CNT.6  
 
The most basic level of anarcho-syndicalist militants resorting to intimidation in Catalonia 
during the Republic appears to have simply taken the form of workers, most likely whilst 
at their workplace, being told to join the CNT, with this instruction being accompanied by 
some form of threat of consequences in the event of non-compliance. José Peirats, who 
was one of the CNT’s most committed servants in the post-Civil War decades of exile, 
recounts how his recruitment into the CNT in 1922 as a fourteen year-old came about 
through him being summoned to the offices of the construction union, where he was 
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questioned about why he had not yet joined the union and warned that if he did not do so 
he would have to ‘abide by the consequences’.7 Given the highly informal nature of this 
practice, it is almost impossible to gauge how widespread it was. Undoubtedly the general 
accusation made in the pages of La Internacional and Cataluña Obrera, the two official 
papers of the Catalan UGT, of CNT intimidation of workers was based on just such a 
practice. In itself, this type of activity was not so much directed at UGT members as it was 
at all workers who were not in the CNT and happened to be working in a sector or 
workplace in which cenetistas saw fit to adopt this tactic. Nevertheless, it inevitably had an 
impact on the ability of individuals to join or remain in the UGT, and also served the 
purpose of preventing the spread of rivals such as the UGT as much as it did on gathering 
unaffiliated workers into the CNT. This is illustrated by the plight of the treasurer of the 
UGT’s national textile federation, which was based in Barcelona, who wrote to the 
Executive Commission to plead that he be allowed to remain as a member of the UGT in 
spite of the fact that ‘due to anarchist coercions he has had to accept the membership card 
of the Confederation, without which he would have been prevented from working’.8  
 
However, whilst there was an unquantifiable level of workers being informally pressured 
to join the CNT, there were times when the amount of workers involved was sufficiently 
large and the actions of the cenetistas involved were sufficiently aggressive for the 
incidents to come to public attention. Such cases tended to come about not from CNT 
militants attempting to induct unaffiliated workers, but from when they attempted to force 
them out of the UGT and into the CNT. Such a case occurred at a textile factory in 
Manlleu, where a UGT union had existed since before the founding of the Republic. In 
June 1931, cenetistas in the town made threats against workers in one factory there to warn 
them off from the UGT. A public meeting was held by the CNT in the town, during the 
course of which one of the speakers, according to the socialist press, asserted that the UGT 
needed to be removed from the town. The next day, two cenetistas who had come to the 
town from Barcelona entered a local factory in which the workers, who totalled 
approximately seventy, were members of the UGT’s local textiles union, and ordered the 
workers there to leave the UGT and join the CNT. When the workers did not comply, the 
cenetistas left the workplace, only to return later the same day, this time threatening to 
burn down the factory, and then returning a third time, when, after failing to stop work 
there, they gave the employees fifteen days to leave the UGT and join the CNT.9 The 
socialist press made much of the incident, with El Socialista referring to it on three 
separate occasions in the course of publishing editorials that focused on CNT violence.10  
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The case of Manlleu was one of many in which the UGT, rather than unaffiliated workers 
in general, were targeted by the CNT within a particular workplace, locality or industry. 
Whilst in some cases, such as Manlleu, the attempts involved the simple use of threats, in 
others the CNT organized boycotts and strikes to force out the UGT presence in a 
particular sector. Undoubtedly the most high-profile examples of this occurred at the 
Barcelona port during 1931. Here on the 28th May 1931, the CNT’s transport union held an 
assembly, at which the port sections agreed that they would from then on refuse to work 
with individuals who were not in the CNT.11 The Catalan government quickly stepped in, 
bringing about a temporary resolution to the matter that enraged the ugetistas. Francesc 
Macià declared on 9th June that only CNT members would be allowed to work in the 
loading and unloading of goods at the port.12 Through La Internacional the UGT presented 
this development as proof of Generalitat favouritism towards the CNT, motivated in part 
by a desire to win votes from CNT members and in part by a fear of the consequences of 
not acquiescing to the CNT.13 The UGT port federation was therefore temporarily 
sidelined, with its members joining the CNT’s transport union so that they could continue 
working. Therefore partly with the help of the new Catalan government, the CNT was able 
– temporarily at least, as will be examined in chapter seven – to force the removal of the 
UGT from the Barcelona port. 
 
However, this was not the last instance of the CNT resorting to such methods to remove 
the UGT at the port. The initial monopoly granted to the CNT transport union at the docks 
was soon broken after it held a strike at the port almost immediately afterwards.14 The 
UGT’s port federation, perhaps unsurprisingly given the CNT boycott against it the 
previous month, provided workers to replace the strikers,15 and it is likely that those UGT 
members who had joined the CNT in June to continue working then returned to the UGT. 
Following the conclusion of the CNT strike at the end of July, an uneasy truce prevailed at 
the port in the following months. The animosities over the port between the CNT and the 
UGT, which now had a worker presence at the port once more, though admittedly a 
reduced one, were articulated through the newspapers of the two organizations, as they had 
been since May, with Desiderio Trilles, the leader of the UGT port federation, accusing the 
CNT of routinely threatening and intimidating UGT members and non-affiliated workers 
through the pages of La Internacional.16 But in October 1931 these hostilities gained a 
practical dimension once more, when the members of the port section of the CNT transport 
union voted in favour of refusing to work with non-CNT workers. There can be no doubt 
that this decision was more motivated by seeking to remove the UGT than it was by 
making unaffiliated workers join the CNT.17  
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This time, however, there would be no endorsement of this position from the Generalitat; 
much of the goodwill between it and the anarcho-syndicalists had been destroyed by the 
CNT’s July strike. Instead, what was effectively a form of strike broke out. Cenetistas who 
worked on board ships refused to hand over wood to ugetista dockers; similar cases of 
refusal to engage in work that involved contact with UGT members occurred in other 
sectors. The strike had a significant impact on the Barcelona economy, with industrial 
concerns in the region running out of primary materials. In spite of the disruption it caused, 
however, through a combination of the regional authorities taking a highly intransigent 
stance against the boycott and the UGT somewhat unsurprisingly willing to provide 
members to replace CNT workers in a strike that was directed against itself, the boycott 
effort effectively collapsed by the end of October. Nevertheless, the CNT’s transport union 
had been willing to carry out a month-long strike to the principal objective of excluding the 
UGT from the port.18  
 
The events at the port over 1931 were the most large-scale example of what was repeated 
on the smaller level of workplaces in Barcelona during the first years of the Republic. For 
example, in September 1932, the CNT textiles union carried out a strike against the Casa 
Sans, in protest at ‘the frequent provocations of the few workers affiliated to the Unión 
General de Trabajadores’ who had allegedly been hired as the product of collusion 
between socialists, the employer and the authorities.19 As will be discussed in more detail 
in the next chapter, Solidaridad Obrera played a crucial role in mobilizing workers behind 
such conflicts through going to lengthy efforts to demonize the UGT workers involved. 
The cenetistas from Sants who conducted the campaign asserted that ‘the workers want, as 
is natural and normal, the dismissal of these shameful individuals [the UGT workers] who, 
unconsciously or through bad faith, are playing into the bourgeoisie’s hands and bring 
disquiet to all of the textile industry’.20 It is difficult to find specific examples of the UGT 
members’ bad conduct being referred to by the cenetistas. The account of the strike given 
in La Vanguardia paints a different picture, according to which a proportion of the 
factory’s two hundred workers did not wish to support the strike, and consequently the 
police were dispatched to protect the workers through the picket line, something that 
further angered cenetistas.21 In some workplaces, therefore, the CNT militants regarded a 
UGT presence as sufficiently grave as to warrant initiating a strike to force their exclusion.   
 
Attacks on UGT organisms were not just restricted to the workplace. On various occasions 
between April 1931 and October 1934, CNT militants adopted the tactic of disrupting UGT 
meetings. In towns outside of Barcelona, the tactic could be used to try and halt the 
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presence of the UGT altogether, owing to the smaller size of the locality. For example, in 
Terrassa on 5th August 1932, the UGT attempted to hold a propaganda meeting in the 
town, with Desiderio Trilles, the leader of the UGT unions at the Barcelona port and a 
deeply unpopular figure amongst cenetistas, as one of the main speakers. According to the 
account given by local cenetistas in Solidaridad Obrera, there was an impressive turnout 
of workers at the event, who were there solely to heckle the speakers. Some individuals in 
the crowd started throwing chairs and stones at the orators, with one being struck on the 
head by a stone. After an hour, the police arrived, which according to the CNT account 
was indicative of ‘the official support that the socialenchufistas receive’.22 Five cenetistas 
were arrested.23 This response to the UGT propaganda meeting reflected the general modus 
operandi of the faísta elements of the CNT in Terrassa, who also attended meetings of 
treintistas in the town to shout down the orators.24 
 
In Barcelona the tactic of disrupting meetings tended to be carried out at the union level to 
try and prevent the spread of the UGT within a particular sector. In April 1934, for 
example, cenetista bus employees attempted to disrupt a meeting at the Casa del Pueblo of 
their UGT counterparts. Their intention in doing this was to ‘unmask the Judas of the 
buses’ that was the UGT.  In writing about the incident, one of the cenetista participants 
explained that the CNT in carrying out such actions ‘defends like a man what that 
miserable [organization] stamps on and sells to the company like a coward: the dignity of 
the worker’. The departing cenetistas were met by members of the Guardia de Asalto, 
whom the ugetistas had called to report the disturbance; this aspect of the incident was 
used to create the headline: ‘In the UGT they incite the arrest of workers’.25  
 
Above all, however, the main thrust of efforts to marginalize the UGT in Catalonia was 
carried out by mobilizing workers against the socialist labour federation through the CNT 
press, orators at public meetings and other forms of propaganda. As will be discussed 
further in the next chapter, the examples of attacks on UGT entities outlined above were 
not limited to physical acts of disruption. Inevitably, they were underpinned by an anti-
UGT rationale that was put forward by cenetistas to explain their attacks on the UGT. In 
some cases, in particular ongoing boycotts against UGT workers, this recourse to 
aggressively asserted anti-UGT arguments was an integral part of sustaining the practical 
dimension of the attacks on the UGT by ensuring workers stayed motivated to support the 
actions. However, attacking UGT organisms through the press was in itself a regularly 
used method by cenetistas in their efforts to mobilize workers in their area of activity 
against their UGT rivals.  
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Throughout the first four years of the Republic, this use of Solidaridad Obrera and other 
CNT and anarchist and/or syndicalist papers by grassroots cenetistas was the most publicly 
visible aspect of the CNT’s attacks on the Catalan UGT, and was highly widespread. 
Solidaridad Obrera’s union and local notices sections, which were generally comprised of 
messages by members of union juntas or local federations, very frequently contained 
instances of attacks on a UGT rival. Militants from outside of Barcelona were apt to use 
Solidaridad Obrera to turn workers against UGT presences in their locality. For example, 
in February 1933, the cenetistas of Caldes de Montbui published an article in Solidaridad 
Obrera recounting an altercation at a local foundry between a foreman named Ignacio 
Martínez and the CNT-affiliated workers at the factory. Martínez had, according to the 
contributor, ‘wielded a pistol, cockily threatening some workers’. The report focused on 
the wider threat that the UGT posed to the workers of Caldes de Montbui, based on the 
premise that it housed individuals such as Martínez:  
 
We know what individuals of Ignacio Martínez’s kind propose to do in this town. We 
know that they want to impose the UGT (General Traitors’ Union) with the collaboration 
and help of the socialist ministers. Here, people of Caldes, is who those of the UGT are.26  
 
CNT unions in Barcelona were equally prepared to use Solidaridad Obrera to mobilize 
workers against their UGT rivals. In the most important sectors of the Barcelona 
workforce, such as the port and the construction industry, these campaigns occupied much 
of the front pages and headlines of the paper, thus elevating them to the level of an attack 
on all UGT entities in the region. Such attacks will be explored in more detail later in the 
next chapter. However, union juntas in Barcelona also used the press to mobilize their 
members against the UGT in their sector of activity in a bid to stop the socialist labour 
federation gaining a foothold there. The public anti-UGT stance taken by the CNT’s wood 
workers’ union at the start of the Republic is an example of the zero-tolerance stance taken 
to the possible enrolment of workers in the industry in the UGT that was put forward 
through Solidaridad Obrera. In early June 1931 the union placed an article in the paper in 
which it warned its members to remain vigilant against the possibility of attempts to recruit 
UGT members in their workplaces. A specific workshop in the wood working industry was 
then given as an example of the threat the UGT posed, in which the CNT workers 
boycotted their single UGT colleague to force his removal. The following description was 
given of the individual in question, having named the workplace being discussed: 
 
In [the workshop] there are eight workers, all of whom belong to the wood workers’ 
union. Only one of them refuses to accept the card. This individual is an agent 
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provocateur of the UGT. He works like a condemned man, out of step from the normal 
and human rhythm of the other comrades in the workshop. Furthermore he coarsely 
insults our organization and makes rude remarks of the most repugnant vulgarity.27 
 
According to the article, the workshop owner, having taken on board the opposition of the 
other workers to this individual, proceeded to dismiss him. However, the ugetista, 
‘emboldened and supported’ by the UGT, returned to the workshop, in possession of some 
form of stamped certificate that apparently required him to be rehired. The seven cenetistas 
abandoned work in protest. The UGT worker then returned to the workshop once more, 
according to the cenetistas’ report, accompanied by policemen, to order the owner to rehire 
the worker and instruct him to, ‘if necessary, ask the reformist and yellow UGT for new 
personnel’. Wood workers were warned to be vigilant against similar ‘socialist 
machinations’.28 
 
The version of events put forwards by the CNT junta reveals how some cenetistas wished 
ugetistas who worked in their industry to be treated and perceived by CNT members. The 
account of the incident, based as it was on the unrealistic claim that individual UGT 
workers had almost limitless access to the support of the authorities, was designed to 
present the idea that UGT workers were inevitably a source of trouble and needed to be 
forced out by their CNT colleagues. The worker was depicted as a traitor of the highest 
order, and the central implication of the article was that other UGT members in their 
workplaces were the same. The leaders of the CNT wood workers’ union – and their 
attitude was mirrored by other union leaders as well – therefore adopted a tactic of trying 
to force out individual UGT workers by mobilizing ordinary CNT members against them 
through the CNT press. 
 
Therefore during the first four years of the Republic, many CNT militants in Barcelona and 
elsewhere in Catalonia took aggressive steps to neutralize UGT presences in their area of 
labour militancy. Whilst this was linked to the more widespread tendency amongst some 
cenetistas of seeking to pressurize non-affiliated workers into the Confederation, it is clear 
that, when faced with a UGT presence, many CNT militants would resort to methods that 
went far beyond these usual pressure tactics. Although it would be unwise to suggest that 
these methods were universally adopted by cenetistas in Catalonia against the UGT, it is 
clear that they were relatively widespread, and certainly do not appear to have been 
discouraged by anyone in the Catalan anarcho-syndicalist movement. As such, it would be 
worth exploring the extent to which these activities against the UGT represented a 
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deliberate policy that had been agreed upon through the CNT’s decision-making 
mechanisms. 
 
The CNT decision-making process on the Catalan UGT 
 
The non-discussion of the UGT at national-level plenums as outlined in chapter one was 
just as notable in Catalonia. Here, across the regional plenums held between 1931 and 
1934, the issue of the UGT was also virtually absent from discussions in terms of the UGT 
on the national level. Instead, aside from routine administrative issues, the key issues of 
debate related either to the factional battle that was progressively tearing the Catalan CNT 
apart, or appraisals of the CNT’s past and future protest actions and the debilitating effects 
of government repression of the organization. This latter category of debate did on 
occasion refer to the socialist movement and the role it was playing from government, but 
overall there was very little discussion of the activities of the UGT in Catalonia.29  
 
In general, a similar lack of formal discussion of the Catalan UGT and how the CNT 
should react to it – including discussion of methods to halt the growth of UGT organisms – 
was also a feature of discussions that took place at the meetings of the Barcelona Local 
Federation and of CNT unions in the city.30 The main features of discussion of the 
construction union’s junta meetings in 1933 related to attempting to mobilize and organize 
workers in the industry in the face of restrictions placed by the authorities on the union and 
an appreciable loss of interest among a significant proportion of unskilled workers in the 
industry. The UGT construction rival was mentioned tangentially as a result of workers at 
the hospital militar being enrolled in the socialist labour federation and thus participating 
in the jurados mixtos, but no discussion was made of how to respond to this, or indeed 
whether to respond at all.31 The decisions by the transport unions to boycott non-CNT 
workers in 1931 were a product of assemblies of the CNT transport union.32 The case of 
the port, however, seems to represent the only significant example of a union coherently 
formulating a strategy against the UGT in this fashion. Generally speaking, neither at the 
level of regional plenums nor at local federation level was a coherent strategy formulated 
on UGT unions. Thus the instances of attacks on UGT unions in Barcelona and elsewhere 
in Catalonia cannot be considered as being part of a pre-formulated campaign or some 
other official policy of attacking the UGT wherever they appeared in the region. 
 
However, though the Catalan UGT was rarely the subject of discussion at the regional and 
Barcelona-level decision-making processes, and accordingly no official stance nor strategy 
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was formulated on it, there can be no doubt that a sizeable majority of committed 
cenetistas shared precisely the same sentiment on the Catalan UGT, namely that it was the 
embodiment of reaction and an integral part of the efforts of the bourgeoisie and the 
government to destroy the CNT.33 One particular incident at the May 1932 regional 
plenum illustrates the unanimously felt nature of this sentiment amongst Catalan 
cenetistas.  At this plenum, the Catalan UGT was brought up in response to a manifesto 
published in El Obrero, a recently launched paper that was in fact an initiative of former 
members of the Sindicatos Libres who were trying to rebuild their shattered labour 
federation, and had no connections with the UGT. To unanimous applause, a delegate 
spoke in response to the manifesto, arguing that cenetistas in Catalonia were as under 
threat from pistoleros as they had been during the monarchy, and asserted that these 
pistoleros were now enrolled in the UGT following the dissolution of the Sindicatos 
Libres.34 
  
On the one hand, then, there seems to have been a unanimously-held perspective amongst 
local and regional CNT leaders that the UGT in Catalonia represented an irredeemably 
reactionary force and was at the forefront of the government’s alleged campaign to destroy 
the CNT. This interpretation was expressed as a deep antipathy towards the Catalan UGT. 
On the other hand, however, this shared sentiment was not converted at any point into a 
plan formulated at regional level, nor at city level in the case of Barcelona, on how to 
neutralize the Catalan UGT. Yet as has already been established in this chapter, CNT 
militants across the region frequently attempted to mobilize workers against their UGT 
counterpart and even individual UGT workers, as well as deploying physically 
confrontational measures against them. In the absence of an explicitly formulated plan to 
take on the Catalan UGT in this manner, it must be assumed that the decision to take such 
actions against UGT entities was principally a product of individual and localized 
initiatives. And because an anti-UGT mentality was so widespread amongst cenetistas, a 
large proportion of them adopted similar methods when dealing with a UGT presence in 
their sphere of activity. It would appear, then, that from the start of the Second Republic, 
adopting methods of intimidation against the Catalan UGT was automatically assumed by 
CNT militants at both grassroots levels and at the top of the regional hierarchy to be a 
valid, even established practice.   
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The effect of anti-UGT attacks on the Catalan UGT’s membership levels 
 
It is difficult to gauge how much success the CNT had in preventing the spread of the UGT 
in Catalonia. The growth or contraction of an organization such as the Catalan UGT is 
based on myriad factors, and was not simply determined by the existence of the CNT and 
its stance towards its socialist rival. Consequently, the changes in membership figures for 
the Catalan UGT cannot be interpreted as simply being a result of the success or failure of 
the CNT’s attacks on its rival. Nevertheless, an examination of the growth of the Catalan 
UGT between 1931 and 1934, and placing this examination into the context of the 
difficulties encountered by the CNT over the same period, does provide some clues to the 
extent to which the CNT was able to halt the socialist labour federation in the region.  
 
The pattern of growth and decline of the CNT in Catalonia is relatively well established, 
even if the precise figures are debatable as a result of poor record keeping and the overly 
optimistic figures kept by the organization.35 However, for the UGT the figures are far less 
clear, due to a mixture of it having been a much smaller entity, the relative lack of 
documentation on which to base the estimates and the lack of attention paid by historians 
to the Catalan UGT. Nevertheless, as mentioned in chapter four, Pere Gabriel highlights 
that the organization progressed from having 17000 members in October 1931 to 45000 in 
April 1934, nearly a tripling of its membership base. Although in absolute terms these 
numbers still made it smaller than the CNT, the fact that the Catalan UGT continued to 
grow while the CNT declined is worth investigating in more detail.36  
 
The method that has been adopted here is to base the figures for new members and unions 
to the UGT from Catalonia on the new entries received and approved by the Executive 
Commission of the UGT in Madrid during the period in question, which appear in the 
minutes of the Commission’s regular meetings. Admittedly, this is not a perfect measure of 
the Catalan UGT’s growth. It only allows growth to be measured according to the starting 
membership figures provided by a union at the moment of its entry; a substantial 
proportion of unions did not provide this figure at all. Any subsequent growth in these 
unions is therefore not recorded. By the same token, the growth of UGT unions in 
Catalonia that existed prior to the Republic is also not recorded. This is important to bear 
in mind, given that the UGT’s unions in many of the most important industries in 
Catalonia, such as construction and textiles, were created prior to the Republic. The figures 
used here therefore represent one indicator in the pace of growth of the Catalan UGT, 
rather than representing its overall changes in membership size. The following graphs 
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indicate the number of unions from Catalonia that joined the UGT each year between 1931 
and 1934, as well as the total number of members held by these unions when they joined 
the UGT: 
 
Figure 1: Total number of new unions to the UGT from Catalonia, 1931 to 1934
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Data source: Actas de la Comisión Ejecutiva de la Unión General de Trabajadores, 1931-
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Figure 2: Total number of new members to the UGT from new unions from Catalonia, 1931 
to 1934
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As can be seen, the years 1933 and 1934 saw a marked increase in new unions – and by 
extension new members – to the UGT from Catalonia relative to 1931 and 1932. Though 
the number of new unions entering the organization fell slightly between 1931 and 1934, 
the total number of members within these unions rose considerably and it must also be 
borne in mind that the figures for 1934 only go as far as the beginning of October 1934 
rather than for a full year.  
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Andy Durgan is one of the few writers to highlight the growth of the UGT in Catalonia 
during the Second Republic, especially with regard to the post-October 1934 period.37 
However, the Catalan UGT was experiencing discernible growth even before October 
1934, and what is apparent about the timing of these increases is that they coincide with 
what were the two most calamitous years for the CNT. From 1933 onwards the level of 
repression enacted upon the CNT in Catalonia was even greater than in the two preceding 
years, with many of its unions experiencing prolonged bouts of enforced closure, not to 
mention many of its organizing militants languishing in jail. By 1933 the CNT had also 
lost much of the membership base that it had picked up in 1930 and 1931. Just as 
importantly, 1933 was also the year in which the factional battle between faístas and 
treintistas became a formal schism, leading to the rupture of many CNT unions. The above 
figures for new entrants to the UGT from Catalonia suggest that the UGT in the region 
benefited from these setbacks suffered by the CNT. 
 
It would appear that the CNT’s difficulties allowed the UGT to have space to establish a 
small but increasing union presence. At the beginning of the Republic, the prospect of 
joining the UGT would have been an intimidating one for many workers who worked in an 
industry or workplace with a dominant CNT presence. The workers would have been in a 
minority that would have been seen to have rejected the CNT, an organization which, as 
outlined in chapter three, aggressively promoted itself as the only valid representative of 
the working classes in the region. At the same time, the workers would have put 
themselves at risk of being subjected to the practices that have been outlined in this 
chapter. Even if they were not threatened with a boycott or directly intimidated in some 
other way, they would have been tarred with the CNT’s discourse on the Catalan UGT that 
emanated from the pages of Solidaridad Obrera and from the mouths of cenetistas at 
public meetings. For an ordinary worker who did not have any particular ideological 
preferences in this context, there would have been no benefits to joining the UGT, only 
stigma.  
 
However, the events of the Republic led to a combination of CNT unions losing their 
ability to sustain their anti-UGT initiatives in industries and the workplace, as well as its 
successive failed attempts at insurrection and ill-conceived strike actions turning many 
workers away from the organization, even if this was not in most cases accompanied by a 
simultaneous growth in enthusiasm for a particular alternative to the CNT. The detention 
of active and committed CNT militants meant that there were fewer cenetistas in 
workplaces who might attempt to intimidate non-CNT members or actively stigmatize 
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members of other unions. The arrest of militants and the prolonged closure of CNT unions 
meant that ordinary CNT members would have gone for longer periods without the 
guidance of the organization’s militants. The closure of unions also led to more passive 
workers leaving the union, meaning fewer instances of workplaces or industries in which 
an imperious majority of CNT workers could be used as an argument to demand that the 
remaining workers join the CNT. At the same time, the turning away from the CNT that 
was brought about by its failed strikes and insurrections, in addition to meaning that fewer 
workers were as disposed to the CNT’s general message as they had been previously, also 
meant that the specifics of its message, including the assertions that the UGT was a union 
of strike breakers, pistoleros and reaction and was undertaking a campaign to destroy the 
CNT, would have undoubtedly become less powerful, especially as they were repeated in 
the same fashion and at the same intensity irrespective of other events. 
 
This is not to say that workers then immediately flocked to UGT unions. The UGT 
continued to be a fringe movement in Catalonia in these years, even if among some sectors 
of workers and in some localities it garnered a significant following. Nevertheless, it would 
certainly appear that as the CNT suffered the cumulative effects of repression, the Catalan 
UGT began to grow, and it is highly likely that this was at very least in part a result of the 
Catalan UGT’s activists, or workers that bought into the UGT’s methods, finding 
themselves increasingly freed from the constraints placed upon them by cenetistas. 
 
The decline of CNT unions in the region allowing their UGT rivals to flourish can also be 
seen in some individual localities and industries that are not covered by the statistics 
above. In Barcelona, the port was undoubtedly the most notable example of the UGT 
expanding after its CNT counterpart had first attempted to extinguish it but was then itself 
nearly destroyed through its clashes with the authorities. Initially the UGT’s port 
federation had a minority presence at the port – though certainly not as small as the CNT 
claimed it was – before temporarily disappearing all together as a result of the CNT’s 
Macià-backed monopoly. For a short time, therefore, the CNT’s attempts to prevent the 
presence of the UGT in the industry succeeded. However, the CNT’s subsequent prolonged 
strike action allowed UGT workers to return to the sector, with the CNT’s closed shop 
rescinded. The second CNT attempt to marginalize the UGT at the docks in the form of its 
October 1931 boycott then backfired as a result of the uncompromising stance of the Civil 
Governor, José Anguera de Sojo, and the UGT’s inevitable decision to offer workers to 
break a boycott aimed at itself. The October 1931 strike was highly damaging to the CNT’s 
port section; not only did it lead to heavy-handed measures against it such as the arrest of 
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militants during the conflict, but having had the objective of excluding the UGT, by 
November the UGT had a greater union presence at the port than ever. 
 
Matters did not improve for the CNT at the port over the course of 1932. The attempted 
revolutionary activity of early 1932 led to further repressions against CNT unions in 
Barcelona. Francesc Arín, the President of the transport union, was detained. The factional 
disputes within the CNT also manifested themselves in the transport union, with Arín and 
the treintista junta of the union being replaced by a faísta one in June 1932.38 As Ibarz 
points out, there was a general trend of port workers drifting away from the CNT after the 
October boycott and over the course of 1932. Those dockers who remained in the CNT 
appear to have been less committed to the CNT’s overall project, a point argued by Ibarz 
through highlighting their non-participation in the January 1932 unrest and subsequent 
CNT protest actions.39 The CNT, by 1933 a minority force at the port, attempted another 
strike there in April to implement an eight-hour day and a new system of contracting 
workers. The strike was neutralized by the authorities, partly through the allowance of 
strike breakers, partly through repression of the CNT and partly through members of Estat 
Català manning the city’s transport services after CNT transport workers initiated a support 
strike.40  
 
Over the course of the Second Republic, then, the CNT at the port repeatedly attempted to 
marginalize the UGT, utilizing methods that brought it into confrontations with the 
authorities, through which the CNT emerged each time as the worse off party. As it did 
this, its ability to prevent the UGT was compromised, and also drove the UGT’s port 
leaders and the authorities more closely together. As it became increasingly weakened, the 
CNT’s ability to dominate the port and demand that all workers there join the organization 
diminished rapidly, and at the same time the UGT became increasingly popular amongst 
port workers without resorting to closed shop tactics or intimidation.41 
 
The passage of some workers into the UGT as a result of the setbacks suffered by the CNT 
is illustrated at the workplace level by the aftermath of the failure of a CNT strike by dyers 
and other fabric treatment workers in Barcelona during the summer of 1934. Following the 
failed strike, the junta of the section wrote to its factory delegates for information on the 
consequences of the strike for the workforce of each factory. The available reports show 
that CNT membership of these workplaces was by this point less than half of the 
workforce, often far less.42 In some cases, it appears a significant proportion of workers in 
some workplaces had joined the UGT by this stage. The delegate for the Casa Pagès i 
  
108
Pagès reported that in that workplace there were thirty-five workers, fifteen of which were 
in the CNT, eleven in the UGT, and nine were unaffiliated. According to the delegate’s 
report, the twenty non-CNT workers had all previously been CNT members. The delegate 
also identified seven members of the workforce who had ‘most stood out through their 
anti-confederal activities’; six of these individuals were listed as UGT members.43  
 
Terrassa is an example of a CNT stronghold in which attempts were made to set up a UGT 
presence, only for it to be met with extreme hostility from the CNT. Ultimately, however, 
it would appear that by late 1932, the socialist labour federation had managed to gain some 
sort of foothold in the city, undoubtedly in no small measure due to the significant bouts of 
repression experienced by the CNT’s unions in the town.44 In June 1932, CNT militants 
from Terrassa published an article in Soldiaridad Obrera providing information on 
attempts made by the UGT to organize in the town. According to the article, a UGT 
presence there had begun in the summer 1931, as a result of ‘a few individuals of shameful 
reputation, who in previous eras belonged to the Sindicatos Libres, and in agreement with 
the bosses, founded the Unión General de Trabajadores’.45 The article was an attempt to 
mobilize local workers in the town against the convocation of jurados mixtos. This 
development appears to have spurred on the local cenetistas to take more direct methods to 
exclude the UGT, because, as mentioned previously in this chapter, in August 1932 
cenetistas forcibly brought a UGT public meeting in the town to an end, injuring one of the 
speakers in the process. The local militants writing in Solidaridad Obrera attempted to 
present the meeting as an utter failure, at which the whole audience harangued the 
orators.46 
 
However, just over a year later the Terrassa UGT held a series of public events in the town 
in conjunction with the local socialist youth, at which some of the key figures of the 
socialist movement in Catalonia spoke, including Rafel Vidiella.47 The fact that high-
profile ugetistas from Barcelona were involved in the meetings would suggest to a certain 
degree that the UGT movement in Terrassa was not simply the product of esquiroles that 
had organized with employers to destroy the CNT, as local cenetistas had suggested. By 
the accounts available, these latter propaganda events were not subject to the same 
coercions as that which took place in August 1932. That this was the case must be put 
down, to a large extent, to the fact that by the time the socialists held these events the CNT 
in Terrassa was in disarray, partly through the extent of the factional split in the local 
organization and partly because so many of its militants were in jail and its unions closed. 
The Terrassa CNT had been one of the most committed local federations to the CNT’s 
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insurrections and protests against the state. To give a few examples, in February 1932 
anarcho-syndicalists took over the town hall by force,48 and a large cache of arms was 
found by the authorities at the CNT’s local headquarters in January 1933 after the uprising 
attempt, both of which events were met with closures of  the CNT’s local unions and 
imprisonment of the local movement’s key militants.49 The cenetistas of Terrassa, writing 
in Solidaridad Obrera in October 1933, argued that the UGT had gained a presence in the 
town because the local authorities had closed its unions and arrested its militants as part of 
a project to allow the UGT to expand in the town, in line with the CNT’s overall 
interpretation of the Republic.50 It seems rather to be the case, however, that the cenetistas’ 
repression was linked squarely to their insurrectionary efforts; this repression seems to 
have badly damaged the organization of the local movement, allowing the UGT a space in 
which to operate more freely.   
 
In the period between the founding of the Republic and October 1934 there was a 
concerted effort by CNT militants across Catalonia to marginalize UGT rivals and prevent 
workers from joining the UGT. These efforts to marginalize took many forms, including 
verbal and physical harassment and boycotts, but above all a use of the CNT’s press organs 
to mobilize workers against the Catalan UGT. Through the press, the impression was 
created that workers needed to be on guard against a predatory UGT presence in their 
workplaces, which the CNT would protect them from. The belief of the socialist 
leadership, outlined in chapter one, that their unions and activists were fighting a continual 
defensive action against the threats of cenetistas certainly seems to have been a valid one 
with regard to Catalonia. An examination of the fortunes of the Catalan UGT during these 
years suggests that the CNT were initially fairly successful in preventing the growth of the 
socialist labour federation, but as the anarcho-syndicalist movement began to disintegrate 
the UGT was able to make some modest gains, indicating that a proportion of the Catalan 
workforce had previously been prevented from joining the UGT directly as a result of the 
CNT’s campaign against it.  
 
In attacking the Catalan UGT in the fashion outlined in this chapter, Catalan cenetistas 
exhibited a mentality that their organization was the only one that could represent the 
working classes in Catalonia, and that UGT workers as much as the organization’s leaders 
were inherently yellow. This was a perspective that went beyond the general-level 
interpretation of the UGT movement, outlined in chapter three, which by and large 
interpreted the UGT’s ordinary workers as merely misguided. This widely-adopted 
approach of attacking Catalan UGT organisms and members was not the product of a 
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regional-level decision making process. Rather, it appears that it was fairly unanimously 
accepted that it was an acceptable course of action to take against the Catalan UGT. 
Precisely why this was will be revealed in the next chapter’s examination of anarcho-
syndicalist discourse of the Catalan UGT.  
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Chapter Six: Largo and the Libres: The CNT’s Construction of the Catalan UGT 
 
Although, as discussed in the previous chapter, the widespread marginalization of the 
Catalan UGT by cenetistas was not the product of a formal CNT initiative, this did not 
mean that efforts to marginalize the Catalan UGT were not underpinned by any sort of 
rationale. In fact, an examination of the Catalan CNT’s interpretation of the Catalan UGT 
reveals that according to the outlook of the cenetistas of the region, there were highly 
pressing reasons for the UGT to be stopped at all costs in Catalonia, which the CNT press 
sought to continually emphasize to the working classes of the region. This interpretation of 
the Catalan UGT is the subject of this chapter.  
 
Largo’s master plan 
 
As was outlined in chapter one, the CNT presented a public stance from the first weeks of 
the Republic that the socialist leadership, and above all Largo Caballero, had an agenda of 
destroying the CNT via their position in government and then implanting the UGT in its 
place. Amongst cenetistas in Catalonia, the belief existed – and was one of the most 
prominent features of the regional movement’s press attacks on the socialists – that 
Catalonia was at the top of Largo and the socialist leaders’ list of targets for this plan. In an 
editorial published on 29th May, Barcelona was identified as being one of the main areas in 
which the UGT general secretary was carrying out his ‘offensive against the CNT’.1 The 
hostilities between the CNT and the UGT at the Barcelona port was the event through 
which this overall interpretation of Largo’s designs on Catalonia was expressed. The 
rivalry of the two organizations at the port was in fact based upon a foundation of 
cenetistas being at loggerheads with rival autonomous unions since the 1910s. Whilst the 
CNT was illegal during the Primo de Rivera years, these autonomous unions continued to 
operate. In 1929 the various unions of the port joined together in the Federación de 
Entidades Obreras del Puerto (FEOP). According to Ibarz, this convergence was a result of 
the port unions having worked together in various labour conflicts during the 1920s, such 
as their campaign to bring about an eight-hour working day at the port, and also the fact 
that they all participated in the comités paritarios. The re-mobilization of the CNT from 
1930 onwards reignited this rivalry. At the outset of the Republic, the CNT transport union 
rapidly expanded at the port, with a majority of port workers – especially the most 
unskilled ones – joining the CNT.2 What would go on to be viewed as a key battleground 
between Largo and the CNT during the Republic was, to a significant extent, a well-
established enmity even before the FEOP sought entry to the UGT. 
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Undoubtedly motivated in no small measure by the CNT’s rapid remobilization at the port, 
the leaders of the FEOP travelled to Madrid to meet Largo Caballero. Following this 
meeting, their unions held assemblies, at which votes were passed to affiliate to the UGT.3 
Attempts were then made to present the case to workers at the port for them to affiliate to 
the Federation. The majority of dockers involved in cotton and wood, as well as the 
controllers, joined UGT entities. In other sectors, a minority of workers joined the socialist 
labour federation.4 
 
The FEOP’s joining of the UGT instantly changed the CNT’s presentation of its battles at 
the port. Initially, the organization presented the move to join the UGT as being a 
desperate measure to win official protection. ‘The [CNT] transport union has the backing 
of almost all the workers of the port’, Solidaridad Obrera argued, also declaring that ‘the 
leadership and support of Largo Caballero from the Labour Ministry will be worth nothing. 
We, the workers of the CNT, are stronger than the opportunists of the comité paritario, and 
we will triumph’.5 However, this initial reaction was soon accompanied by a repeated 
assertion that the FEOP’s joining of the UGT was part of a plan by Largo to destroy the 
CNT. The paper argued that Largo’s insistence on his ministry having jurisdiction over 
handling of labour issues in Catalonia rather than the Catalan government was motivated 
by a wish to impose the UGT at the port, declaring it had been ‘chosen as the place of 
choice for the warlike efforts of the Unión General de Trabajadores’.6 Just a few days after 
these claims were made, the CNT transport union, as discussed in the previous chapter, 
declared its boycott against non-CNT workers at the port. 
 
However, the belief that Largo was master-minding a plan to destroy the CNT was not 
limited to the port. The idea was quickly embraced by many CNT unions, and repeatedly 
and vociferously expressed through the pages of Solidaridad Obrera. In the first months of 
the Republic, some CNT unions in Barcelona interpreted the presence of the UGT in their 
industry as corresponding to this overall plan that was attributed to Largo. In early June 
1931, for example, the CNT’s wood workers’ union placed an article in Solidaridad 
Obrera in which it warned its members to remain vigilant against the possibility of 
attempts to recruit UGT members in their workplaces. The appeal was firmly grounded in 
the premise that the UGT was undertaking a campaign to destroy the CNT, and was 
recruiting the most reactionary elements of the Barcelona workforce to help it to achieve 
this aim. ‘The Unión General de Trabajadores is beginning its offensive against the 
Confederación Nacional del Trabajo’, the message began, before claiming Largo was 
attempting to ‘drag workers towards his reformist organization’.7  
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The actions of UGT unions in Catalonia, when they conflicted with those of CNT unions, 
were also interpreted as corresponding to this agenda. For instance, in June 1931, the 
CNT’s union of cinema workers declared its intention to carry out a strike if the set of 
bases that it had sent to the Civil Governor were not accepted within eight days. The 
corresponding UGT union refused to back the strike call on the grounds that they believed 
it would be used as a pretext by employers in the industry to lay off workers. It would 
appear that the CNT union ultimately did not strike after agreeing to negotiate with the 
employers’ association.8 Nevertheless, the CNT union published an article in Solidaridad 
Obrera in which it attacked its UGT counterpart not only for refusing to back the strike, 
but also for its members allegedly declaring their intention to occupy the posts of the 
striking cenetistas. The CNT cinema workers judged that ‘only those who are in the UGT 
could operate in this way, at the unconditional service of Largo Caballero, playing the 
repugnant role of yellows and traitors to the cause of the workers’.9  
 
As the Republic progressed and CNT unions ran into difficulties as they clashed with the 
authorities during labour conflicts or other protest actions, the setbacks they had suffered 
were explained squarely in terms of Largo’s plan. Such a perspective was put forward by 
the CNT’s transport union. The union had suffered various defeats since the founding of 
the Republic, such as the transport strike of October 1931, which had started at the port in 
an attempt to impose a CNT closed shop there but had ended with several other non-port 
sections striking in support.10 The leading militants of the CNT’s transport union in 
Barcelona were of the mindset that their organization was being targeted by Largo with the 
goal of destroying it. The expression of their belief in July 1932 that they had been in the 
midst of a ‘battle to the death’11 that the UGT general secretary had been waging against 
the CNT since the start of the Republic came on the back of the protracted and damaging 
strikes that the union had entered into. From the articles published by the transport workers 
in Solidaridad Obrera, it is evident that its organizers felt their union needed to be on a 
perpetual war footing against attempts emanating from the Ministry of Labour to destroy 
the CNT.12 
 
It is important to scrutinize this argument that the Catalan UGT represented a conduit 
through which Largo could destroy the CNT. It is taken for granted in contemporary and 
historical accounts of the Second Republic that the UGT general secretary harboured a 
great deal of animosity towards the CNT. His accommodation of the FEOP leaders at the 
start of the Republic must be viewed in part as a marriage of convenience, through which 
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both parties would benefit through having the same agenda of wishing to introduce 
arbitration systems at the docks. A mutual antipathy towards the CNT – and obviously a 
recognition that it would prevent the establishment of arbitration – did undoubtedly unite 
the governing socialists and the leaders of the union. The difficulty comes in determining 
whether this collaboration was motivated first and foremost by this shared agenda of 
implementing an arbitration system, or rather by a simple hatred of the CNT. Certainly in 
the eyes of cenetistas it was the latter, and this was the interpretation that they presented to 
workers in Barcelona.  
 
On the part of the FEOP leaders, it is difficult to establish which factor motivated them 
most, though it is highly likely that it was some combination of the two. What is certain is 
that the FEOP organizers’ antipathy towards the CNT was based around a belief that the 
CNT’s methods were inimical to the interests of workers. The proceedings of meetings of 
worker entities at the port that decided to join the UGT from May 1931 offer an insight 
into why some unions decided against joining the CNT. One of the key arguments cited in 
favour of joining the UGT over the CNT that was expressed by the cotton, wood and salted 
fish sections was that the socialist labour federation would ‘totally respect our structuring 
and independence’.13 By contrast, the idea was expressed by the leaders of these entities 
that under the CNT not only would their union become subsumed into the transport 
sindicato único, which also contained all the urban transport workers, whose sectors were 
unconnected to the port, but that they would also lose any control of their organization and 
how it operated, to the Barcelona CNT as a whole.14  
 
At the heart of these port unions joining the UGT and not the CNT, therefore, was a wish 
to be able to ensure the workers of the unions had control over their ability to negotiate and 
call strikes, rather than being ‘steamrollered’ by the junta of the transport union.15 This fear 
reflected a long-standing suspicion of the CNT on the part of the non-CNT port unions, 
who according to Ibarz had for over a decade viewed the CNT’s militants at the port as 
outsiders who lacked an understanding of the particularities of labour issues there.16 This is 
not to say that the leaders of the sections did not endorse the idea of workers being grouped 
together in a single entity, with the ‘necessity that all workers have of grouping themselves 
together to defend our interests’ being expressed as the fundamental premise for the 
argument that the unions needed to join either the CNT or the UGT.17 It rather seems to 
have been the case that, while workers did need to be able to present a united front against 
the bourgeoisie overall, when it came to the matter of settling material conditions within a 
given industry, the independence of workers within that industry to chart their own path 
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through industrial relations with their employers was paramount. At the same time, at these 
meetings of the port unions the view appears to have been taken that the leaders of the 
CNT were fundamentally ‘mistaken’ with regards to their overall goals, and that there 
would simply be no escaping the imposition of these were the union to be affiliated to the 
CNT.18 Rather than being motivated primarily by a wish to destroy the CNT, then, it would 
appear that the FEOP’s activists and members chose to join the UGT principally to 
conserve their method of union organization rather than submit to that of the CNT.19 
 
With regard to the designs of the UGT national leadership on Catalonia, the CNT’s line 
that the organization was undertaking an all-out assault on the CNT through the creation of 
UGT unions does not receive any corroboration if the support given to Catalan UGT 
unions by the national leadership is given any attention. The socialist leadership in Madrid 
were throughout the Republic largely indifferent to the fortunes of their labour federation 
in Catalonia. This is illustrated by their attitude to requests for assistance from regional 
UGT leaders. On 20th July 1931 the Executive Commission of the UGT received a request 
from the Barcelona Local Federation of the UGT for 5000 membership cards. The Local 
Federation stated that the request was made because a large number of unions had 
requested to join the organization. However, the Local Federation advised that it could not 
afford to pay for the cards up front, as was standard UGT regulation, but would pay for 
them within forty-five days. The request was denied by the Executive Commission.20 
Similar rebuttals were experienced by the leaders of the UGT’s bakery union in Barcelona 
when they requested additional membership cards from their national industrial 
federation.21 This stance punctures the CNT’s argument that the socialist leadership had a 
special interest in its organization replacing the anarcho-syndicalist labour federation in 
Catalonia. Had this been the case, the national leadership would have surely shown some 
flexibility in its procedures to ensure that ugetistas in the CNT’s stronghold at least had the 
means to allow the organization to take on members there. Instead, it insisted upon an 
adherence the organization’s standard rules, which were designed to ensure the solvency of 
the organization but were desperately unsuited to fighting the CNT for members in 
Catalonia. Whilst the CNT were able to issue over 100000 membership cards in a single 
month in Catalonia, a practice that left the organization with substantial deficits through 
the disparity between cards issued and dues paid, the UGT had to send off to Madrid for 
much smaller quantities, with payment upfront. 22  
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The Catalan UGT as successors to the Sindicatos Libres 
 
The postulation of a Largo master plan was used to explain the general presence of UGT 
organisms in the region; a different argument was put forward to explain the fact of 
workers in the region becoming UGT activists or simply holding a UGT membership card. 
This argument revolved around the assertion that the membership of the UGT in Catalonia 
was based around the Sindicatos Libres. 
 
The Sindicatos Libres had been formed at the end of the 1910s, in direct response to the 
CNT, which at the time was at the height of its powers in Catalonia and was the scourge of 
the authorities and employers. Even after its unions rapidly dissolved with the founding of 
the Republic, they and the era in which they burst onto the scene of the Catalan labour 
movement left a long lasting, deep imprint in the imaginations of cenetistas. Certainly in 
the first months of the Second Republic amongst Republicans and the left in Catalonia the 
name of the Libres was associated principally with the idea of gunmen given immunity by 
Severiano Martínez Anido, the Military Governor of Barcelona between 1919 and 1922, to 
murder CNT militants, especially after the publication in 1931 of Pere Foix’s exposé of 
links between Libres gunmen and Martínez Anido, which was also serialized in 
L’Opinió.23  
 
Consensus exists that in its earliest days the Libres was founded and led by virulently anti-
left individuals, often with Carlist connections. However, the organization expanded 
considerably beyond this founding nucleus, especially after the CNT was driven 
underground by Primo de Rivera. For much of the 1920s, it was the most important 
organization through which material claims were made by Barcelona workers, with even 
Ángel Pestaña acknowledging its role as a vehicle for protecting the material interests of 
workers.24 As Colin Winston highlights, in the mid to late-1920s the Libres was a much 
more heterogeneous organization, comprised of a relatively smaller proportion of 
reactionary individuals, with many of its unions focused instead on reformist unionism and 
exhibiting no particular political agenda.25 What is important here, however, is that in 
cenetista discourse, the Sindicatos Libres continued to stand for nothing more and nothing 
less than an anti-CNT hit squad of pistoleros and strike breakers. For an organization to be 
associated with pistolerismo was the gravest accusation that could be made. And this was 
precisely the claim that was made in the CNT press of the UGT in Catalonia during the 
Second Republic. 
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From the outset of the Republic, the CNT in Catalonia made repeated claims in its 
newspapers that the unions of the Catalan UGT that were being formed in the region were 
a continuation of the Sindicatos Libres. This claim partly took the form of arguing that the 
leaders and ordinary members of new Catalan UGT unions had essentially reformed their 
old Libres union in the UGT, and as such were attempting to continue the yellow and 
reactionary practices of the Libres. But above all the claim centred around the accusation 
that the pistoleros of the Libres had also found a home in the Catalan UGT, from which 
they would continue to murder CNT militants and even ordinary workers. This depiction of 
the Catalan UGT in its entirety was often made from editorials in Solidaridad Obrera, such 
as one in June 1931 in which the paper argued that ‘the CNT has not only refused to allow 
in pistoleros, but has rejected organizations that had belonged to the Sindicatos Libres. The 
UGT has accepted them en bloc’.26  
 
The CNT often accused UGT entities that set up in Catalonia of being comprised of former 
Libres unions. For example, during 1932, moves were made by some tram workers to set 
up a UGT section. In keeping with its reputation as one of the most militant CNT unions, 
the transport union responded to these moves by attempting to mobilize tram workers 
against the individuals concerned. The UGT tram workers’ section was initially set up in 
April 1932, but appears to have remained inoperative in its first months.27 On 7th 
September 1932, the tram workers section of the transport union placed an article in 
Solidaridad Obrera in which it warned workers to be on alert against attempts being made 
by the ugetistas to allow the UGT to be a recognized union in the sector. The names, jobs 
and card numbers of all those implicated in the efforts to set up a UGT section were 
printed as part of the article.28 One of the named individuals was Eduardo Gómez 
Benedicto, who would go on to become the Catalan representative in the UGT’s national 
transport federation.29 The authors also argued that the UGT was simply a replacement of 
the Sindicatos Libres, and also suggested that those involved had made threatening 
suggestions that force would be used to establish a UGT presence.30 A similar stance was 
taken by the Barcelona wood worker’s union, who warned their members that members of 
the Sindicatos Libres ‘have found refuge and enrolled in the social reformist ranks, 
protected by the power of the government’. These individuals had been leading members 
of ‘the gang that Martínez Anido created’ and were ‘agents provocateurs at the service of 
the politico-socialist class’.31  
 
Of course, the CNT were not the only entity in Catalonia for which the Sindicatos Libres 
and the era of pistolerismo had left a lasting impression. The Libres were also a recurrent 
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theme in the Catalan socialist press, to a large extent in response to the CNT’s accusations 
against the Catalan UGT. UGT activists found themselves using the pages of La 
Internacional to repeatedly refute accusations that their organization was a haven for 
former Libres gunmen and activists. In June 1931, the paper claimed that the Barcelona 
UGT would take Solidaridad Obrera to court over its accusations that the UGT in 
Catalonia had recruited the pistoleros of the Libres.32 Desiderio Trilles, the leader of the 
UGT at the port, also refuted these accusations in his regular columns on the battles 
between the CNT and the UGT.33 Adolfo Simó, a leading figure in the UGT’s bakery 
union, also offered a detailed refutation of the accusations specific to the industry. Simó 
observed that ‘every time a group of workers outside of the dictatorial ranks of the 
Confederation refuses to follow those of the único, they are “pistoleros of the Libres”’ 
according to the CNT press.34 A similar refutation was made by the UGT’s public 
entertainment union.35 
 
At the same time as refuting the idea that the Catalan UGT was a re-branded version of the 
Libres, La Internacional also levelled counter-accusations at the CNT over the question of 
pistoleros. In socialist discourse, as discussed in chapter three, violence was an integral 
aspect of the CNT’s activities as its militants attempted to impose their union on workers. 
In its reports of CNT attacks on UGT members, the Catalan UGT’s papers averred that 
these incidents represented an attempt on the CNT’s part to plunge the region to a return to 
the pistolero heyday of Martínez Anido. In June 1931, a piece in the paper claimed the 
Libres was a product of the CNT’s attempts to use violence to make workers join the 
union, and that the CNT’s activities in 1931, citing assassinations of ugetistas in 
Barcelona, Sabadell and Badalona, were an attempt to return Catalonia to the same 
dynamic of violence.36 
  
The truth of exactly where the violent elements of the Libres actually did go is virtually 
impossible to ascertain. Clearly workers who had been in the Libres did variously join the 
CNT and the UGT. Nevertheless, it is certainly worth giving some critical consideration to 
the CNT’s claims regarding the Catalan UGT. On the one hand, some incidents of 
altercations between CNT and UGT militants and workers do hint at some unsavoury 
characters being associated with the activities of the Catalan UGT, even if there is no way 
of proving that they had definitely been in the Sindicatos Libres prior to the Republic. A 
shootout that took place outside the Alena box and wood panel factory in June 1931, which 
will be examined in more detail later in this chapter, is perhaps the most prominent of 
these. Here, gunmen shot at CNT members who were picketing factory employees who 
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had recently joined the UGT. At the same time, however, it must be recognized that the 
CNT press also made assertions of UGT-Libres and/or pistoleros connections that were 
much more dubious. La Internacional responded to a claim made in Solidaridad Obrera 
that the UGT people involved in a violent altercation with CNT workers in Blanes were 
also ex-Libres pistoleros by highlighting that there had never been a Libres presence in 
Blanes, viewing Solidaridad Obrera’s accusations as indicative of their campaign to 
delegitimize the Catalan UGT through linking it to the Libres.37  
    
It is also important to consider that, in addition to the Catalan UGT vigorously refuting any 
connections between the labour federation and the Libres, the Catalan UGT was 
historically an enemy of the Libres, as Colin Winston highlights.38 La Internacional in its 
rebuttal of the accusations made against the Catalan UGT by the CNT interpreted the era 
of Libres dominance in Catalonia as a dark period for the workers’ movement in the 
region. Moreover, the Libres’ own papers during the 1920s were highly critical of the 
PSOE and UGT.39 There is also evidence to suggest that Catalan UGT’s public 
condemnation of the Libres was not merely posturing. For example, the minutes of the 
UGT’s metal union meetings suggest that its leaders took accusations that any of its 
members had been militants in the Libres very seriously. In February 1932, a member of 
the junta warned his colleagues that a former ‘action man’ of the Libres was attempting to 
join the union. It was agreed by the junta to reject his request, and subsequently agreed that 
prospective members had to provide their previous union card before being allowed to 
join.40 
 
The twin strands of discourse that the UGT in Catalonia was both a direct product of Largo 
Caballero’s project to implant the UGT and destroy the CNT in Catalonia and also an 
organization comprised of the former pistoleros of the Sindicatos Libres quickly fused 
together into one. It became commonplace for editorials and reports in Solidaridad Obrera 
to identify UGT organisms in Catalonia as corresponding to both of the above traits. The 
activities of the UGT at the port, for example, were depicted at times as being 
simultaneously agents of Largo and representing a continuation of the Libres and 
harbouring pistoleros.41 Having previously been portrayed as being at the ‘unconditional 
service of Largo Caballero’,42 the cinema workers affiliated to the UGT in Barcelona were 
subsequently depicted as being ‘the leaders and collaborators of the awful Sindicatos 
Libres’, who, upon the collapse of the Libres ‘sought refuge within the UGT, which had 
also benefited from the favours of the dictatorship’.43 
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The most obvious pay-off for the CNT of the depiction of UGT unions as being a 
continuation of the Sindicatos Libres and also a creation of an anti-CNT and anti-working 
classes Labour Minister was the delegitimizing value that they brought with them, which in 
turn would serve the overall objective of extinguishing a UGT presence in the region. The 
Libres as an organization was a byword in CNT discourse for the bourgeoisie attempting to 
destroy working-class organization and for pistolerismo carried out against representatives 
of the working class. To depict the Catalan UGT in this fashion therefore drew on a very 
powerful, well-established aspect of the workers’ movement in Catalonia and allowed it to 
be put to use to present the Catalan UGT as every bit as reactionary and dangerous to 
workers as was the Libres. The Second Republic may have represented a massive change 
to the political structure of Spain and Catalonia, but in CNT discourse the working classes 
and the CNT continued to be locked in precisely the same struggle against the same groups 
and organizations as they had been in the late 1910s and the 1920s.   
 
Likewise, because the theory of Largo’s master plan was expounded when newly affiliated 
Catalan UGT organisms were discussed in Solidaridad Obrera, the idea was presented to 
workers that any organization that joined the Catalan UGT was playing an integral role in 
fulfilling the anti-CNT agenda of the Labour Ministry. Rather than merely being workers 
that sought a different vehicle for defending their material and social interests, they were 
presented as being aligned to forces outwith Catalonia that were attempting to destroy the 
main workers’ organization. The result was that in Catalonia, UGT unions being created or 
unions affiliating to the socialist labour federation were presented through the anarcho-
syndicalist movement as an advance of the bourgeois-socialist offensive against the 
workers, as well as another move by them against the CNT. 
 
A case study: the Alena factory, Barcelona, June 1931 
 
Through these linkages to Largo and the Libres, the Catalan UGT was thus presented as 
being a combination of the worst of the present and the worst of the past. The overall 
validity of these two interpretations has been questioned here. However, it is important to 
examine how these accusations worked in relation to specific incidents. Unfortunately, it is 
impossible to judge all claims made against the Catalan UGT by the CNT, on the grounds 
that so much additional information on any given incident is required to assess its validity. 
All too often, such supplementary evidence does not exist. However, in June 1931, a 
violent confrontation took place between CNT and UGT members in Catalonia, which, 
because of the numbers involved, received a substantial amount of press attention. The 
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incident in question occurred on 9th June 1931, at the entrance of the Alena wood panel 
factory, where eight cenetistas, two ugetistas and one unaffiliated individual were injured, 
the majority of them by gunshot wound. The CNT reacted to the incident by arguing that it 
represented a fusion of Largo Caballero attempting to use the UGT to destroy the CNT in 
the region and former Libres pistoleros carrying out these attacks on his behalf. Whereas 
the majority of articles in the CNT press that asserted a Libres pistolero-UGT connection 
were not backed with any substantiating proof, the Alena incident, along with a similar 
outbreak of violence later that month in Blanes, represented the two most compelling 
pieces of evidence that the CNT press were able to present of connections between Libres 
violence and the Catalan UGT’s activities. A detailed reconstruction of the incident – and 
its antecedents – highlights how the interpretations of one another’s movements offered by 
the CNT and the UGT in Catalonia do not satisfactorily explain the hostilities that 
sometimes occurred between their members.    
 
The Alena factory usually employed around 150 workers.44 In the months immediately 
prior to the founding of the Republic, all of the workers in the factory had been members 
of the CNT.45 Conflict between the union and the management initially took the form of 
the CNT’s factory delegate, Manuel Carlos Miralles, being dismissed, apparently for ‘bad 
behaviour’. That Miralles may have been dismissed for his activities as a cenetista cannot 
be ruled out, but neither can it be taken for granted. Following the intervention of the CNT 
wood workers’ union, Miralles was reinstated. Shortly after this incident, the management 
announced that the entire factory would be temporarily shut for renovation work. The 
workforce was temporarily dismissed, to be informed of the reopening of the factory at a 
later date so that they could return to work.46  
 
However, in May the employer decided that it would initially only take on a proportion of 
the workforce, with the remaining workers being re-contracted in phases.47 The CNT wood 
workers’ union was opposed to this move, believing it to have been a manoeuvre designed 
to phase out undesirable workers. The sacking of Miralles would undoubtedly have been 
one antecedent that raised this suspicion. However – and this was a point that the UGT 
were eager to stress after the bloodshed – that all the workers would be readmitted had 
been agreed in a settlement reached by the employers and the Delegación Regional del 
Trabajo.48 The workers that had been invited back, totalling sixty-five, did not wish to 
support the CNT’s proposal to declare a strike at the workplace to demand that all workers 
be rehired at once, so they left the CNT and joined the UGT. The precise circumstances of 
how and why they chose to join the UGT, rather than simply leave the CNT, are not one 
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hundred percent clear. According to the CNT it was indicative of the socialist labour 
federation being an instrument of employers.49  
 
Upon learning of the return to work of these sixty-five workers and their enrolment in the 
UGT, cenetistas – both of the wood workers’ union as well as, it would appear, those from 
other industries, in particular construction – began to organize a picket at the entrance of 
the factory, composed of both militants and the CNT’s members who formerly worked at 
the factory. The goals of the picket were principally to agitate for the rehiring of all 
workers and prevent their positions being taken by others, though censuring the UGT 
workers must have also been a motivation. For a few days the UGT workers continued to 
work as normal, in spite of the picket.  
 
On the 9th the CNT picket arrived at the factory entrance over an hour early, and upon the 
arrival of the UGT workers, individuals from both sides quickly entered into confrontation 
before shots began to be fired. The majority of people attached to both groups quickly fled, 
leaving behind a smaller group of fighters. Two key points of controversy were which 
group made the first move towards violence, and which side was armed. The nature of the 
casualties would suggest that if the cenetistas were armed at all, they were exceptionally 
poor shots. Of the eleven casualties, six of the eight cenetistas received gunshot wounds, 
whereas the two ugetistas’ wounds were from blows from sticks or other objects.50 
Solidaridad Obrera openly accused the two injured ugetistas of having been pistoleros of 
the Libres in the past.51 Whilst it has not been possible to corroborate this, it would appear 
that one of the two men, Manuel Pedra Lorente, did have a violent past, having wounded a 
neighbour with a knife during an argument in 1925,52 and having also been detained in 
early 1931 for insulting a police officer.53 Nevertheless, the cenetistas did exaggerate the 
extent of the shootout, claiming that several men had barricaded themselves in a bar 
opposite the factory, from which they fired shots at the cenetistas, an accusation that was 
refuted by the owner of the bar. 
 
Solidaridad Obrera on its front page announced that ‘the pistoleros of the Sindicatos 
Libres, recruited by the Unión General de Trabajadores, shoot at our comrades’  and 
repeated on several occasions in its coverage words to this effect.54 The incident was 
displayed as proof that the Catalan UGT had a deliberate strategy of hiring pistoleros to 
murder cenetistas. The paper even made the claim that people who lived near the UGT’s 
headquarters had overheard someone in the building saying ‘“we need to kill a few of the 
Confederation’s people to spread panic”’,55 a claim that should be taken with a very large 
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dose of scepticism. The paper presented the incident as a calculated attack by gunmen on a 
peaceful demonstration. The other crucial point of emphasis aside from the aforementioned 
link with the Sindicatos Libres that was asserted was the argument that blame for the 
whole incident should be directed squarely at Largo and the leaders of the UGT in 
Catalonia. The editorial on the front page of Solidaridad Obrera argued that the initial split 
of the factory’s workforce and the ensuing conflict were ‘the consequences of the policy 
that Largo is directing from the Ministry of Labour’. A statement in the paper by the CNT 
wood workers’ union went even further, arguing that ‘the secretary of the UGT and of the 
Socialist Party, installed in the Labour Ministry, can order workers of the Confederation to 
be murdered’. Furthermore, the paper argued, ‘the leaders of the Unión General de 
Trabajadores know that without recourse to violence, the Confederación Nacional del 
Trabajo would manage to organize all workers in Catalonia and leave them with nobody’.56  
 
On the part of the Catalan UGT, the response to the incident was equally one of depicting 
it as an outrage, though one planned and executed by violent cenetistas, not the UGT.  
According to La Internacional, the UGT workers were merely going about their business, 
‘fulfilling the decision of the Delegación Regional del Trabajo that they and the employer 
agreed upon’, only to find themselves in the days immediately prior to the fight ‘coerced 
and attacked by those from the CNT, who wish to impose their will through all means on 
Catalan workers’. The ‘inept and sectarian authorities’ of the city were blamed for having 
failed to protect the UGT workers against the threats of the cenetistas. This interpretation 
of the incident was placed into the context of their wider allegations of cenetistas 
threatening workers at the port to make them join the CNT. The only acknowledgement 
that UGT members had any connection to the violence outside the factory took the form of 
arguing that it was understandable that they would defend themselves in the face of such 
sustained attacks and without the support of the authorities.57  
 
For both CNT and UGT, then, the incident was an individual manifestation of their wider 
interpretations of the agenda of their rivals. Whilst there are elements of linkage to the 
wider activities and positions taken up by the two labour federations, however, certain key 
points relating specifically to the case in question should not be obscured by the anarcho-
syndicalist and socialist interpretations. One of the most important of these is the role 
played by the workers of the factory themselves, independent of the activities of union 
militants. It would appear that all of those who were given the opportunity to return to 
work did so, joining the UGT in the process. They totalled sixty-five workers out of a total 
workforce of about 150; in other words over forty percent of the total workforce. This 
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would suggest that the primary motivation of many of the individuals in the factory was 
not rooted in commitments to a particular union, but simply being able to work. It was this 
which caused them to switch unions, rather than a rejection of anarcho-syndicalism or a 
commitment to UGT principles. The workers appear to have been happy to remain in the 
CNT and have it represent their interests until the moment when being in it actually came 
into conflict with their ability to work. To a significant proportion of the workers involved, 
the CNT’s attempts to present the Catalan UGT as something of a bogeyman was not a 
sufficiently persuasive argument to prevent them from joining it, something that would 
indicate that by no means did all workers – and indeed (former) CNT members – share 
cenetista militants’ loathing of the UGT.  
 
It must also be borne in mind that, whilst it appears those connected with the UGT were 
aggressors, those at the vanguard of the CNT picket were not connected with the Alena 
workplace at all. Many of those injured in the fighting were militants of the construction 
union, and not the wood workers’ union, and were therefore not even employed at the 
workplace, let alone connected to it through their sindicato único.58 Their stake in the 
conflict was therefore more organizational and ideological than it was material. Quite what 
form the picket would have taken without their protagonism can only be speculated on, but 
their presence as outsiders to the conflict leading the demonstrations against the UGT 
workers can only have raised tensions, and possibly brought them further into the realm of 
a more sectarian conflict. In contrast, the two injured ugetistas – who Solidaridad Obrera 
asserted were pistoleros – were employees at the factory.59 This composition of the two 
groups brings us to the question of the motivations of those who attacked. Although the 
balance of probabilities would indicate that the UGT workers were aggressors, the idea that 
they were gunmen who had turned up specifically to attack cenetistas and had no specific 
interest in the workplace dispute needs to be called into question. Certainly the two injured 
ugetistas had a specific interest in the factory. Looking at it from their perspective, and 
particularly that of a seemingly volatile character such as Pedra Lorente, the previous days 
of insults they would have received from the pickets and in Solidaridad Obrera may have 
been sufficient provocation to attack, rather than a more principled hatred of the CNT in 
general. Although the possibility that pistoleros were on the scene with the specific 
intention of murdering any cenetistas in their path cannot be discounted, the two injured 
ugetistas seem to have had a far more personal stake in the event, detached from the long-
standing battle between Libres and cenetistas.  
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What certainly can be discounted in examining this incident are the accusations made in 
the CNT press that the event was either part of a wider policy of Largo, or had been 
ordered by him or any UGT leader in Catalonia. There is simply no evidence for the 
accusations, and the idea that Largo would have the ability or the inclination to order the 
assassination of such low-ranking cenetistas is simply not credible. This aspect of the 
CNT’s presentation of the event needs to be seen as an attempt to graft the organization’s 
wider stance on the UGT – in particular its representation of the socialist labour federation 
as having a plan to destroy the CNT using violence and the machinery of state – onto a 
localized incident, the roots of which were not planted in a direct rivalry between the CNT 
and the UGT. The Catalan UGT were equally open to grafting their wider position on the 
CNT onto the event. For their part, this required a fairly selective presentation of it, with 
La Internacional failing to address the fact that it appears to have been ugetistas firing the 
shots. Although the men doing the shooting may not have been gunmen from the Libres, 
they had certainly chosen to escalate the confrontation onto the level of violence.   
 
However, because the cenetista delegate of the factory, the wood workers’ union and 
Solidaridad Obrera all refused to accept that all the workers would be re-employed, as 
agreed upon through the Delegación Regional del Trabajo, and instead chose to adopt a 
picketing footing, the conflict did take on a dimension that fitted in with the CNT’s wider 
stance on the Republic in the respect that it corresponded to the organization’s refusal to 
accept government arbitration. And it also appears to have been through adopting this 
posture that the workers who did wish to return to work ultimately came to join the UGT. 
It was therefore through the CNT’s position of deciding to fight against the Delegación 
Regional del Trabajo that the conflict came to take on a dimension of CNT-UGT 
organizational rivalry, even if it was fundamentally grounded in factors that were 
independent of this split, in particular the wish of one part of the workforce to return to 
work. Once the two sets of workers were split between the CNT and the UGT as a result of 
the CNT’s stance, however, and especially after the altercation, the whole incident came to 
be seen as a straight case of CNT-UGT rivalry, enmeshed in the wider stances and 
representations adopted by the CNT and the UGT on their rivals, with the original, non-
sectarian aspects of the incident quickly becoming obscured. As will be seen in the next 
chapter, the conflict at the Alena was certainly not the only one that would take place in 
Barcelona during these years that would also become a CNT-UGT conflict due to the 
question of arbitration.   
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Chapter Seven: CNT-UGT Hostilities and Labour Conflicts 
 
Bound up closely with the CNT’s attempts to mobilize workers against the UGT in 
Catalonia and provide a delegitimizing interpretation of the organization was the series of 
labour conflicts that occurred in the region in which both the CNT and the UGT had a 
union presence in the industrial sector in question. Some of the largest and most significant 
strikes that took place in Barcelona between 1931 and 1934 had a central component of 
CNT-UGT conflict, as did many others of a lesser importance. This chapter will examine 
the dynamics of labour conflicts in which the CNT and the UGT clashed during this 
period. 
 
The jurados mixtos 
 
The single most important stimulus for confrontation between the CNT and the UGT in 
Catalonia between 1931 and 1934 during labour conflicts was the question of the jurados 
mixtos. As was discussed in part one, the CNT were particularly opposed to this aspect of 
the UGT’s national agenda, presenting the jurados as an attack on direct action and indeed 
on the CNT itself. In Catalonia and especially Barcelona, this opposition to the jurados and 
other forms of arbitration in industrial relations took on a real and practical dimension, 
often with violent and acrimonious consequences. Although the UGT was small in 
Barcelona, jurados mixtos would play a role in a surprising amount of the most significant 
industrial conflicts in the city during this period, much to the chagrin of cenetistas.  
 
The jurados mixtos played a key, not to mention highly divisive role in two of the most 
prolonged labour conflicts that occurred in Barcelona during this era, namely the 
carpenters’ strike of late 1932 and the construction strike of April 1933. In late 1932, what 
would prove to be one of Barcelona’s most protracted strikes of the Republican era broke 
out in the carpentry trade, initiated by the wood workers’ union. The strike, as Vega 
highlights, was indicative of the turn towards greater violence that occurred in CNT strikes 
from the latter half of 1932 onwards. The strike was called to bring about the 
implementation of new bases de trabajo for carpenters, which included a reduced working 
day to help remedy the high unemployment in the sector. Whilst the CNT wood workers’ 
union pursued the new bases through a protracted strike that would go on for three months, 
the UGT minority in the sector negotiated a set of bases for the industry through a jurado 
mixto. The formula agreed upon in the jurado was a working week of forty-eight hours – 
four more than the CNT proposed – and similar salary increases to those contained within 
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the CNT’s agreement. Both the CNT and employers rejected the terms drawn up in the 
jurado. The CNT strike therefore continued. The strike intersected with the January 1933 
insurrection, which led to the union being closed and many of its militants being arrested. 
In spite of the union’s continued resistance, by February the majority of workers had 
returned to work, effectively with the solution agreed upon by the jurado coming into 
effect.1  
 
For the CNT wood workers’ union, and indeed for the CNT in Barcelona as a whole, the 
carpenters’ conflict became every bit as much about fighting against the jurados mixtos 
and what the UGT stood for as it did about winning material advances for workers. The 
union ran a vitriolic series of articles from the pages of Solidaridad Obrera against the 
UGT, the jurados, and, above all, against Largo. In December 1932 the union publicly 
advised that ‘neither the Delegado del Trabajo of the Generalitat, the jurados mixtos nor 
the authorities should bother sending us conciliatory notes nor invitations, since it will be a 
waste of time as they will all end up in the waste paper basket at our office’. Even before 
the jurado proposed a solution, the writings of the union’s junta and strike committee were 
focused on dismissing the jurados as having any legitimacy in the conflict, regularly 
emphasising that the employers ‘have to resolve the conflict directly with the workers and 
no-one else’. The UGT’s own wood workers’ union was unsurprisingly heavily criticized 
for what were interpreted as its attempts to derail the CNT strike and damage the material 
interests of the carpenters by presenting their own set of bases to the jurado.2  
 
Solidaridad Obrera’s hostility towards the jurados mixtos became more pronounced as the 
conflict wore on.  References to the jurados and the ley del 8 de abril pervaded the union’s 
statements, all in conjunction with an assertion that the CNT would remain defiant against 
them and would not prevent the CNT winning the dispute on their own terms.3 However, 
as the strike ran out of impetus in February, the cenetistas squarely pointed the finger at 
Largo and the jurados mixtos as being the reason why the conflict had lasted so long. 
According to an editorial published in Solidaridad Obrera on 14th February 1933, ‘Largo 
Caballero, a collaborator of Primo de Rivera’ had prevented a solution being reached by 
coming between employers and the CNT. According to the paper, employers and the strike 
committee had reached an agreement and were ready to return to work until the Labour 
Minister had intervened as part of his ‘offensive against the Confederación Nacional del 
Trabajo’.4 To a significant extent, this position must be seen as one of damage limitation 
and blame deflection in the face of a failing, protracted strike. The fact that the CNT had 
rejected a solution created by the jurado for the sector was obscured by a torrent of 
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accusations that it had done nothing but meddle where it should not have been in the first 
place.  
 
In spite of the return of workers to work, the CNT attempted to maintain the strike, with 
the backing of the Local Federation. By this point the stakes had been raised far higher 
than the winning of new working conditions and regulations for the Barcelona CNT. At a 
meeting of the Local Federation on 26th February, in agreeing to continue the strike and 
potentially extend it to other sectors, the delegate for the construction union asserted that 
the strike ‘was not about the conflict of a section, nor of a union, but of the UGT and the 
jurados mixtos against the CNT’.5 The strike nominally continued on this basis, as did an 
insistence that the dispute had to be won through direct action and not through the jurados 
mixtos, which continued to be a ‘den of enchufados that are hated and repudiated by 
employers and workers’,6 a claim made at a time when the majority of the industry was 
effectively working in accordance with the bases of the jurado. 
 
The CNT-led construction strike that began in April 1933 had many parallels with the 
carpenters’ strike in terms of the role that the jurados played in it. In April 1933 the CNT 
initiated a general strike in the industry, the goal of which was the creation of a new set of 
bases. The central demand was the creation of a six-hour working day, to help better share 
work amongst the 10000 unemployed workers in the sector. The conflict ultimately lasted 
over four months. During the conflict the CNT clashed with both the UGT construction 
union and the jurados mixtos. The conflict illustrated how committed both sets of militants 
were to working only through their own methods of handling industrial relations. It was 
also a prominent example of how, to both the CNT and UGT union leaders, the actions of 
their rivals were tantamount to collusion with the forces of reaction.7  
 
The CNT’s strike began on 17th April. The UGT’s union did not back the strike, with its 
members attempting to attend work as normal. At the same time as the CNT’s strike was 
launched, the UGT’s construction union, which unsurprisingly had considerably fewer 
members than that of the CNT, presented its own set of bases to the industry’s jurado 
mixto, in the hope that the conflict could be resolved using its own methods of arbitration 
rather than through the need to strike. The CNT, however, resolutely refused to pass the 
dispute through the arbitration systems.8  
 
Unlike in the wood workers’ strike, the sector’s employers were more willing to participate 
in the jurados. That they did so, placed into the general context of businesses in Spain 
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opposing them, illustrates the extent to which they were not prepared to deal with the CNT. 
Whilst viewing this move by employers as a pretext for refusing the CNT’s demands, 
however, the CNT ultimately blamed Largo for the employers’ position. In a 
demonstration of their faith that direct action would otherwise have prevailed, Solidaridad 
Obrera asserted that had it not been for Largo ‘imposing himself and his miscarriage of the 
jurados mixtos from his ministry, the employers would have already opened discussions 
with us’.9 The stage was therefore set for the CNT to fight the socialists on two levels: 
firstly against the UGT’s workers on the ground, and even more importantly against the 
jurados mixtos. 
 
For its part, the UGT in Catalonia was from the start highly hostile to the CNT’s strike, 
whilst at the same time wishing to present an alternative method of advancing the workers’ 
material position in the industry. Ugetistas writing in Cataluña Obrera argued that the 
strike had no purpose other than to ‘cover up’ the CNT’s ‘failure’ at the port, where an 
anarcho-syndicalist strike was during these days losing its momentum. In the eyes of the 
socialists, the strike only aimed to benefit the goals of the FAI, who were in turn serving 
the ends of the bourgeoisie by leading workers into an unnecessary strike.10 The USC took 
an equally critical stance of the CNT’s strike in the pages of Justicia Social.11  
 
In the first days of the strike, the CNT was bullish about its prospects.12 However, the CNT 
and the employers remained deadlocked, with the CNT continuing to refuse any 
involvement with the jurados. The occurrence of other, wider CNT protest actions, such as 
the general strike of May 1933, undoubtedly also caused the conflict to remain unresolved 
for longer, particularly as a result of the detentions of cenetistas and closure of its unions 
that resulted from them. At the same time, the UGT persisted in its negotiations with 
employers through the jurado mixto, but failed to reach an agreement, its demands for a 
seven-hour working day being rejected.  
 
The Barcelona construction strike took a crucial turn in July, when Largo imposed a 
solution in his capacity as Labour Minister. Largo’s solution stipulated a forty-four hour 
working week and substantial pay increases.13 Had the settlement been accepted at this 
point, the rivalry between the CNT and the UGT would have in fact served to the general 
benefit of workers in the sector. However, the CNT roundly refused to accept Largo’s 
settlement, precisely on the grounds that it represented an imposed solution by the 
socialists and an attack on direct action. The CNT’s view of Largo’s intervention was that 
after three months of conflict ‘when they had calculated that the strikers had arrived at the 
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extreme limit of physical resistance, when they thought hunger would defeat them’ Largo 
had stepped in, having ‘prepared bases behind the backs of the [CNT] union and the 
employers’. The argument of Solidaridad Obrera was a somewhat contradictory one in the 
respect that it seemed to imply Largo and the employers constituted a single bloc that 
sought to exploit the lengthy nature of the conflict, whilst also seeking to present Largo as 
someone who had interfered in the process against the wishes of the CNT and the 
employers. The paper also maintained that workers were united in their rejection of 
Largo’s ploy.14  
 
The attempts of the UGT to use arbitration to solve the conflict had a knock-on effect of 
escalating the level of confrontation on the streets and in workplaces. The most high-
profile instance of violence that resulted from the CNT’s construction strike was the 
murder of Francesc Llagostera, a ceramics worker and UGT member who was a worker 
representative on the jurados mixtos of the construction sector. On the evening of the 7th 
July, Llagostera left his home with one of his children. In the street, a group of men 
grabbed him, separating him from his child, before shooting him several times.15 There is 
little doubt that Llagostera was deliberately targeted and that his murder was premeditated; 
according to the Febus press agency the men had taken the trouble to find Llagostera’s 
jurados mixtos accreditation card before shooting him.16 The socialist press were adamant 
that it was faístas who had committed the murder. The Catalan Secretariat of the UGT 
released a statement to the press on 10th July in which they condemned the killing and 
presented it as another clear-cut instance of pistolerismo, linked to ‘the absurd construction 
strike, declared in the most favourable moments for the bourgeoisie’.17   
 
The solidity of the strike had been damaged by July, with many workers returning to work, 
believing that a solution had been reached by Largo.18 That this was the case illustrates 
how for many workers, the material outcome of the strike was more important than the 
methods by which the gains had been won or who had won them, factors which were 
paramount for committed cenetistas. In spite of their best efforts, the CNT construction 
union representatives had little choice but to enter into negotiations with employers in 
August, and on the 13th of the month the solution formulated by the two parties was put to 
a vote at a CNT assembly of construction workers, at which it was approved. The 
negotiated solution they had reached was for a forty-four hour working week, but in terms 
of its pay improvements was noticeably less than that which Largo had attempted to 
impose. The turnout at the assembly, according to Vega, was less than 2000, perhaps 
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indicating less of a commitment on the part of the workforce to the CNT’s handling of the 
conflict than Solidaridad Obrera had asserted throughout it.19  
 
In some industries, the creation of a UGT union brought with it moves by its leaders to set 
up jurados mixtos, which in turn spurred on the cenetistas in the industry to attack their 
UGT rivals with a particularly acute sense of urgency. As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, a UGT tram workers’ union was set up in Barcelona in 1932, a move which was 
met with the CNT’s transport union attempting to mobilize workers against it. However, 
such efforts to prevent a UGT presence amongst tram workers failed. Even worse, those 
involved with the foundation of the UGT tram section moved rapidly to bring about the 
creation of a jurado mixto for the sector. On 2nd November 1932, Ponciano Alonso, one of 
the key militants of the CNT transport union during the Republic and the Civil War, 
published an article in Solidaridad Obrera which comprehensively attacked both the 
implementation of the jurado mixto in the industry and also carried out a character 
assassination of Eduardo Gómez Benedicto, the socialist who spearheaded efforts to create 
the UGT union in the sector. Gómez Benedicto was an expert in ‘dirty and murky 
business’ who was ‘a traitor to the proletarian cause’ and, to top it all, had, according to 
Alonso, been an esquirol during the infamous La Canadiense strike of 1919. The veracity 
of the accusations is unfortunately impossible to prove, but they undoubtedly 
complimented very well Alonso’s efforts to discredit both the UGT and the jurados. He 
went on to describe the arbitration system as ‘the absolute negation of liberty and 
proletarian defence’ and argue that those who had joined the UGT’s tram workers’ section 
were of an even lesser calibre than Gómez Benedicto and were ‘all esquiroles’. However, 
Alonso was also convinced that ‘the tram workers, united as a single man in the invincible 
CNT, will not step back in their social revolutionary march’, in spite of these attempts to 
set up a jurado for tram workers.20  
 
A similarly combative outlook against the jurado was expressed at an assembly of tram 
workers held by the CNT transport union on 8th November. Here, when the subject was 
raised, the jurados were denounced as ‘an instrument of capital and the state to kill the 
rebellious spirit and the rights of the worker’ and were a ‘dictatorial work’ directed against 
the proletariat by Largo. A cry of ‘no!’ was raised by the assembled workers in response to 
a militant asking if they would accept a jurado for their industry. Later on at the assembly, 
according to the report in Solidaridad Obrera, speakers ‘scathingly attacked the Unión 
General de Trabajadores for being an organism of traitors and esquiroles at the service of 
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the bourgeoisie and the state, miserably and cowardly tricking workers with promises that 
turn into hunger and misery, into imprisonment and crime’.21  
 
Alonso published similar attacks on this new UGT presence amongst tram workers and the 
jurado that they were attempting to set up.22 In spite of the hostility of both Alonso and the 
tram workers at the CNT assembly, however, the ugetistas did not appear to give up. In 
December 1932, Gómez Benedicto went to Madrid, along with another leader of the 
UGT’s tram workers, where they met with Largo to discuss their jurado mixto, as well as 
meeting with UGT transport leaders from other cities in Spain. Moreover, in May 1933, 
the Socidedad de Tranviarios de Barcelona held an event to celebrate the first anniversary 
of the organization.23  
 
This hostility towards the UGT tram union and the jurados that it promoted was 
maintained as late as 1934. The nature of the criticism and the language deployed indicate 
a movement in disarray, reduced to making the most vitriolic attacks possible on perceived 
enemies. Solidaridad, the temporary replacement for Solidaridad Obrera following the ban 
on that paper, published an article on 24th February in which the UGT tram union was 
attacked for presenting a set of bases through the jurado mixto. The rant against the UGT’s 
attempts to present new working conditions was nothing short of bizarre. The socialists 
were ‘traitors, as always’; according to the author ‘their dirtiness does not surprise us. They 
cannot infect us with it. Our epidermis is impermeable’. It also maintained the façade that, 
by this stage, the CNT’s transport union still commanded the loyalty of all tram workers, 
whilst that of the UGT represented an illegitimate minority.24  
 
As has been demonstrated here, the CNT in Barcelona presented the jurados mixtos as an 
anti-worker aberration, and fought against the involvement of arbitration even if it would 
bring a faster solution to a conflict with the same material outcome. However, the idea that 
it did this purely out of a commitment to its principles, and not because arbitration was the 
strategy adopted by a rival, must be called into question. Both immediately before and 
during the Republic, various cenetistas in Catalonia were willing to accept the intervention 
of regional or municipal authorities into the resolution of conflicts. The case of Macià 
intervening on behalf of the CNT at the port in June 1931, outlined in chapter five, was not 
a one-off. Rider highlights the recurrent recourse, during the summer of 1931, a period 
which marks the peak of the CNT winning new bases for workers, by its unions in 
Barcelona to accept solutions drawn up by the local authorities.25 Furthermore, according 
to Martin Benjamin and Albert Balcells, from 1934, once the Generalitat had been given 
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greater power over industrial relations, some CNT unions accepted the interventions of 
Martí Barrera, a former cenetista who was appointed labour counsellor to the Generalitat.26 
This willingness to accept arbitration hints not just at a certain pragmatism on the part of 
certain CNT union leaders, but also that the attacks on arbitrated solutions to conflicts were 
motivated as much by an organizational rivalry as they were by ideological tenets. Eulàlia 
Vega points out that from the spring of 1930, once the CNT was legalized, its unions 
attacked Libres and UGT rivals for using arbitration, when in many cases CNT militants 
themselves had been using such mechanisms during the dictatorship when they were 
operating in other unions. Vega argues that this highlighted their wish to use the idea of 
arbitration as amounting to collusion with employers to discredit rivals; the same could, to 
a certain extent, be said of the CNT’s stance during the Republic.27  
 
If the CNT became fixated on the jurados in some conflicts to the point where they would 
reject their settlements on principle and regardless of the terms they offered, then it was 
equally the case that UGT unions were at times fairly opportunistic in undercutting strike 
actions undertaken by the CNT from their moment of inception, drawing on the jurados 
mixtos in the process. A strike called by the CNT in the packaging sector in November 
1933 offers an example of how Catalan UGT unions sometimes responded to CNT-
initiated conflicts. On the 26th November the CNT’s graphic arts union held an assembly 
for workers involved in the production of paper and card packaging, at which it was agreed 
to call a strike after attempts to negotiate with employers over new bases de trabajo had 
not produced satisfactory results. The strike would take place with immediate effect. The 
UGT’s union for this field immediately released a statement to the press to let it be known 
that it did not support the strike due to the way it had been called – that is to say, not in 
accordance with the laws of the Republic in terms of notice given – and instructed its 
workers not to adhere to the strike.28 Another reason given by the UGT union for this 
opposition was their belief that the CNT union lacked the sufficient numerical support to 
be in a position to call a strike in this fashion. It was not simply the case, then, that the 
UGT union did not support the strike, but that it actively wished to distance itself from it 
and condemn it. At the same time, the UGT also entered into negotiations with the 
industry’s employers, with a new set of bases being agreed via a jurado mixto in early 
December and the employers announcing to the CNT that these were the bases that they 
would be prepared to implement once they ended their strike.29  
 
The CNT union was furious with the UGT’s handling of the conflict, publishing an 
account of ‘ugetista treachery’ in Solidaridad Obrera on 3rd December. The cenetistas 
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took issue with the accusation that they did not have sufficient worker representation to 
call the strike and attacked the UGT union leaders, as was to be expected, in terms of them 
being ‘opportunists’ and ‘enchufistas’ who were living off workers. The opportunity was 
also taken to declare that workers in this industry were against the reformist methods of the 
UGT and wholly backed the CNT.30 Although it is difficult to know the precise balance of 
forces in this industry, it would appear that the UGT would have represented a minority, 
though not a tiny one, declaring one hundred members when it joined the UGT in August 
1930, having previously been an autonomous union.31 The CNT union, meanwhile, 
evidently had enough support to disrupt production significantly through its strike; in early 
December, departments in the Generalitat were unable to conduct normal business due to a 
lack of envelopes as a result of the conflict.32  
 
Even as the CNT in Barcelona progressively declined, its opposition to the jurados 
remained as resolute as ever. This manifested itself not just in the form of the labour 
conflicts in the construction and wood working sectors. The opposition in these months of 
decline also took the form of the CNT refusing to cooperate in any strike actions with other 
organizations of the left, in large measure due to these groups wishing to initially pursue 
conflicts through the jurados. In 1934, for example, the UGT workers in the fabric 
treatment sector sought the cooperation of the CNT for a conflict with employers in the 
sector. The ugetistas organized a meeting to suggest that they and the CNT co-ordinate 
their presentation of bases to employers. The minutes of the meeting reveal the evasive 
attitude taken by cenetistas to this suggestion, with the junta members rejecting the offer 
whilst stressing that they were not opposed to unity. The ugetistas were informed that a 
coordination of their efforts would be ‘problematic’ and were alerted to the different labour 
conflict methods adopted by the two organizations. The junta were keen to stress that they 
could not accept any ‘interventionism’ in a labour conflict and that all CNT labour 
disputes, by order of the organization’s statutes, ‘have to be carried out through direct 
action’. The UGT’s proposal of first seeking a solution from arbitration and then carrying 
out a strike if the bases were not accepted was rejected by the CNT junta. For the 
cenetistas, it was simply not permissible for a labour conflict to be fought outside of their 
own terms, while the ugetistas likewise insisted on first using arbitration, even if they 
showed slightly more flexibility by indicating a willingness to adopt direct action methods 
if negotiation failed. At the same time, the CNT junta sought to stress that it ‘has always 
and at all times done everything possible to bring about unity of action; it has never tired of 
asking comrades to join our section’. This latter statement illustrates that, for many 
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cenetistas in the era prior to October 1934, worker unity could only result from all workers 
being in the CNT.33 
 
Outside of Barcelona, there is also some evidence of the jurados playing a role in 
interactions between the CNT and the UGT in the region. In Tortosa, the CNT found itself 
in 1933 and 1934 eclipsed by the UGT in terms of its membership levels. With the UGT 
the dominant worker entity, the jurados became an increasingly prominent feature in the 
town. Nevertheless, and as a reflection of the CNT’s deep-rooted opposition to the 
Republic’s arbitration measures, the CNT here staged a defiant stand against the UGT and 
the jurados, initiating strike actions against them. The UGT set up ten unions in Tortosa 
between the start of the Republic and October 1934.34 The local UGT attempted to impose 
the jurados mixtos and their settlements on employers. Employers in the construction 
sector refused to accept the bases de trabajo drawn up by the local jurados, and the UGT 
construction union accordingly called a strike, which took place in September 1933. 
However, it was not just employers who opposed the jurados here. The CNT were equally 
opposed to the settlement and the UGT’s campaign to impose it. The anarcho-syndicalists 
presented the UGT’s settlement as an attack on liberty of union affiliation, because as part 
of the work distribution element of the agreement workers were required to hold a 
registration card from the jurados. Although the card was freely available to all workers, 
cenetistas in the town viewed the arrangement as an imposition of socialism. Mirroring 
Solidaridad Obrera’s interpretation of workers who accepted the jurados, El Socialista 
suggested that the workers who opposed the jurados in Tortosa were being manipulated by 
the bourgeoisie. The case of Tortosa illustrates how there was a degree of inevitability, 
when two unions with opposed methods attempted to occupy the same space, that one 
union would have to occupy a position that would align it with employers.35  
 
In 1934 the CNT stepped up its efforts to overturn the jurados mixtos of the construction 
industry in the town. In late August, workers without the jurados mixtos registration were 
dismissed from a construction site. One of them, a cenetista named José Subirats, refused 
to accept the dismissal, and returned to work as normal the next day. The Guardia Civil 
were ultimately called in to remove him. This led to a delegation of CNT militants heading 
to the town hall to inform the Mayor that the CNT would initiate a general strike in the 
town if the workers were not readmitted. The Delegado del Trabajo was immediately 
called to the town to resolve the dispute, but was unable to break the deadlock, his offer of 
immediately issuing registration cards to all workers, including those who had been 
dismissed, being refused by the cenetistas.36 The CNT in the town then began to prepare to 
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mobilize workers against the jurados. However, in a reflection of the heavy-handed 
treatment that was by this stage of the Republic routinely used against CNT organisms, the 
government ordered the closure of the CNT’s local headquarters and detained some of its 
militants.37 The plight of the CNT in Tortosa was followed by the right-wing press, who 
used it as an opportunity to present the UGT in fairly similar terms as did Solidaridad 
Obrera. The pro-monarchist El Siglo Futuro, for example, took the CNT’s side, declaring 
that ‘the Casa del Pueblo of Tortosa opposes workers who do not belong to it working’.38 
The cenetistas themselves were no less indignant, describing their socialist counterparts as 
‘despots of the working class’ and exhorting workers to ‘fight against this jurado mixto, 
against these cowardly socialists’.39 The fight against the jurados mixtos in Tortosa made 
the transition from the local notices section of Solidaridad Obrera into its opinion pieces, 
where the situation was presented as being that the local socialist movement had a 
stranglehold over the local government of the Esquerra.40  
 
Esquirolaje 
 
One vital element of the dynamic of hostilities between the CNT and the UGT during 
labour conflicts in Barcelona was the issue of strike breaking. The linkage between the 
UGT and esquirolaje was made with regard to UGT unions across Spain, but was made 
especially vehemently with regard to the Catalan UGT. As the alleged successor 
organization to the Sindicatos Libres, Solidaridad Obrera and CNT militants posited that 
strike breaking was one of the fundamental traits of the UGT in Catalonia. Solidaridad 
Obrera often reported that UGT workers were pressed into service as esquiroles during 
smaller CNT strikes, replacing striking CNT members. To give one example, during the 
course of a strike at a glass workshop in January 1932, the junta of the CNT section 
coordinating the strike asserted through the pages of the paper that the employers had 
undertaken ‘a recruitment of esquiroles in favour of the social detritus that is called the 
UGT’.41 Accusations of strike breaking were often linked to the idea that Largo Caballero 
was coordinating an offensive against the CNT to destroy its unions, such as the strike that 
CNT cinema workers threatened to call in June 1931, outlined in the previous chapter.42 
 
One complicating factor in judging the role that strike breaking played in the dynamic of 
CNT-UGT interactions in Catalonia is that the terms ‘esquiroles’ and ‘esquirolaje’ were 
used by cenetistas to describe instances of UGT members continuing their work when their 
CNT counterparts called a strike, which happened often, as well as using it in relation to 
instances of UGT members being called in to replace striking CNT members, which 
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happened far less frequently in Barcelona. These were qualitatively two very different 
things, the latter being far more provocative than the former, but cenetistas tended to brand 
both as being esquirolaje. For example, during the construction strike of 1933, Solidaridad 
Obrera labelled the Catalan UGT as esquiroles simply for its initial stance of opposition to 
the conflict.43 Often, therefore, it is unclear which meaning of the term is being deployed 
by cenetistas in their attacks, making it even more difficult to assess claims of esquirolaje, 
especially in smaller-scale strikes.  
 
What would appear to be the case is that the CNT’s claims regarding the extent of the 
Catalan UGT’s esquirolaje, in Barcelona at least, were overstated. To a certain degree, the 
CNT’s repeated denunciations of UGT esquirolaje in Catalonia were no more or less valid 
than those made against the CNT by other groups, such as the communists, in the event of 
a CNT union not supporting one of their strikes in this period.44 In the case of the cinema 
workers’ conflict, the claim of strike breaking was made before a strike had even taken 
place.45 Even Solidaridad Obrera admitted on some occasions that, whilst the UGT did not 
back a particular CNT strike, their organization did not provide labour to replace CNT 
strikers. However, according to cenetistas, that this was the case was due to the Catalan 
UGT having so few members, rather than it choosing not to provide strike breakers. The 
implication was therefore that the Catalan UGT did by default attempt to provide strike 
breakers, and was only prevented from doing this through a lack of support. For example, 
during the carpenters’ strike of late 1932, the CNT strike committee acknowledged that the 
UGT wood workers’ union had not provided strike breakers to replace CNT workers, 
though this was put down to the fact that ‘the UGT is like a mythical legend, without 
stability nor real substance. It is a phantasm’. In other words, its non-provision of 
esquiroles was only a result of it not having sufficient members to do so.46 
 
Similarly, during the 1933 construction strike, in appraising the state of the conflict on 20th 
April, Solidaridad Obrera presented the UGT as esquiroles for their public announcement 
of not supporting the strike, whilst also mockingly implying that the union in any case 
must have had no members since ‘there is not a single esquirol’.47 Based on its later 
coverage of this conflict as it dragged on into June, had there been wide-scale deployment 
of UGT labour, it is certain that the anarcho-syndicalist press would have condemned it 
loudly and vociferously.48 Indeed, the Catalan UGT itself expressed the concern that the 
CNT’s strike was leading to the hiring of workers who were happy to act as strike 
breakers. The UGT also continued to maintain publicly that the CNT (or rather the FAI, 
which the Catalan socialists now judged to be totally in control of the union’s actions) in 
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its handling of the conflict had ‘offered an excellent service’ to contractors by giving them 
a pretext to erode union representation in the sector by hiring strike breakers.49 
 
Unsurprisingly, given the extent of the CNT-UGT conflict there and its manifestation in 
the form of sectarian boycotts, the port was one of the key areas of Barcelona in which the 
accusation of strike breaking was most aggressively levelled at the UGT. As has been 
outlined in this part of the thesis, in July and October 1931, the UGT provided strike-
breaking labour for the two CNT strikes that took place there. As was also discussed in 
chapter six, during these conflicts the CNT accused the UGT of acting on behalf of Largo 
to destroy the CNT and replace it with the UGT. Though not termed precisely as 
esquirolaje, Solidaridad Obrera nevertheless argued, with regard to the October conflict, 
for example, that UGT port workers were ‘hypocrites and mercenaries’ who were working 
to serve the interests of employers at the port.50. 
 
However, it is essential to bear in mind that the two strikes that took place at the port were 
inextricably bound up with the CNT’s attempts to marginalize the entire UGT port 
federation, as was discussed in chapter five. The July 1931 strike by the CNT, though 
aimed at implementing a new system of contracting workers and other material 
stipulations, came just a month after the CNT had successfully banished the UGT from the 
port. It is hardly surprising that the FEOP would be willing to offer its members to 
employers in such circumstances, especially as, in any case, the FEOP sought to bring 
about an arbitration system to handle the management of industrial relations at the docks. 
The calling of the strike so quickly after the imposition of the closed shop illustrates, on 
the part of the cenetistas, a certain naivety. Having forced all workers into the CNT – even 
if it was only a minority who actually needed forcing – it was certainly not very astute then 
to believe that these workers would not resent that manoeuvre, let alone stand firm in a 
strike convoked by the CNT. If the UGT had any case to answer over its response to the 
July conflict on the grounds that it was a strike designed to improve the material position 
of dockers, the same could not be said of the October 1931 conflict. On this occasion, the 
CNT’s boycott-cum-strike was directed entirely at the UGT. It was hardly surprising that 
the organization would provide members to replace striking cenetistas when the dispute 
was aimed squarely at removing the UGT from the port entirely.   
  
There was one further CNT-led strike at the port, which the UGT once again refused to 
back. By this juncture, the CNT was a fading presence at the port, through a combination 
of the spectacular backfiring of its July and October 1931 strikes there, the passing over of 
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some workers to the UGT and the general attritive effects of repression. The UGT, on the 
other hand, was the dominant union at the port. Nevertheless, the CNT transport union 
called a strike at the port in April 1933. The goals of this strike were an establishment of a 
fair system for distributing work, and an eight-hour day.51 Once more, the FEOP provided 
replacement labour for CNT strikers, and the conflict collapsed.52 On this particular 
occasion, the difficulty in judging the UGT’s actions stems from the fact that it was the 
larger union, and as such the FEOP leaders obviously would have felt incensed by the idea 
of a smaller union attempting to execute a strike that was effectively in opposition to the 
system that it had promoted, just as CNT union leaders became enraged by their much 
smaller UGT counterparts attempting to resolve disputes through arbitration. This was 
admittedly not a dynamic that occurred frequently in Barcelona during the Republic; the 
norm was rather a UGT minority refusing to back a strike by the CNT majority.  
 
Competing claims of legitimacy 
 
During strikes in which the CNT clashed with the UGT, a key part of the recriminatory 
accusations that publicly went back and forth between the two organizations was centred 
on which organization had the legitimacy to speak and act on behalf of workers in the 
industry in question. This occurred in particular when a conflict took on the dynamic of the 
CNT calling a strike, and the UGT then attempting to resolve the conflict in the industry 
through the use of the jurados mixtos. In such cases, cenetistas loudly accused the UGT of 
being too small to have the right to impose a jurado on an industry in which the CNT was 
the stronger union, extrapolating from this that the jurados themselves were illegitimate. 
This very perspective was put forward by the CNT during the carpenters’ strike of late 
1932. In fact, the criticism went much further, presenting the leaders of the UGT wood 
workers’ union as ‘bullshitters who try to make themselves out as wise, trying to trick 
workers with a few material gains which will be laughed out of every workshop’ and who 
were also trying to ‘spread confusion’ through their involvement in the conflict.53  
 
The CNT’s construction union equally perceived the UGT and the jurados as illegitimate 
actors during the prolonged strike in the industry over the spring and summer of 1933. 
‘Who do the worker “members” who attend the meetings convoked by the jurado mixto 
represent?’ asked the front page of Solidaridad Obrera on 22nd April. The answer, 
according to the paper, was that ‘they do not represent the construction workers, affiliated 
to the Confederación Nacional del Trabajo’. At the same time, the paper attacked 
employers in the industry for having instructed the CNT to present their demands through 
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the jurados and also of having accused the CNT construction union of having no influence 
amongst workers in the industry. Evidently for all sides involved in the conflict it was of 
paramount importance to present their opponents as having no support within the sector 
and therefore no legitimacy.54 
 
The central accusation made by the CNT in such conflicts in which the UGT tried to 
intervene, then, was that the organization and its small unions were given, through their 
promotion of the jurados mixtos, a role that went far beyond their size. Whilst the 
accompanying rhetoric regarding their efforts amounting to collusion with the bourgeoisie 
or representing a direct attempt to destroy the CNT is more debatable, the claim itself 
certainly has an element of validity to it. With regard to the construction strike, for 
example, that there was by 1933 a jurado mixto established for this industry gave the UGT 
a stronger presence in it by allowing the socialist union publicly to present itself as having 
some method of resolving the dispute, in spite of its smaller size. 
 
Some cases of the UGT setting up unions in an industry and then proceeding to set up a 
jurado likewise illustrate the CNT’s fear that the arbitration would give somewhat parvenu 
UGT activists in an industry a disproportionate level of influence that would potentially 
undermine the CNT’s influence, which was based first and foremost on the strength of 
numbers of workers enrolled in the sindicatos únicos. The reaction of the CNT transport 
union’s militants to the creation of a UGT tram union and a jurado for that sector, outlined 
above, illustrates this. Looking at these developments from the cenetista perspective, it 
must have been galling and threatening to have expended a great deal of effort in building 
up a union that sought to represent the majority of workers in its field, only to then see 
those efforts potentially threatened by individuals with no substantial support amongst the 
workforce making moves to set up a legally binding entity that would govern labour 
conflicts for all workers in the sector. Under such circumstances, it is perhaps unsurprising 
that the cenetistas’ response to the UGT tram workers’ efforts was one of vitriolic hostility. 
 
For its part, the Catalan UGT had its own series of reasons why it regarded the CNT as not 
a legitimate representative of the working classes in the region. These were expressed not 
just during specific labour conflicts, but also on a more routine basis through newspapers 
connected to the Catalan UGT. The claim of illegitimacy was related to one of the central 
accusations made against the CNT by the Catalan UGT during the Republic, which was 
that the anarcho-syndicalist labour federation’s popularity was based upon coercion and 
intimidation of workers into joining the sindicatos únicos. The argument followed that 
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because its dominance in a particular sector was based on this deceit, it had no right to 
force workers into counterproductive and self-defeating strike actions. From the summer of 
1931, La Internacional routinely informed its readers of cases of workers ‘being coerced 
and attacked by those from the CNT, who wish to impose their will through any means on 
Catalan workers’.55  
 
This basic interpretation of the CNT’s modus operandi served as the main basis for 
justifying the Catalan UGT’s opposition to the CNT’s strike actions. The port was one key 
example of this. According to Desiderio Trilles, writing in La Internacional, the CNT’s 
initial supremacy at the port was a result of its coercion of workers, and as such the actions 
undertaken by the transport union did not reflect the will of the port workers.56 Similarly, 
Catalan UGT organizers at times often dared to make the claim that their CNT rivals did 
not even represent a majority at all in some industries, even taking into account their 
recourse to intimidating workers into the organization. This claim was made by, amongst 
others, Adolfo Simó, with regard to the battle between the CNT and the UGT in the bakery 
industry,57 and again at the port over the CNT’s April 1933 strike.58  
 
The Catalan UGT’s claims of CNT illegitimacy are somewhat problematic, even if the 
proposition on which they are based, namely that cenetistas did resort to intimidation to 
gain members, does have some validity to it. There were clearly cases of workers being 
intimidated into joining the CNT, ranging from them simply being told that it would be in 
their interests to join the CNT all the way to outright threats of violence. However, the 
Catalan UGT’s interpretation of the CNT turned this aspect of its militants’ behaviour into 
being the sole reason for the CNT having members, when it was undoubtedly the case that 
a substantial amount of the CNT’s strength was based on a genuine popularity amongst 
workers, albeit one which diminished over the course of the Republic. For the Catalan 
UGT to claim that the CNT had no legitimacy whatsoever in its claims to be acting on 
behalf of workers was therefore partially disingenuous. That said, it must also be borne in 
mind that CNT union organizers often did their utmost, as outlined in chapter five, to 
prevent the presence of a competing UGT union in their sector. Accordingly, it is 
impossible to know if UGT unions could have gained a more substantial level of grassroots 
support – and thus more legitimacy when it came to leading industry-wide labour disputes 
– had their unions had more freedom to promote themselves amongst workers from the 
outset of the Republic.  
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The negative impact of CNT-UGT hostilities on workers 
 
One aspect of some labour conflicts in Barcelona in which the CNT and UGT clashed was 
that it was ultimately employers who benefited from the inter-union rivalry, and workers 
who lost out in material terms. Employers were able to exploit the fact of the two labour 
federations attempting to solve labour conflicts separately from one another by being able 
to choose the union that they wished to negotiate with according to which one was likely to 
bring about a better deal. In the 1933 construction strike, for example, the employers were 
able to exploit the stand-off between the CNT and the UGT to ensure that the outcome of 
the conflict was one of minimal improvements. In July the employers were able to reject 
the terms imposed by Largo Caballero as a result of the CNT’s continued opposition to 
them; the conflict ultimately ended, as discussed, with a settlement that was inferior to that 
put forward by the Labour Ministry.59 
 
Sometimes, employers were able to take advantage of the CNT’s aversion to the jurados to 
roll back any material gains that they had provided workers, with the CNT willing to 
accept bases that were inferior to those that had been previously established by the 
jurados. This was the case in the wood working industry, where the CNT wood workers’ 
union ultimately got its revenge on its UGT rival over its intervention in the carpenters’ 
strike of late 1932 and early 1933, though certainly at an overall cost to workers in the 
industry. In August 1933 there was another wood workers’ strike. As in the previous 
conflict, the UGT concurrently presented bases to the jurado, which the CNT and 
employers once again rejected, in the latter case undoubtedly because they realized it 
would be to their advantage to negotiate directly with the CNT. Accordingly, the CNT 
struck a deal with employers, though it was a noticeably inferior one to that which the 
UGT had achieved through the jurado.60 Writing in Justicia Social, the Secretary of the 
UGT’s wood workers’ union denounced the development as a connivance of the CNT 
union leaders with the employers in an attempt to undermine the jurados, in the process 
acting against workers’ interests in the sector. The secretary derided the claims of the 
cenetistas that they had won an agreement that represented the ‘authentic will’ of the 
workers by asking ‘since when have wood workers had as their will to win a lower wage 
and have worse working conditions?’.61  
 
Adolfo Simó of the UGT’s bakery union likewise complained of the CNT undermining the 
material interests of workers, and thus benefiting employers, through its opposition to 
gains won by the UGT and through arbitration mechanisms. Writing in June 1931, Simó 
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claimed that ‘between December and the fall of the monarchy, the fearsome 
revolutionaries of the único did everything they could to sabotage whatever La Espiga did 
to improve the living conditions of everyone in the sector’. According to Simó, the CNT 
leaders were willing to accept the same conditions that the representatives of the Libres 
had done so that they could gain a foothold in the industry.62 From early on in the 
Republic, the CNT and the UGT union were at loggerheads over the crucial issue of how 
to interact with employers in the industry. The CNT were unsurprisingly insistent on 
adopting an approach of direct action, whilst the ugetistas themselves wished to make use 
of the Republic to force the implementation of bases that they had been fighting for since 
the 1920s but which the Libres had hitherto blocked. La Espiga initially voiced their wish 
for an unspecified form of government intervention to force the bases to be adopted; they 
subsequently came to be strong proponents of the jurados mixtos.63 The UGT union 
remained publicly critical of the methods of its CNT counterparts, claiming they were 
making no progress whilst maintaining the sector in a state of conflict through a strike they 
launched in the industry in the summer of 1931.64 As the CNT were continuing to negotiate 
with business owners in the summer of 1931, La Espiga gained the support of the local 
Delegado del Trabajo to bring about a new starting time for bakers, one of the key points 
of conflict in the sector, with night work having been previously mandatory until this 
intervention.65 
 
Through the Delegado del Trabajo and then the jurados mixtos, the UGT bakers gained the 
implementation of the bases that they had been campaigning for since the days of the 
monarchy. However, the CNT refused to accept these bases.66 Instead, the leaders of the 
CNT and employers, in a meeting apparently brokered by the Civil Governor, came to an 
agreement on an alternative set of bases at the beginning of 1933 that were inferior to those 
agreed through the jurados. The 5am start that had been won through the jurados was 
revoked, bringing about a return to night work.67 Simó indignantly vented his anger 
through the pages of Justicia Social and Cataluña Obrera, claiming that ‘the CNT have 
played into the bourgeoisie’s hands’.68   
 
Conclusions 
 
Where there was a UGT presence within Barcelona industries, its acrimonious co-existence 
with the CNT often complicated labour conflicts, with the two labour organizations’ 
opposing methods and agendas conditioning the course of several important industrial 
disputes in the city. However, the UGT’s role in CNT labour disputes did not necessarily 
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conform to the accounts given by cenetistas. Although the CNT publicly claimed that their 
UGT rivals would provide strike breakers in virtually every strike that they could, the state 
of affairs was generally far more complex than this. Often the UGT simply refused to 
support a CNT strike rather than actively providing replacement labour for employers; on 
other occasions, strikes were themselves directed at the UGT, making their opposition to 
them eminently more comprehensible. However, esquirolaje tended to be more of a 
symptom of the more fundamental issue of the jurados mixtos and other forms of 
arbitration, which proved to be the primary cause of hostilities between the CNT and the 
UGT in Barcelona during labour conflicts. The method of winning a labour conflict, rather 
than the objective of receiving a positive material settlement of workers in the industry in 
question, all too often became the overriding focus of several highly protracted and 
acrimonious disputes.  
 
The issue of which organization – CNT or UGT – and which method of industrial relations 
– direct action or management unionism – should be used to manage industry-wide 
disputes raised the deeper question of which organization could present itself as the 
legitimate manager of dispute, and by what criteria. The CNT sought to stress the small 
membership base of the UGT, whilst the UGT countered that the CNT deployed a fairly 
violent form of majoritarianism vis-à-vis the participation of workers in its disputes. Whilst 
it is evident that the CNT took the attitude that all those in an industry that did not comply 
with its strike calls were esquiroles and thus merited targeting, it is also difficult not to 
have a certain empathy with the perspective of their militants during the sorts of disputes 
outlined in this chapter. Cenetistas had built a mass movement from the ground up, and the 
existence of arbitration systems potentially empowered individuals who were relatively 
unknown to have a decisive influence in the representation of all workers in the industry, 
assuming the arbitration mechanisms functioned correctly. Ultimately, though, the most 
consistent losers in labour disputes in which the CNT and UGT clashed were not either 
organization, but workers themselves.  
 
Finally, it is important to note that the broad outlines of the activities of the Catalan UGT 
with regard to labour conflicts for the most part corresponded closely to the ethos of Santos 
Julià’s description of ‘management unionism’ that was outlined in chapter one. As we have 
seen, UGT unions in Catalonia that became embroiled in the most significant 
confrontations with the CNT did so as they attempted to pursue industrial relations 
according to the fundamental attributes of ‘management unionism’. Furthermore, as this 
chapter and chapter six have also highlighted, unions that joined the UGT during the 
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Republic, such as the FEOP or the tram workers, did so first and foremost because they 
sought to manage labour relations through arbitration systems. Likewise, unions such as 
the bakers, construction and wood workers fell foul of the CNT in the course of practicing 
this form of unionism. CNT-UGT conflicts in Catalonia cannot be explained by the idea 
that the Catalan UGT was a reactionary front for Libres gunmen, or the execution of a 
Largo Caballero master plan to destroy the CNT, executed by pliant lackeys, as the CNT 
presented them to be. Instead, hostilities between the two unions in the region seem to have 
been the result, to a significant extent, of the same causes as the battles between CNT and 
UGT unions going on elsewhere in Spain, which were fuelled by the CNT’s direct action 
methods jarring against the union practices of the UGT. The key difference between CNT-
UGT hostilities in Catalonia and those elsewhere was therefore not so much the 
characteristics of the Catalan UGT as it was the CNT’s efforts to construct their socialist 
union rivals as being entirely reactionary and anti-worker, coupled with the cenetistas’ 
belief that, because they and the working classes were in their view synonymous, they 
could and should attempt to marginalize the Catalan UGT. 
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Chapter Eight: The CNT’s Alianza Revolucionaria Proposal to the UGT, 1936 
 
October 1934 and its consequences 
 
The left’s confrontation with the right over the course of 1934 culminated in a failed 
rebellion, led by the socialists, in October. Though it did fail, and in most areas was put 
down relatively easily, October 1934 would become a watershed moment for the Republic 
and above all for the Spanish left, due to a combination of the two-week stand made by 
workers in Asturias, which was a product of the joint efforts of the CNT and the UGT 
there, the severity of the repression that was enacted by the government in response to the 
uprising, and the general sense amongst the left that the right were willing and able to use 
force to impose an authoritarian regime.  
 
The event that led the socialists to launch the attempt at revolution was the withdrawal by 
the CEDA in late September of their support for the Radical government, which had been 
operating as a minority government that depended on CEDA backing. José María Gil 
Robles, the leader of the CEDA, now demanded the formation of a government that would 
include CEDA ministers. A new cabinet was formed on 4th October, containing three 
CEDA ministers. The socialists had argued since the beginning of 1934 that the entry of 
the CEDA into the government would mark the death of the Republic’s ideals and the 
beginnings of fascism. But the socialist leadership lacked the conviction to make the 
decisive call to bring about such a movement when it seemed certain that the CEDA would 
enter the government; for all the revolutionary rhetoric of the Caballerista faction and in 
spite of the practical preparations being drawn up, the socialists sought to put off taking a 
stand until the last possible moment.1 As Preston points out, several days elapsed between 
the collapse of the government and the naming of the new cabinet, and it was widely 
expected that the new cabinet would contain CEDA ministers. Yet during these days Largo 
Caballero made no decisive preparations to prime his revolutionary movement, choosing 
instead to do nothing until the official announcement of the new government.2 
 
The socialist coordination of the overall movement was severely lacking. The insurrection 
that took place in October 1934 was the culmination of several months of planning by the 
socialists, even if the preparations had consisted of little more than some attempts – often 
with only limited success – to procure arms, and an exercise in gathering information 
regarding which members of the movement’s grassroots would be willing to participate 
when the call came. 3 The overall plan for the insurrection was for socialist militants across 
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the country to call general strikes and, if possible, take up arms to neutralize the state’s 
security apparatus when the call to do so came, and then await further instructions from the 
leadership in Madrid, which would provide central coordination for the nationwide 
movement. The overall success of the uprising would therefore depend on events in 
Madrid; if it was defeated there, no alternative way of coordinating the uprisings that 
would take place in towns across the rest of Spain existed. 
 
On 4th October, the socialists gave twenty-four hours’ notice of a general strike in Madrid. 
Although socialist unions, as well as some communist and anarcho-syndicalist forces, did 
strike, they crucially did not occupy the streets. Moreover, many socialist leaders were 
either arrested or went to ground, with no significant assault on the institutions of authority 
taking place.4 The city that was supposed to be the nexus point of the revolution was 
therefore rapidly neutralized, even if some workers stayed on strike for up to a week.5 
General strikes also took place in several other major cities, including Seville, Zaragoza 
and Valencia.6 There were isolated instances of well-planned revolt and defiant battling 
against security forces, such as the armed takeover of the Centenillo mining area by UGT 
miners in Andalucía.7 But individual acts of rebellion were ultimately in vain because they 
were not tied together by any overall coordination. Just as importantly, none of the general 
strikes took on a dimension of presenting a serious threat to the forces of order that a 
revolution would have required them to overthrow.  
 
The two regions in which insurrection occurred on a more significant scale were Asturias 
and Catalonia, though the nature and degree of success of the rebellions in these two zones 
were very different from one another. The contrast between events in these two areas 
would prove to be particularly significant for the CNT and the question of its stance on the 
rest of the left. The essentially different configuration of political forces in Catalonia gave 
the October revolt there a very different form relative to the rest of Spain. Here, two 
different forces coalesced to defy the government, though with little success. On the one 
hand the ERC potentially had much to lose were a government that closely followed the 
CEDA agenda to be formed. In the months immediately prior to October relations between 
the Generalitat and the institutions of the Spanish state had been severely strained after 
agricultural reforms passed by the Generalitat were overturned in Madrid. For the ERC, the 
government of the right in Madrid represented a real threat to the autonomy process. On 
the other hand, the non-CNT left in Catalonia, many of whose organizations had by this 
time coalesced in the Alianza Obrera, shared the interpretation of the socialists that the 
entry of the CEDA into the government would usher in the beginnings of a right-wing, 
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authoritarian state. Although relations between the ERC and the non-CNT left in Catalonia, 
namely the BOC, the treintistas and the USC- and PSOE- affiliated socialists were by no 
means uniformly good, they ultimately shared the common ground of viewing a more pro-
CEDA government as being far worse than what had gone before in the bienio reformista. 
Accordingly, on 5th October the Alianza Obrera declared a general strike in Barcelona, 
with its local branches also declaring strikes or attacking the authorities in other towns in 
the region. On the 6th Lluís Companys publicly declared Catalonia to be an independent 
state within a federal Spain.  
 
Crucially, the CNT did not share the perspective of the rest of the left in Catalonia that 
Companys’s independent Catalonia was worth defending for the good of the working 
classes. As has been established already in this thesis, the organization presented a public 
stance of regarding the rest of the left and the Republicans as being every bit as reactionary 
and corrupt as the Radicals and CEDA. Consequently, when news of uprisings elsewhere 
came through, the ERC and the Alianza Obrera were on the same side, while the CNT 
looked on. Companys’s independent Catalonia was doomed from the moment it was born; 
the armed forces in Catalonia stayed loyal to the central state, quickly surrounding the 
Generalitat, and the general strike of the Alianza Obrera did not develop into any form of 
armed insurrection. Although in some localities strikes and resistance lasted as late as 10th 
October, by the seventh the main thrust of the rebellion in Catalonia was over.8 
 
Asturias was the sole case of a sustained insurrection being carried out in October 1934, a 
dramatic anomaly that bore no relation whatsoever to the ineffectual general strikes that 
characterized the rebellion elsewhere. Unlike in the rest of Spain, the manpower and 
resources of the CNT, the UGT and the communists were channelled into endeavours that 
were far more clearly revolutionary in scope than elsewhere. Instead of merely striking, the 
workers of the region took up arms. Indeed, the creation of communes in various areas of 
the region and the impressive fight put up against the armed forces mark the Asturian 
insurrection as arguably the most significant attempt at proletarian revolution through 
armed resistance in Western Europe since the Paris Commune.9 With a fairly limited pool 
of arms, a sizeable proportion of which was simply dynamite used in the mining industry, 
workers in the region seized control of towns and villages from under Civil Guard control, 
before then fighting armed forces that had been sent to re-take control of the region for 
several days. Although not successful everywhere, the Asturian workers of the CNT, the 
UGT and the communists nevertheless managed to control sizeable areas of the region for 
almost two weeks, even if their efforts were ultimately doomed to failure due to the risings 
  
154
elsewhere quickly collapsing. The rebellion in Asturias was greatly facilitated by the CNT 
and the UGT in the region working together in accordance with the Alianza Obrera that 
the two organizations had entered into in March, combined with the fact that both 
organizations, unlike many of their counterparts elsewhere in Spain, were capable of and 
willing to confront the security forces with weapons.  
 
The uprising began late on the 5th October, when thousands of cenetistas and ugetistas 
besieged the barracks of the Civil Guard in the principal towns of the region and in the 
mining region in the south of Asturias. The miners gained control of the port towns of 
Avilés and Gijón, villages and towns in the mining region, and also gained a precarious 
grasp on the centre of Oviedo. Over the following two weeks Asturias was to all intents 
and purposes a warzone, as workers organized into militias fought the army and Civil 
Guard across the region. On several occasions, the rebels scored surprising victories 
against much more heavily armed and better trained opponents. However, there was a 
tragic inevitability that the revolutionary forces were simply no match for the might of the 
army, especially once the Army of Africa, Spain’s only combat force, was dispatched to 
the region to put down the revolt with extreme force. General Eduardo López Ochoa, 
commanding the main body of troops that were sent to the region, had 15000 soldiers and 
3000 members of the Civil Guard under his command. Mistakes were also made by the 
rebels, such as their failure to secure the port in Gijón, which allowed army detachments to 
disembark there, and their failure to decisively take Oviedo in the first days of the uprising. 
By 18th October, the rebels had been pushed back to the southern mining region, and were 
forced to surrender.10 Nevertheless, that the unions of the CNT, the UGT and the 
communists were able to fight off the full might of the armed forces for nearly two weeks 
was a feat that captivated the hearts and minds of the left worldwide, and would have a 
profound effect on the outlook of the Spanish left for the remainder of the Republic.    
 
The awe in which the actions of the Asturians were held was not just grounded in an 
admiration for their sheer bravery. Asturias was not simply a warzone during October; in 
areas held by the rebels, a revolutionary order, which in some respects foreshadowed the 
initiatives of the CNT’s social revolution in the early months of the Civil War, was 
fleetingly set up. Committees were set up to coordinate the administration of towns, and 
money was sometimes abolished. The specific systems that were set up varied from town 
to town, often reflecting the blueprints of revolutionary order held by whichever of the 
labour federations were dominant in the area in question.11 Crucially, both the military 
efforts and the coordination of the communes were coordinated by the Alianza Obrera. All 
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left-wing forces in the region had shown a willingness to rise up, rather than the dynamic 
present in Catalonia, where CNT leaders had refused to back the Alianza. And although in 
reality there were disagreements between the different organizations that comprised the 
Alianza Obrera in the region over questions of arms distribution and whether to continue 
resisting certain defeat, the overriding lesson that was taken from the events of October 
was that with a united course of action, the Spanish proletariat could achieve what its 
political parties and labour federations had hitherto only dreamed of. As Ramón Álvarez 
Palomo, a cenetista militant from Gijón who participated in the insurrection, suggested 
fifty years after the insurrection, the key legacy of the rebellion belonged to ‘the CNT and 
the UGT, who created the pact that served as a foundation for the events that astonished 
the world and were the work of all the Asturian people’.12  
 
Critically, however, as will be discussed later in this chapter, the CNT’s main press outlets 
such as Solidaridad Obrera remained detached from this entire revolutionary attempt. 
CNT participation across the country depended on the local leaders of the movement.13 But 
because the overall uprising quickly came to be defined almost exclusively by the events in 
Asturias, this stance of indifference was taken as being indicative of the CNT’s overall 
response to the heroics of Asturias. As will be examined more closely later in this chapter, 
the organization’s overall public appearance of ambivalence in the face of the events of 
October would have significant consequences in terms of the criticisms that were levelled 
at the anarcho-syndicalist movement after the insurrection had been put down, with the 
movement being characterized by the Marxist left abroad as having deliberately refused to 
come to the aid of the Asturians by not rising in Catalonia.14 
 
The divergent responses between how the CNT in Asturias and Catalonia responded to the 
socialists’ uprising reveal a clear difference in outlook between the cenetistas of the two 
regions, even if local particularities did play a role in shaping their respective responses. 
As Chris Ealham points out, the CNT in Catalonia had something of a case for refusing to 
countenance alliance with the ERC-controlled Generalitat, with which it had been in 
conflict for much of the Republic and which it regarded as using the region’s institutions 
and security apparatus to subdue the CNT.15 However, the CNT in Catalonia’s response to 
October was also unquestioningly one of rejecting the initiatives of the Alianza Obrera on 
the grounds of its animosity towards the organizations within it, which in the faístas’ view 
merely had designs on imposing a Marxist form of authoritarianism. The events of October 
put what had been previously two conflicting stances that had been expressed at CNT 
national plenums into revolutionary practice. Whereas the Asturian CNT followed through 
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with their belief in the necessity of joint action with the UGT in the context of the present 
moment – even if there were factions within the Asturian movement, in the form of a faísta 
minority, who disagreed with this stance16 – the Catalan CNT’s view that the rest of the 
left were as fascistic as the right manifested itself in their refusal to back the alianza’s 
uprising.  
 
That this was the case should not serve as the basis of a simplistic assumption that relations 
between the CNT and the UGT in Asturias had always been good, and were free of the 
conflicts that characterized CNT-UGT interactions in Catalonia. These difficulties went 
beyond the aforementioned pockets of anti-Alianza faístas based in the region. The CNT 
and the UGT’s unions in Asturias were at loggerheads throughout the Republic, to a large 
extent based around the usual refusal of UGT unions to back CNT conflicts and cenetistas 
to accept the jurados. As Ángeles Barrio Alonso demonstrates, these disputes between 
cenetistas and ugetistas were deeply acrimonious.17 What truly differentiated the Asturian 
and the Catalan CNT was that, unlike the cenetistas who dominated the movement in 
Catalonia, the majority of cenetistas in Asturias drew a distinction between differences in 
handling labour conflicts and the broader and much more urgent question of how to defend 
the working classes – and even bring about proletarian revolution – in response to an 
authoritarian right that was gaining rapid momentum. The faístas of Catalonia, however, 
did not view the UGT or the other actors of the left in such nuanced terms, either before 
October 1934, or, as this chapter will demonstrate, in the months afterwards. That this was 
the case makes it all the more intriguing that, as will be examined in this chapter, it would 
be the Catalan CNT which would set the CNT on the national level onto a path of 
proposing an alliance with the UGT in 1936. 
 
Of equal importance to the Asturian heroism in the following months was the repression 
that followed. In Asturias, the Army of Africa’s actions in re-captured areas was 
essentially that of occupying belligerents, with rebel workers being summarily executed – 
or at the least beaten and tortured – and cases of women being raped by soldiers. By the 
time the fighting was over 1100 Asturian workers were dead and another 2000 wounded.18 
Once the rebellion had been finally suppressed, a more comprehensive clean-up of the left 
across Spain began. Military justice was applied in Asturias. Elsewhere, the majority of the 
premises of the labour federations and political parties of the left and the left republicans 
were closed, as were their newspapers, though Solidaridad Obrera escaped a long-term 
ban, unlike the papers of the socialist movement. In total, around 40000 people across 
Spain were imprisoned for having played a role in the October insurrections.19 Amongst 
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these were some of the most prominent figures of the bienio reformista, including Largo 
Caballero and Manuel Azaña. Others, such as Indalecio Prieto, managed to escape abroad. 
The psychological impact of the scale and intensity of the repressive response of the 
government on both the left and amongst the left Republicans cannot be underestimated. 
The imprisonment of activists in their tens of thousands by a government that was now 
controlled by those who were intent on undoing the most basic of reforms that so many had 
hoped for when the Republic had been founded provided proof, if any more was needed, 
that the right intended to destroy the ideals of 1931, crushing any opposition to these goals. 
 
In the months following on from October 1934, amongst large swathes of the left and left 
Republicans, the sentiment developed that, based on both the heroics exhibited by the 
unified actions of workers in Asturias and the brutality displayed by the right, a 
fundamental change of approach to a common political foe at the other end of the political 
spectrum was necessary. Whether individuals took the lesson that unity could bring 
revolution, or that disunity in the face of the right would lead to extinction, the majority 
came to the conclusion that a united front against the right needed to be found. Whether 
manifesting themselves in the creation of the Popular Front in early 1936, the CNT 
agreeing not to explicitly implore workers to abstain in the February 1936 election or the 
cooperation of CNT and UGT unions in strike activity in 1936, the consequences of 
October 1934 on all of the left, as will be seen in the following two chapters, were 
enormous. However, and as will also be seen in this part of the thesis, the fractures that 
pre-dated October 1934 continued to exist, and the forms and goals of unity envisaged by 
the various organizations and the factions within them never truly came to be agreed upon. 
 
In the short term, the events of October 1934 ushered in a period in which the left and 
Republican groups were largely silenced by the hard-line actions of the government of the 
right. And in the longer-term, the uprising and the reprisals that followed it would have an 
even more profound effect on how the organizations of the left interacted with the 
Republic and with one another. But until elections were called at the end of 1935, the left 
and the Republicans could do little more than consider their next moves for when they 
emerged from under the shadow of repression. CNT leaders and militants could also not do 
much more than reflect on the past actions of their movement and what future direction the 
organization should take. One of the most fundamental changes that would come about 
when the CNT emerged with the rest of the left from the restraints placed upon it by the 
right-wing government was a totally new stance on the UGT.  
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The socialists after October 1934 
 
After October 1934 it is difficult to speak of a coherent PSOE-UGT position on any 
matters – even the agreement to join the Popular Front was fraught with difficulty and 
infighting – due above all to the rapidly developing factional splits that beset the 
movement. These splits complicated not just the socialists’ wider stance on the issues of 
the Republic, the right and revolution, but also on how the movement positioned itself with 
regard to the questions of unity and relations with the CNT.  
 
The split within the socialist movement that began developing more openly in 1933 – but 
of course had existed in some form or another since much earlier – reached unprecedented 
levels after October 1934. Whilst the followers of Julián Besteiro continued to plough the 
same gradualist furrow, faithful to the tenets of Pablo Iglesias, it was the factions that lined 
up behind Indalecio Prieto and Francisco Largo Caballero that represented the two most 
important currents of opinion within the organization, but also increasingly conflicted with 
one another. For the Prietistas the revolutionary posturing prior to October and the event 
itself had been a tragic misadventure, the remedy for which was a reconciliation with the 
Republicans and a consolidation of a stable, democratic state. For the Caballeristas, 
however, October 1934 merely confirmed the analysis that had initially led them to adopt 
such a confrontational stance against the government after November 1933, namely that 
proletarian participation in bourgeois democracy was a dead-end that would only lead to a 
capture of power by fascism.20 
 
As will be discussed, the different perspectives of these latter factions would lead to both 
presenting different formulations and emphases on unity and alliances. However, in late 
1935 and early 1936, once socialist newspapers were in publication once more, both 
factions offered a reconciliatory hand to the CNT. Those more aligned to the Prietista 
position gravitated around El Socialista, whilst the Caballeristas set up, during the summer 
of 1935, their own paper, entitled Claridad. From its reopening, El Socialista attempted to 
forge a positive relationship with the CNT, with an eye firmly on the upcoming elections 
and with the goal of trying to dissuade the anarcho-syndicalists from running the same sort 
of pro-abstention campaign as the one they had promoted in the 1933 election. In 
December 1935, the paper appealed to the organization to recognize the importance of the 
upcoming election, whilst being at pains to emphasize that it was not taking issue with is 
anti-politicism.21 Solidaridad Obrera’s cordial response led El Socialista to express the 
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hope that a positive dialogue could be ‘the beginning of a brotherhood that the interests of 
the working class and the current circumstances require’.22  
 
However, there was certainly recognition on the part of El Socialista that there were 
definite limits to the extent of cooperation between the CNT and the socialist movement. 
Even before the February election victory for the Popular Front, the paper periodically 
voiced its displeasure at the criticisms against the socialists made by Solidaridad Obrera – 
even if they were made against Largo Caballero – on the grounds that they jeopardized the 
united front of the left in the context of the election battle.23 El Socialista’s support for 
unity was not tied to the idea of a revolutionary alliance or the fusion of different 
organizations – even though it was certainly in favour of the general premise of unity in the 
face of fascism – but was instead grounded much more in a support for the Popular Front. 
 
From its founding in the summer of 1935 until early 1936, the Caballerista paper Claridad 
in its editorials argued that the question of unity between the CNT and the UGT on the 
national level was a more complicated one than the ongoing issue of unification between 
the UGT and the CGTU on the grounds that the theoretical gap between anarchists and 
socialists was far greater than that which divided the Marxist camp, especially in terms of 
the difference it implied with regard to political activities.24 Indeed, some of the paper’s 
editorials at the end of 1935 seemed to be faintly overwhelmed by the possibilities of 
bringing about a unity of labour organizations in the short term, given the number of 
ideological and organizational divisions between them.25  
 
However, from the beginning of 1936, the paper turned its attention slightly more to the 
question of the UGT’s relationship with the CNT. This had much to do with the bombastic 
rhetoric of Largo Caballero upon his release from jail. A component of Largo’s 
revolutionary rhetoric during 1936 was based upon the idea of left-wing organizational 
unity, and a sub-theme of this was his assertion that outright fusion of the CNT and the 
UGT was possible. Largo announced in a front-page interview in Claridad that he would 
not be satisfied until ‘all the revolutionary Spanish proletariat is grouped together in one 
union’. In his public pronouncements, Largo was extremely – and arguably disingenuously 
– positive about not just the possibilities of some form of agreement between the CNT and 
the UGT, but also his willingness to bring it about, saying that ‘the UGT would be willing 
at any moment to name a commission, not just to mutually aid one another in any joint 
actions that might arise, but also to study immediately the grounds for a fusion’ of the CNT 
and the UGT. He also remarked that this fusion would be ‘as full and cordial as has been 
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that between the UGT and the CGTU’.26 This latter assertion would have set alarm bells 
ringing in the ears of any cenetista, carrying the implication, intentionally or not, that the 
CNT would merely be absorbed into the UGT.  
  
The public courting of the CNT on the national level embarked upon by Largo needs to be 
placed into the context of his wider stance of 1936, which was one of making speeches that 
declared the imminence of proletarian revolution, whilst at the same time making virtually 
no preparations in this regard. Espousing a discourse of unity between the CNT and UGT 
had similar mobilizing and support-winning functions as did his projection of a 
revolutionary message, not least because it implied that it would give the working classes 
the necessary collective strength to carry out revolution. And like his talk of proletarian 
revolution, it did not need to be backed by any actions. There is scant evidence that Largo 
had any intention of entering into a formal dialogue with CNT representatives, let alone 
any specific ideas of his own – other than a fanciful idea of the CNT dissolving into the 
UGT – on the matter of CNT-UGT unity.27  
 
However, whilst it is clear that Largo’s public pro-unity stance over the CNT was part of 
his wider rhetoric of revolution, and ultimately without substance, it is also important to 
recognize that CNT-UGT relations did not constitute a central plank of the Caballeristas’ 
platform, rhetorical or otherwise, during 1936. As Helen Graham argues, Largo’s pursuit 
of a socialist convergence with the communists was a tactic deployed against the Prietista 
sectors of the socialist movement.28 Largo’s rhetoric on unity with the CNT must also be 
seen as a part of this courting of the Marxist left. However, the bulk of Largo’s efforts 
centred around mobilizing those already within the socialist camp, or incorporating 
elements from outside it who would back his position, hence his backing of the fusion of 
the UGT with the CGTU and his initial support for the fusion of the socialist and 
communist youth movements. The question of the CNT’s relationship with the UGT could 
only have ever had a very limited role in this strategy. Whilst speaking in favour of a single 
labour federation was a crowd-pleasing message, it did little towards helping bringing the 
balance of forces within the socialist movement in his favour. Consequently, whilst Largo 
did present himself as being in favour of a fusion of the CNT and the UGT at the national 
level, this was certainly not a major component of his platform during the months prior to 
the Civil War.  
 
This lack of an interest specifically in the CNT with regards to the contrasting positions on 
unity within the socialist movement was matched by a relative lack of consideration of the 
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anarcho-syndicalist labour federation within the UGT’s decision-making processes after 
October 1934. In December 1935 the National Committee of the UGT discussed its 
participation in the Popular Front electoral alliance. At one point the discussion moved 
towards the matter of whether or not the CNT and the treintista organizations should be 
invited to participate in the Popular Front. Whilst some members of the Committee were in 
favour of at least making a gesture towards the CNT, others, such as Ramón Lamoneda 
and Luis Viesca, were deeply hostile to the idea of the CNT being included in any form of 
joint action with the UGT, principally motivated by what they viewed as the CNT’s 
‘treachery’ of the October movement.29  
 
Overall, then, the socialist movement had no formal position on the CNT to speak of after 
October 1934, with the question of relations between its labour federation and the anarcho-
syndicalists playing a fringe part in discussions within the movement. Nevertheless, a 
general sentiment towards unity was publicly expressed by the movement, and in the case 
of the Caballeristas, this extended to calling for alliances and even fusion of worker 
organizations, including the CNT, for the purposes of revolution. This espousal of unity 
was equally present at this time amongst the dissident communists and the Soviet 
communist parties.30 In combination with the enthusiasm that developed for the Popular 
Front, the overall result was that from late 1935 onwards, virtually all of the left was 
promoting the idea of pan-left alliances and unity, whether to preserve the Republic, fight 
fascism or bring about proletarian revolution.  
 
The CNT after October 1934 
 
Although the CNT was badly damaged by the government onslaught against the left that 
occurred from October 1934, it was still able to publish some newspapers, including 
Solidaridad Obrera. It was also possible for the organization to hold plenums over late 
1934 and 1935. For cenetistas, the most immediate priority was to keep the organization 
functioning in some form. However, it would have been impossible for no comment to 
have been passed on the events of October. This was equally the case with regard to the 
days of the uprisings, as well as over the course of 1935, when the left in both Spain and 
abroad busied itself with analysing the uprising. 
 
The initial analysis of October 1934 that was carried out in the pages of Solidaridad 
Obrera certainly did not view the insurrections, neither in Catalonia, Asturias, nor 
anywhere else, as particularly heroic, and saw them as having not been fought for a 
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legitimate cause. In the immediate aftermath of the events – and indeed whilst workers in 
Asturias were still fighting the army – the stance taken in Solidaridad Obrera was that the 
loss of life was a tragedy, but that the CNT had made the right decision not to participate in 
the uprising. This initial analysis was unsurprisingly carried out overwhelmingly with 
regards to Catalonia; in October full information about events in Asturias and their 
ramifications were very difficult to obtain from elsewhere in the country.31 On 10th 
October an editorial on the front page of Solidaridad Obrera explained that ‘faced with a 
conflict that was not initiated by the CNT, and without it having common objectives with 
our own, it was logical’ that the CNT did not back the revolutionary movement in 
Catalonia.32 
 
Elsewhere in its immediate post-insurrection coverage, the paper voiced the argument that 
the uprising had failed because ‘without the participation of all the people, undertakings of 
such magnitude are impossible’.33 This observation was undoubtedly made to imply that it 
was only the CNT who had the sufficient popular backing to carry out such an insurrection. 
Another article on 14th October argued that  
 
the failed movement has served to show the lack of capability of those who were leading 
it. The boastfulness, conceit, lack of revolutionary technique and the absolute ignorance 
of the psychology of the people made it so that what could have been a triumph turned 
into a defeat.34  
 
From October onwards, sectors of the Marxist left, both from Spain and other countries, 
publicly attacked the CNT for not having thrown its full organizational weight behind the 
various insurrectionary initiatives. The French communists in particular took up the cause 
of attacking the CNT and the FAI over their stance in October. Reporting on events in 
Spain, L’Humanité on 10th October informed readers of the ‘treachery of the anarchist 
leaders’.35 This highly damaging – and in some respects distorted – depiction of their role 
was put forward in subsequent months, in tandem with the notion that ordinary workers in 
the CNT had in many cases happily united with socialists and communists during the 
movement.36 Spanish socialists who fled to France were also publicly quoted in relation to 
the CNT’s non-participation in events outside of Asturias. Whilst in some cases, such as 
that of Indalecio Prieto, it is arguable that their words were presented as being more critical 
of the anarcho-syndicalists than they may have been to fit in with the paper’s overall 
interpretation of events,37 others were more unequivocal, such as Margarita Nelken, who 
opined that ‘the anarchist leaders have always betrayed the workers’ movement’ and 
suggested that they were in alliance with Alejandro Lerroux.38 In an August 1935 report to 
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the AIT, the CNT National Committee wrote that it had expended much of its efforts after 
October 1934 fighting a propaganda battle against the ‘defamatory campaign by the 
communists and socialists’.39 
 
The faísta Diego Abad de Santillán’s newly launched Tiempos Nuevos took on the mantle 
of defending the CNT and the organization’s anti-alliance position. A key journalist and 
intellectual in the Argentinean anarcho-syndicalist movement, Abad de Santillán had only 
entered Spain in 1933, but quickly rose to prominence within the FAI.40 The stance of 
Abad de Santillán and other key sectors in the CNT illustrates that the starting point for the 
turn towards endorsing a pro-alliance line between the CNT and the UGT that would occur 
in early 1936 was not the events of Asturias in October 1934. Far from viewing the 
rebellion in Asturias as a testament to the power of unity of action, Abad de Santillán 
depicted the events in the region as having been characterized by socialist and communist 
betrayal of the movement.41 He conjectured that had the workers in Asturias successfully 
fended off the authorities, the socialists and communists, due to the authoritarian nature of 
Marxism, would have most likely turned their attentions towards destroying the anarchist 
strongholds of La Felguera and Gijón.42 He also argued that Asturias was one of the few 
regions where libertarianism was the minority force amongst workers, and as such 
cenetistas and faístas were forced to cooperate with socialists and communists, whereas 
elsewhere in Spain this would not be the case.43 Overall, therefore, the faísta current of the 
CNT took the view that the events of October 1934 were not merely an invalid argument 
for pro-unity positions, but actively demonstrated the treachery of the Marxist left and thus 
the inadvisability of any cooperation with it whatsoever. This interpretation of October 
1934 was echoed in the CNT newspaper Revolución Social, which began to be published 
in Madrid in late 1934.44 
 
Solidaridad Obrera for its part reprinted some of the articles on Asturias from Tiempos 
Nuevos,45 as well as publishing articles by individual CNT unions or militants in which 
they drew attention to ‘low manoeuvres of the supporters of the false Alianza Obrera and 
of the much lauded frente único’46 in their field of union activity, or argued more generally 
that the CNT could not ally with those ‘who have not abandoned their work tools’, which 
was to say those connected with political organizations.47 At root, then, the rebuttal of 
alliances expressed in late 1935 was the same as it had been in the years leading up to 
October 1934. As 1935 drew to a close and the possibility of an election became 
increasingly likely, this opposition to the alliance and unity movements being promoted by 
the rest of the left was modified to the effect that these sectors were promoting alliance for 
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their self-serving political ends of gaining electoral support. In an article on 28th December, 
the paper noted the proliferation of alliance initiatives – from both left and right – arguing 
that they were a product of the upcoming election and that all were essentially 
symptomatic of the same ill, namely that of politicians manoeuvring to further 
themselves.48  
 
The positions adopted in Solidaridad Obrera and Tiempos Nuevos were matched by an 
equally strong suspicion of unity initiatives amongst both the National Committee and the 
Catalan Regional Committee of the CNT. In June 1935 the Regional Committee produced 
a report for an AIT congress, at which one of the items for discussion was the position to 
be taken on ‘united fronts’. The committee wrote that 
 
we consider the frente único to be an incongruity that brings terrible results. The frente 
único is always proposed by political sectors in opposition to the ruling power, but the 
desire for this front disappears when the political parties proposing it come to enjoy 
office and impunity that the power of being in charge provides. Reason suggests to us to 
reject this course of action because it is a chain that links all, from the Muscovite 
communists and the Largo Caballero and Prieto-style socialists, who have committed so 
many betrayals of the revolutionary and anarchist cause, to the most blatant fascists and 
the enemies of liberty.49 
 
A similar position was expressed by the National Committee in its own report to the same 
AIT congress, reasoning that ‘expecting that we are going to fight with enthusiasm for a 
cause outside of our libertarian convictions, or that the authoritarians [i.e. Marxists] would 
collaborate towards our goals, is a fantasy’.50  
 
Faístas outside of Catalonia remained similarly defiant in their stances on alliances. In 
Madrid, where the anarchist groups of which the FAI was composed were beset by 
factional infighting, one of the key sources of division was the question of alliances, with 
some continuing to maintain a staunchly anti-socialist position. In June 1935 the anti-
alliance faction sent out a circular to the anarchist groups of the city in which they stated 
that ‘we do not believe in the possibility of realizing [an alliance] unless we agree to 
subordinate ourselves to the manoeuvres of the eternal traitors of the proletariat’.51 In May 
1935 the FAI’s Regional Committee for the Paris region wrote to the CNT National 
Committee and the FAI Peninsular Committee to warn them of cases of cenetistas who had 
fled Spain attending public meetings at which other exiled socialists and communists 
spoke. Such was their vigilance that even the presence of two cenetistas at a funeral that 
was also attended by Indalecio Prieto was deemed worthy of reporting.52  
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The basic stance of defiance over the CNT’s actions in October and a position of continued 
hostility to alliances also had a decisive influence over the CNT’s formal decision-making 
processes during 1935. In November 1934 a plenum was held, at which only a handful of 
regions were present due to the effects of repression on the organization’s ability to 
operate. Here, the emphasis was almost exclusively on attempting to re-erect previous 
organizational structures across Spain and to attempt to allow CNT papers to return to 
publication.53 But in June 1935 another national plenum was held, at which all regions 
except the Canary Islands attended. At this meeting the key issues to the CNT at this 
juncture, namely alliances, healing the factional split with the treintistas and the calling for 
an amnesty for social prisoners were addressed, albeit in limited form. Owing to the 
ongoing crackdown against labour unions, the plenum was called with a fairly limited 
mandate, as the normal process of consultation of the CNT’s unions was impossible in the 
current political climate. Accordingly, the plenum decided instead to release a manifesto in 
which the above issues were mentioned, but in which it was made clear that positions on 
them would only be formulated with the proper consultation of the CNT’s unions. On the 
matter of alliances, the tone struck was one that expressed scepticism over the intentions of 
the rest of the left in proposing alliances, but which also conceded that sectors of the 
CNT’s grassroots may have been in favour of a more pro-unity position. The manifesto 
stated: 
 
On the part of those who shout from the rooftops for alliances, they are not fully aware of 
their purposes, and neither do they point out the fundamental motives that exist for 
alliances not being established between disparate ideological sectors. We sincerely 
believe that if the next elections were not close, neither the socialists nor Republicans, 
and much less the left-Republicans would be interested in speaking about alliances or 
united fronts. Despite being exhorted by some sectors to sign up to such campaigns, we 
have not paid heed to such requests out of respect for our ideas and above all because the 
bulk of the confederal organization in Spain, except for the Asturian region before 
October, declared itself, in principle, against any alliance. It is the sindicatos who will 
have to decide the path to follow.54 
 
The manifesto illustrates, then, that even the events of October 1934 had not fundamentally 
altered the attitude, grounded in the movement’s anti-political ideas, of the most important 
leadership sectors within the CNT to the idea of alliance, even if there were certainly those, 
both within the grassroots and upper cadres of the organization, who had come to favour a 
change of stance. The attitude adopted in this manifesto is all the more significant given 
that, as will be discussed, just six months later a regional congress of unions in Catalonia 
proclaimed an openness towards a revolutionary alliance with the UGT.  
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The remobilization of the CNT from 1935 and the Popular Front election 
 
Following the lifting of legal constraints towards the end of 1935, the CNT’s unions began 
to reform and remobilize, as did those of the UGT. This process was accelerated by the 
election result of 1936 as it brought with it a belief that the unions would once again have 
the upper hand over employers. According to the calculations made at the organization’s 
congress in Zaragoza, held in May 1936, the CNT had at that moment 559000 members.55 
If it is fairly clear that between the summer of 1931 and October 1934 the CNT as a 
national actor exhibited an avowed intention to sweep away the Republic with libertarian 
communism, and moreover that various elements of the organization attempted 
insurrections and general strikes during those years, the prevailing outlook of the 
movement in 1936 and until the start of the war is more difficult to gauge. The more 
established view of the CNT’s stance in the pre-war period is perhaps best summarized by 
Gerald Brenan’s assertion that the organization sought to keep up ‘the revolutionary tempo 
in the country by lightning strikes’,56 a position that has recently been challenged to 
varying degrees.57 These newer analyses point out that the movement’s leaders were 
interested first and foremost on consolidating the organization, with Jordi Getman-Eraso 
going as far as to argue that ‘the CNT persisted in its determination to defend the political 
status quo right up to the start of the Civil War’.58 Whether anarcho-syndicalist militants 
were driven by a wish to defend the Republic specifically or were simply biding their time 
until the organization and the circumstances were right to attempt libertarian communism, 
it is clear that in early 1936 a key priority, especially in Catalonia, was a reunification with 
the treintistas.59 And as the year progressed and political and social tensions mounted, 
emphasis in the CNT press moved increasingly away from general revolutionary rhetoric 
towards calling for preparedness for a fascist attack.60 
 
Although the CNT’s leading militants would not have wished to admit it, the February 
1936 election contest was the event that really captured the public’s imagination and was 
the main focal point of the ever-more open confrontation between the increasingly 
polarized left and right.61 Towards the end of 1935, moves were made, spearheaded by 
Manuel Azaña, to form an electoral alliance between Republicans and the rest of the left. 
The Prietista wing of the socialist party was the most enthusiastically in favour of joining 
this alliance, and managed to steer the party into it. At the same time, the Communist Party 
had turned towards a pro-Popular Front direction. The Popular Front’s electoral platform 
was a fairly narrow one of promising amnesty for those arrested during the right’s tenure in 
power and a promise to put back in place the reforms carried out by the Republican-
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socialist government and since repealed by the right.62 The right coalesced around its own 
electoral bloc, the Frente Nacional. Perhaps worryingly, from the point of view of some 
cenetistas, the Popular Front, in its electoral campaign, inspired a huge amount of interest 
on the part of the working classes. Crowds in their tens of thousands attended Popular 
Front rallies across the country, and the Republican and left-wing press spoke of little else, 
when they were not attacking the right. 
 
The phenomenon of the Popular Front and the adherence of the vast majority of the rest of 
the left to it presented a problem for the more radical factions that continued to be at the 
helm of the CNT. Whilst more moderate CNT regions and the treintistas were able to 
pragmatically accept the idea of getting behind the Popular Front, for the radicals the 
Popular Front was a preoccupation because it was causing workers to place their hopes in 
political parties.63 However, attacking the Popular Front outright would have been suicidal 
for the CNT. The battle with the right seemed so finely balanced that an attack on it by the 
CNT would have been presented by the rest of the left as tantamount to backing fascism. In 
the event, the CNT decided at a national plenum held in January 1936 not to sabotage the 
electoral campaign of the Popular Front coalition by agitating for workers to abstain in 
their propaganda, as they had done during the 1933 election.64 Such restraint would have 
been unthinkable in previous years, and was effectively an acknowledgement that the 
previous stance of being as unyieldingly hostile to the left as well as the right was 
unworkable in the present climate.  
 
On 16th February 1936, elections were held, at which the Popular Front coalition swept to 
victory in terms of the number of seats it gained, based on a relatively narrow victory in 
terms of votes cast. A turnout of seventy-one percent illustrates the extent to which the 
battle of left and right gripped the country.65 The socialists were once more the biggest 
single party in the Cortes, as they had been in 1931. However, as a result of the 
Caballeristas, the PSOE did not participate this time in government.66 Instead, from 
outside of it, the Caballeristas continued to talk the rhetoric of proletarian revolution.67 
The socialist leadership was so badly factionalized by this point that it is impossible to 
speak of a coherent socialist stance regarding its support or opposition to the Republic. The 
business of government was left to representatives of Republican parties, which simply did 
not have the same mass backing as did the socialists.  
 
Amongst much of the right, the electoral defeat effectively marked the end of any final 
attempts to participate in the Republic and a turn towards advocating an outright overthrow 
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of the system by force. Even before the election result, elements within the military were 
planning a response to a Popular Front victory, whilst Gil Robles solicited a military 
intervention after the election.68 The ranks of the Falange, youth organizations and 
paramilitaries swelled, and the battle between militants of the right and those of the left 
commenced in the street. Political assassinations became increasingly prevalent from 
March onwards, with an estimated 269 political killings taking place between then and 
July.69 
 
This political instability was equally matched by the social instability that was unleashed 
upon the election victory of the Popular Front, in the form of land occupations in the 
countryside and strikes both there and in cities. There was understandably the expectation 
amongst the grassroots of the labour movement that the advantages gained – or in the case 
of rural reform, had been promised – should now be immediately be given back. However, 
with faith in the ability of the Republic to provide and safeguard these gains badly eroded, 
workers and peasants took the initiative instead at the grassroots level. In the countryside, 
the FNTT began to organize land occupations.70 In the cities, CNT and UGT unions alike – 
the latter acting much more according to their own instincts in these months rather than 
according to a line of discipline laid down by the socialist leadership – made immediate 
demands and resorted to strikes to achieve them, even if, in the case of CNT strongholds, 
this propensity for strikes was in fact less strong than it had been in the first months of the 
Republic’s lifetime. As will be seen, in some instances these strikes were a product of joint 
action between CNT and UGT unions. 
 
The genesis of a new CNT position on the UGT 
 
If even in late 1935 Solidaridad Obrera was presenting a position of CNT hostility to any 
alliances with other organizations on the left, by the end of January 1936 it was heralding 
the prospect of a revolutionary, national CNT-UGT alliance. It is clear that the decisive 
change to turn the CNT as a national actor around from being flatly opposed to other 
organizations of the left to publicly proposing an alliance with the UGT emanated from 
Catalonia, the region that had been most consistently against such ideas throughout the 
Republic, including in 1935. The way in which the militants of Catalonia achieved this was 
through their own formulation of an alliance initiative with the UGT at a regional congress, 
combined with the actions of the Regional Committee’s representatives at a national 
plenum and the propaganda efforts of leading CNT militants from the region and 
Solidaridad Obrera to promote the idea. 
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The key turning point towards a pro-alliance position was the CNT’s regional congress, 
held at the end of January 1936. The handling of the question of relations with the UGT 
was, like much of the rest of the congress, marked by eyebrow-raising procedural 
irregularities. The congress had been convoked very quickly, meaning many CNT 
organisms did not have time to hold assemblies of their members to agree positions on the 
items on the agenda. In other cases, some unions were not able to attend at all as they were 
still shut. Some delegates at the congress complained about this. The conformity of the 
congress to CNT procedures was cast even further into doubt by the Regional Committee’s 
insistence that delegates were not allowed to reveal what procedures of consultation had 
been undertaken by the organizations they were representing in formulating the positions 
they expressed at the congress.71 
 
It was on this basis that the question of the possibility of alliances with other organizations 
was handled.72 Some delegates, in particular the purist anarchist faístas, questioned the 
validity of the issue of alliances being discussed in this forum, arguing that it was only a 
national congress that could decide such issues, a concern that was also voiced by the 
representative of the National Committee at the congress.73 This was precisely the stance 
the Catalan representatives had taken at the national plenums in 1934. Now, however, the 
Catalan region saw fit to decide a national question at a regional congress. 
 
Aside from the position of declaring the discussion invalid, three basic other positions on 
the question of alliance were revealed when each delegate voiced an opinion on the 
matter.74 The simplest position, expressed by a significant minority of the delegates, was 
that there should be no form of pact or alliance with any other organizations on the left, as 
this would represent a negation of the CNT’s principles and the final goal of libertarian 
communism.75 This position was grounded in the same basic premise as the hitherto 
prevailing anti-alliance position of 1933 onwards, though stripped of the explicit anti-
socialist sentiment that had characterized it prior to October 1934. At the other end of the 
spectrum, a sector of delegates exhibited not just a willingness for the CNT and the UGT 
to enter into a pact with one another, but also for a CNT-UGT alliance to be formulated 
through a process of negotiation. This position was thus fairly similar to that which the 
Asturian CNT had defended at the national plenums of 1934. The final main body of 
opinion was that the CNT should enter into some form of revolutionary alliance with the 
UGT, but that any move towards alliances should be governed by some strict conditions so 
as to ensure the CNT’s objectives and principles were not compromised. Many also 
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stipulated that the pact could not bring about ‘authoritarian ends’ or be ‘with politicians’. 
For this current of opinion, any alliance with the UGT would have to bring the socialist 
labour federation into line with the anti-political principles of the CNT.76 
 
What is highly revealing about this part of the discussion is that the Barcelona construction 
union gave a much fuller and more detailed position than all other delegations, with the 
exception of the Badalona manufacturing and textiles union. The Barcelona construction 
union was a stronghold of the radical tendency that was centred around Juan García Oliver 
and the Nosotros group. Nosotros (formerly Los Solidarios) was perhaps the most 
influential – and infamous – of the grupos de afinidad, who earlier in the Republic had 
been at the vanguard of attempts to organize insurrections against the Republic. Its leading 
figures, such as García Oliver and Buenaventura Durruti, were unskilled workers, and had 
often been drawn to Barcelona on the basis of it being the epicentre of proletarian 
revolutionary activity.77 Their comprehensive plans for relations with the UGT in the 
context of other delegates offering only vague ideas hint strongly that the García Oliver 
faction was using the congress to impose a newly formulated position on the question of 
CNT-UGT relations, a perspective taken by Felipe Alaiz in his complaint to Federica 
Montseny in a February 1936 letter of the congress being ‘captured by the new orientations 
of [García] Oliver and company’.78 Alaiz and Montseny belonged to what is often 
considered a ‘purist’ current of anarchism, for which the CNT’s adherence to anarchist 
theory was paramount. What set them apart from the militants of Nosotros was that, as 
middle-class intellectuals, they were not involved in the unskilled unions that formed the 
backbone of the Catalan CNT. The two sides of the debate over relations with the UGT in 
Catalonia were represented by these two radical currents. While the purists viewed any 
willingness to ally with the UGT as compromising anarchist theory, García Oliver and his 
followers would put forward a formula, via the construction union, that would attempt to 
make an alliance proposal with the UGT that would not negate their anti-political 
convictions.  
 
The construction union argued that the current climate had compelled the socialists to 
‘undertake a revolutionary line if they did not wish to lose control of their members’, 
though this was not to say the socialists were at this point genuine revolutionaries. To the 
contrary, they were exhibiting ‘a double personality’ by talking the rhetoric of revolution 
whilst also ‘signing a pact with the bourgeois left’. The CNT needed to ‘pose them the 
dilemma: either with the bourgeoisie or with the people’. This would be done through 
proposing a revolutionary pact with the UGT. Part of this pact would require all workers to 
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join the CNT or the UGT to facilitate their collective ability to bring this revolution about, 
an idea that would subsequently be promoted by García Oliver and his allies.79   
 
After each delegate had outlined their opinions, a team was named to create a draft 
resolution on the question of relations with the UGT. The Barcelona construction union 
was part of the team. The resolution that was drafted was clearly influenced by the ideas 
that the construction union had brought to the congress, with the alliance proposal that they 
presented also seeking to satisfy the stipulations of those who opposed the idea of the CNT 
entering into an alliance with ‘authoritarians’ or ‘politicians’. The resolution stipulated that 
the UGT recognized that a revolutionary destruction of the current regime was the only 
viable option for the Spanish proletariat, and that as a consequence it would need to break 
all ‘political and parliamentary collaboration with the bourgeoisie’. The resolution also 
empowered the Regional Committee to request that an alliance proposal with the UGT be 
discussed at the next national congress. The resolution ended with the demand that all 
autonomous unions join either the CNT or the UGT.80  
 
At the same time as the unions of Catalonia were agreeing upon a formula for a 
revolutionary alliance of the labour federations, the representatives of the regional 
committees of the CNT and the National Committee were meeting in Madrid to discuss the 
orientation of the organization in the present moment. There were two key issues which 
they discussed that would have a direct bearing on the matter of the CNT’s relationship 
with the UGT: the issue of the CNT’s stance on the upcoming election, and the matter of 
the agenda for an upcoming national congress. With regard to the second of these, all 
regions were agreed on the need to discuss the issue of alliances at a national congress, 
partly because some had strong views on the matter, and partly because all were agreed 
that public disagreements on the matter had been going on for too long and that a definitive 
solution to the matter was required.81  
 
However, it was through the discussion of the CNT’s stance on the upcoming election that 
the Catalan CNT put forwards its ideas for a revolutionary CNT-UGT alliance. 
Unsurprisingly the discussion of the election hinged around whether or not the CNT should 
formally support the Popular Front, or indeed whether it should make a concerted effort to 
promote abstention, as it had done in the 1933 election. It was in discussing this element of 
the CNT’s stance on the election that the Catalan delegate informed the plenum of the 
agreement reached on alliances at the regional congress. The proposal was put forward to 
the plenum in the form of arguing that the CNT should promote such an alliance, whilst at 
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the same time running, if not an outright pro-abstention campaign, then at least one that 
denounced the validity of political participation and process.82  
 
In other words, Catalonia was proposing that the CNT should offer a revolutionary alliance 
to the UGT that rejected any cooperation with political organizations or the Republic’s 
political process, and that all unaffiliated workers should join the CNT or the UGT as part 
of this, whilst at the same time campaigning against worker participation in the upcoming 
election. The revolutionary alliance was being used, in effect, as an alternative to 
supporting the Popular Front. The idea was largely rejected by other delegates. 
Nevertheless, the Catalan delegate’s contribution to the discussion certainly indicates that a 
CNT-UGT revolutionary, anti-political alliance was used by a faction of the Catalan 
leaders to compete against the Popular Front coalition. 
 
At the end of the Catalan regional congress, a selection of the region’s most famous 
militants spoke about the resolution on revolutionary alliance with the UGT. The majority 
of the keynote speakers, such as Juan García Oliver, Buenaventura Durruti and Manuel 
Pérez had not participated in the congress as delegates, but it is difficult to escape the 
conclusion that it was them, rather than the congress delegates, who had played the 
decisive role in creating the new position on the UGT. Their speeches reveal a mentality of 
believing that it was the Catalan region that determined the CNT’s overall relationship 
with the UGT, with the agreement on alliances created at the regional congress being 
treated virtually as a fait accompli. All the speakers promoted not just the premise of an 
alliance with the UGT under which the UGT would abandon political activities, but also 
promoted the related idea of all workers joining the CNT or the UGT. In the words of Juan 
Doménech, those who did not do this would be ‘traitors to the revolution’. Some speakers 
also directly addressed UGT members in telling them that their organization could no 
longer endorse the Republic and the support of it by socialist politicians, and instead 
needed to unite with the CNT to bring about revolution.83  
 
Solidaridad Obrera’s first presentation of the congress agreement on alliances came in the 
form of a publication on its front page of the resolution on 28th January. The resolution was 
billed by the headline as ‘an agreement of historical transcendence’.84 The front page of the 
paper on 30th January 1936 gave further attention to the pact proposal, as well as the 
congress’s position in favour on the upcoming election, which was effectively an explicit 
rejection of political methods that stopped just short of instructing workers not to vote. The 
headline highlighted that the congress had simultaneously approved a rejection of the 
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political process, whilst at the same time stating that: ‘The CNT proposes solutions: A 
CNT-UGT revolutionary pact, which is to say a coincidence in an insurrectional line [and] 
the abandonment of all political activity’. What is also worth noting about the editorial’s 
presentation of the alliance agreement was that it spoke of it as though it were something 
that would now be carried forward on a national level, which is to say it gave the 
impression that the Catalan regional congress’s agreement on the matter meant that it 
would automatically become a national-level goal for the CNT.85  
 
In the weeks following on from the regional congress, both Solidaridad Obrera and the 
region’s leading militants continued to promote the CNT-UGT alliance from the congress. 
It is crucial to stress, however, that they were very specific in terms of how they promoted 
the alliance, insisting that it was a national-level alliance, with exclusively revolutionary 
ends, and that it amounted to a rejection of political means and also required the entry of 
all workers into either the CNT or the UGT. On 31st January 1936, for example, the 
headline of the front page of Solidaridad Obrera proclaimed: ‘Worker! Your place is in the 
union! The end of slavery depends on the alliance without politics of the CNT and the 
UGT’.86 On 1st February, its front page argued that all the problems of exploitation 
experienced by the working classes would continue regardless of which party was in 
power, but that ‘all these problems will disappear if workers put their strength behind the 
unions’.87 The alliance proposal thus became tied up in attempts to convince workers that 
the CNT’s anti-political stance was the correct one by the alliance and the revolution it 
would bring being presented as the final outcome of workers abandoning political parties 
for unions. Meanwhile, the paper also emphasized through its editorials the need for all 
workers and union entities to be within the CNT or the UGT, with groups that remained 
outside the two labour federations being branded ‘parasitic forces in the workers’ 
movement’.88  
 
At the same time as Solidaridad Obrera endorsed a CNT-UGT alliance along these 
aforementioned lines, the CNT’s most influential militants from Catalonia also spread the 
same message at CNT propaganda meetings. For example, speaking in Santander in 
February, Juan Doménech promoted alliance between the CNT and the UGT, ‘but to carry 
out a revolution that liberates us all’. Doménech told his audience that the previous years 
had illustrated that neither the CNT nor the UGT alone could bring about revolution 
individually, and that the way forward was for the two organizations to expand through all 
workers joining one or the other according to their natural ideological affiliations, before 
then entering into the pact as outlined by the Catalan region’s congress and carrying out a 
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revolution that would not prejudice the ideological principles of either labour federation.89 
It would appear that, based at least in part around the lead taken by militants in Catalonia, 
cenetistas from other regions also started to promote the same line of argument. In a 
meeting in Madrid in February, for example, a local militant spoke of ‘the sincerity of the 
Confederación Nacional del Trabajo, which not fearing the responsibility of the crossroads 
of the current moment, has not hesitated for an instant to throw a fraternal line out to our 
brothers of the UGT’, a claim based on the alliance offer made at the Catalan regional 
congress, which the militant claimed would be the basis of the alliance of the two labour 
federations.90 
 
Following on from the January 1936 regional congress in Catalonia, less than three months 
after the Popular Front’s electoral victory, came a CNT national congress, held in Zaragoza 
at the beginning of May 1936. It was here that the formula for CNT-UGT revolutionary 
alliance that had been created in Catalonia at the start of the year would become the CNT’s 
official, national position on the UGT.  
 
Part of the team of delegates who had drawn up the draft proposal that was a basis for 
discussing CNT-UGT relations at the congress were attached to the same Catalan unions 
whose delegates at the January 1936 regional congress had been involved in formulating 
the resolution on alliance with the UGT at that congress. The draft resolution that was 
drawn up was critical of the UGT’s past actions, especially with regard to its role during 
the Republic. Not only was the UGT held responsible for the divisions amongst the 
working classes in the draft resolution’s preamble, it was also argued that had this division 
not existed the Spanish working classes would have inevitably committed themselves to 
revolution. The preamble concluded that the lessons of the preceding years demonstrated 
‘the inevitable necessity of unifying the Unión General de Trabajadores and the 
Confederación Nacional del Trabajo in revolutionary action’.91  
 
Having established that an alliance of some form with the UGT was necessary to bring 
about revolution, the draft resolution then outlined how alliance with the UGT would be 
brought about and what its goals were. It insisted that the revolution that the alliance would 
bring about would ‘completely destroy the social and political regime that regulates the life 
of the country’. However, the draft resolution contained no detail as to precisely how the 
alliance would bring revolution about, nor how an alliance would be structured and 
organized. More significant than this, however, was the first point of the draft revolution, 
which generated a significant amount of debate at the congress. This point stated that  
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the UGT, on signing the revolutionary alliance pact, will explicitly recognize the failure 
of the system of political and parliamentary collaboration. As a logical consequence of 
this recognition, it will cease to offer any type of political and parliamentary 
collaboration to the ruling regime.92  
 
In the key respect that this revolutionary CNT-UGT alliance would be an anti-political one, 
the alliance proposal formulated at this congress would fundamentally follow that which 
had been agreed upon at the Catalan regional congress.93 
 
The discussions of the pact led to the expression of broadly the same three positions on the 
matter as those that had emerged at the Catalan regional congress, with the most purist 
anarchist delegates arguing that the proposal would compromise the CNT’s libertarian 
principles,94 the delegates from Asturias most forcefully supporting the idea of alliance but 
rejecting the notion that the proposal placed demands on the UGT to turn its back on 
political participation, and other delegates supporting the draft resolution in its original 
form.95 On the surface, therefore, three seemingly irreconcilable positions regarding 
revolutionary alliance with the UGT were expressed. However, it would have been 
virtually impossible for the congress to have concluded without a firm position on alliance 
being taken that presented the CNT’s credentials as a champion of unity. As several 
delegates pointed out, the general atmosphere amongst workers was for there to be greater 
unity between the CNT and the UGT, and within the Confederation the majority were in 
favour of some form of alliance proposal being created. Unsurprisingly, therefore, a final 
stance regarding alliance with the UGT was reached relatively quickly, in spite of the 
seeming difference of positions.  
 
It was Juan García Oliver, representing the Barcelona manufacturing and textile union, 
who proposed the amendment to the draft resolution on Alianza Revolucionaria that 
succeeded in reconciling the different positions amongst the majority who were in favour 
of some form of alliance proposal being made.96 Whilst the first article of the draft 
resolution insisted that the UGT formally renounce its recourse to political methods, 
García Oliver proposed the insertion of an additional article that would apparently place 
the overall process of negotiation of an alliance between the two labour federations onto a 
more consensual footing. The additional article clarified that the preceding points of it 
were ‘provisional’ and that the UGT at its next congress could draw up its own proposals 
for an alliance with the CNT. The addition of this point managed to satisfy both those who 
demanded that alliance with the UGT be linked to the UGT turning its back on any 
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involvement in the political sphere and taking to the street to bring about change and those 
who did not wish to deter the UGT from an alliance that could bring about revolution, or 
give them a pretext to accuse the CNT of derailing unity initiatives. Essentially the 
additional article reframed the whole of the rest of the resolution so that, whilst it 
continued to demand that the UGT rectify its erroneous participation in politics, the whole 
basis for alliance was in fact open to negotiation. Consequently it is difficult not to see the 
resolution ending up as a fudge that was designed to achieve consensus but in the process 
created a somewhat confused and contradictory end result.97 With the approval of this 
proposed amendment, discussion of the Alianza Revolucionaria at the Zaragoza congress 
quickly came to a close, with the resolution being approved.98 The proposal marked a 
watershed moment in the history of the CNT, and a particularly crucial turning point in 
terms of its official stance on the UGT during the Second Republic. Never before had the 
CNT on the national level formulated an offer of alliance of this nature to the UGT. The 
proposal set a precedent that would be referred back to by the CNT during the Civil War as 
its apparent blueprint for proposing a wartime alliance with the UGT.99  
 
The outcome of the Zaragoza congress was heralded in the CNT press as a groundbreaking 
initiative that would lead the Spanish proletariat towards revolution. Solidaridad Obrera 
took the lead of the alliance resolution made at Zaragoza in May and promoted the notion 
of CNT-UGT alliance. On its front page on 10th May, the headline thundered: ‘Not one 
minute more! The CNT and the UGT can, and must, end with the fascists and with the 
danger of a possible installation of fascism in Spain. We cannot wait another minute!’.100 
On 13th May, an editorial in the paper declared that the Alianza Revolucionaria ‘has 
resolved a problem’, arguing that the formula for alliance drawn up at the congress 
represented a definitive solution to a long-unresolved question. As in January, the defining 
aspect of this formula for alliance was it having a purely revolutionary goal and 
represented workers achieving revolution without political leaders.101 As the paper 
emphasized later in May, ‘Alianza Revolucionaria, yes; but outside the fluctuations and 
flirtations of political parties and without the interference of jefes and leaders’.102  
 
There are some important aspects of the CNT’s historically unprecedented change of 
stance over the UGT that are worth commenting on here.  Firstly, it is important to stress 
that the final outcome was a proposal that, by virtue of its preamble that criticized the most 
basic tenets of socialist principle, namely a participation in political systems and political 
parties, not to mention made a demand for the UGT to break political connections, was not 
grounded at all in any serious consideration of what the UGT would consider to be an 
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acceptable starting point for alliance negotiations. The additional amendment that was 
added to the resolution at the eleventh hour that implied that the demand that the UGT 
break its political ties was merely provisional was no more than a concession to those 
within the CNT who had been campaigning, since 1934, for an alliance with the UGT and 
who believed this could only be possible if certain aspects of anarchist principles were put 
on hold. The Alianza Revolucionaria proposal was essentially an articulation of the CNT’s 
own revolutionary goals and ideological principles that downplayed their incompatibility 
with those of the UGT, so that it both satisfied the spectrum of opinion within the CNT 
without appearing to alienate the UGT.  
 
Secondly, it is important to emphasize the organizational procedures and decision-making 
mechanisms through which the new stance had come about. The alliance proposal was not 
a product of the regions of the CNT that had been most consistently in favour of a CNT-
UGT pact. To the contrary, it was the historically most anti-alliance region of Catalonia 
that spearheaded the initiative and ensured it became national policy. True enough, at 
Zaragoza the traditionally pro-alliance elements of the organization did back the resolution, 
even if they did have misgivings about the initial insistency on the UGT being forced to 
break political ties. However, that they and the García Oliver faction came round to 
endorsing the same position is a testament to the particularities of the CNT decision-
making process – through which carefully-worded resolutions could satisfy different 
factions, as occurred at the February 1934 plenum – and of a convenient convergence of 
the two groupings’ positions as a result of the new fervour for alliance exhibited by the 
García Oliver grouping, rather than the proposal representing a belated triumph for the 
unity position that the Asturians had defended since 1934.  
 
For the agreement drawn up at Zaragoza was by-and-large that which had been created at 
the January 1936 regional congress in Catalonia. The Catalan regional congress set the 
CNT on a path towards a dramatic shift in its stance on the UGT and alliances. The 
initiative launched at this regional congress was then converted into a concerted 
propaganda campaign by Solidaridad Obrera and leading CNT militants from the region to 
promote the idea of an exclusively revolutionary, anti-political CNT-UGT alliance. 
Initially it would seem that this had been done so that the CNT could fight the Popular 
Front by other means; but even after the election, García Oliver and his allies played a key 
role in ensuring that their unity formulation prevailed in Zaragoza. Such a rapid change of 
position is, to say the least, surprising, and cannot simply be explained because the idea of 
a revolutionary alliance of the labour federations would fit the CNT’s anti-political 
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principles. Quite why the most historically anti-UGT region would actively seek to turn the 
organization’s position on the UGT on the national level is a question that will be 
addressed in the next chapter. 
 
The ability of an influential grouping of militants in Catalonia to turn around the entire 
stance of the organization on the matter of alliances – even if certain sectors of the 
organization were already open to or outright in favour of a revision – illustrates not just 
the malleability of the CNT decision-making process, but also the willingness of those who 
were in the organization to abuse process to suit their own ends. In 1934 the Catalan 
delegates at national plenums argued that only a national congress could discuss the 
question of the CNT’s stance on alliances; in 1936 they saw fit for their own region to 
formulate a position on behalf of the entire organization. As in 1934, Catalonia was able to 
determine the CNT’s national-level stance on alliances; whilst in 1934 it had achieved this 
through an insistence on procedure and principles, in 1936 it achieved it through a 
disregard for them. 
 
Thirdly, the outcome of the congress was based on a contradictory set of ideas regarding 
proletarian unity, alliance proposals and revolution. At the congress, the idea that ‘the 
people’, ‘the working class’ or ‘the proletariat’ wanted unity and were also innately 
revolutionary was repeated by delegates throughout the discussion, except for those allied 
to the most classical anarchist position. The location of the desires for both unity and 
revolution, then, was believed to be the whole Spanish working class, which is to say it 
was not bound up to any particular organization, but was in fact a desire that existed 
outside of ideologies or organizational agendas. At the same time, however, the method 
that was put forward for achieving this unity and in turn revolution was linked explicitly to 
not just a formal alliance with the UGT, but one that emanated from the leaderships of the 
two organizations. The CNT-UGT alliance would be drawn up by the National Committee 
of the CNT picking a delegation that would enter into negotiations with another delegation 
picked by the UGT leadership. It was therefore very ambiguous as to how such a pact 
would tap into this sentiment for unity amongst the masses. That such a contradiction 
existed hints that the alliance proposal that was formulated was not, for some cenetistas, 
the attempt to bring about proletarian unity that it was ostensibly supposed to be. As will 
be discussed in the next chapter, this ambiguity as to precisely what role the grassroots of 
the organization would play in this process of CNT-UGT convergence would subsequently 
serve to be a major problem for those leading militants, especially those from Catalonia, 
who had encouraged this idea of a revolutionary alliance between the CNT and the UGT, 
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but were simultaneously opposed to localized cooperation between CNT and UGT 
organisms. 
 
Finally, it must be highlighted that, although the national congress agreed to send a 
proposal for a revolutionary alliance to the UGT leadership, the initiative was by no means 
unanimously supported. Moreover, the most concerted opposition to the new alliance 
stance emanated from Catalonia, in spite of the fact that it was also from this region that 
the impetus towards putting the CNT on a pro-alliance footing had been engineered. This 
somewhat paradoxical situation was indicative of a split that developed amongst faístas, 
with the ‘purist’ anarchists – in particular those whose sphere of activity was the printed 
word, such as Federica Montseny and Felipe Alaiz – maintaining an abhorrence towards 
the notion of the CNT debasing its libertarian principles by reaching out to authoritarian 
Marxists, whilst so-called ‘anarcho-Bolshevik’ figures such as Juan García Oliver and 
Buenaventura Durruti, who were the protagonists of CNT protest actions and insurrections, 
drew up a new strategy of advocating a CNT-UGT anti-political alliance. But while the 
latter grouping may have successfully negotiated the decision-making mechanisms of the 
organization to implement their position, this did not change the fact that there were still 
militants in Catalonia who remained strongly opposed to alliance. The Hospitalet de 
Llobregat delegate led the charge against the alliance proposal in Zaragoza, and a 
significant number of delegates at the regional congress expressed opposition to any form 
of alliance with the UGT.103 The purists’ leading figures were also equally opposed. Felipe 
Alaiz, for example, refused to write for Solidaridad Obrera as a result of the alliance 
proposal produced at the regional congress, complaining that as a result of it ‘the socialists 
will establish themselves in Catalonia’.104 Alaiz’s fears would come to be shared with an 
increasingly large proportion of the anarcho-syndicalist movement in Catalonia, including 
those who had masterminded the organization’s change of strategy in the first place.  
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Chapter Nine: The Return to CNT-UGT Hostilities on the Eve of the Civil War 
 
The socialist response to the Alianza Revolucionaria proposal 
 
An important stumbling block in the way of a convergence between the CNT and the UGT 
in 1936 was the position held on the matter by the socialist leadership, who, without 
rejecting the CNT’s Alianza Revolucionaria proposal outright, in practical terms gave it 
short shrift. The editorial writers of El Socialista, representing the more moderate 
tendencies of the socialist movement, were rather lukewarm towards the unity proposal 
formulated by the CNT at Zaragoza. In an admittedly polite fashion, the El Socialista 
editorial that appraised the CNT’s Alianza Revolucionaria proposal essentially dismissed it 
as unviable. As was to be expected, a substantial proportion of its doubt was based on its 
displeasure at the clauses of the proposal which demanded a socialist disavowal of the 
political route.1 The moderate factions of the socialist movement were thus openly 
unconcerned with the possibility of an alliance between the CNT and the UGT, an 
unsurprising stance given that their goals in 1936 were certainly not to direct their 
resources towards a revolutionary activity, and instead continued to hope that the political 
channels of the Republic could remain open to them.  
 
In spite of the different factional positions that El Socialista and Claridad represented, the 
latter was approximately as tepid in its response to the CNT’s alliance proposal as was the 
former, though admittedly for slightly different reasons. Claridad lamented that the 
agreement made at Zaragoza shied away from the more fundamental issue of unity and 
fusion of workers’ organizations, instead of a mere alliance of them. As mentioned in 
chapter eight, in his pronouncements on unity Largo on occasion argued in favour of a 
fusion of the CNT with the UGT; the criticism of the Alianza Revolucionaria proposal was 
very much in tune with this proposed objective. It would be unwise not to consider, 
however, that the paper’s lack of endorsement of the alliance proposal may have been 
motivated at least in part by a more basic wish of not handing a propaganda victory to 
another organization by endorsing it. For the paper to have applauded a CNT initiative 
would have undoubtedly run the risk of undermining attempts to position Largo as a 
champion of proletarian unity.2  
 
The indifference of the two main socialist factions to the CNT’s Alianza Revolucionaria 
proposal was matched by a lack of interest given by the socialist leadership to the idea in 
their decision-making processes. No substantial discussion of the proposal took place. The 
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receipt of the proposal was briefly discussed at a meeting of the Executive Commission on 
21st May 1936. However, this discussion did not go beyond agreeing that the proposal 
would be examined fully at a later stage by the National Committee and at a future UGT 
congress.3 Whilst this response was a fully necessary one, given that it would have been 
impossible for the Executive Commission to have entered into a potentially 
groundbreaking agreement with the CNT at national level without some consultation of the 
organization’s membership, it is certainly also the case that the Executive Commission 
appear to have been in no hurry at all to bring about this consultation so as to provide a 
response to the CNT as fast as possible. In May 1936 the political and social situation of 
the Republic was highly volatile and rapidly shifting. In such a context, the idea of making 
no efforts to facilitate a speedier discussion of the question of alliance with the CNT and 
instead integrate it into the ordinary procedural framework of the upcoming November 
congress can only be interpreted as being a result of a lack of interest on the UGT 
leadership’s part to discuss the matter. The matter was essentially put on the back burner, 
and no-one within the UGT leadership appears to have had any objections to this.  
 
Unity as rivalry 
 
However, in many respects the socialist leadership’s indifference to the alliance proposal 
played into the hands of certain sectors of the CNT. For some within the CNT – especially 
those based in Catalonia – the appeal of launching the idea of an alliance with the UGT 
was, from the start, in fact a strategy to compete with the UGT.4 CNT leaders were well 
aware of the potential of a public pro-unity stance as a method of boosting the CNT’s 
popularity, even before the Alianza Revolucionaria proposal had been formulated at the 
Zaragoza congress. In March 1936, the National Committee sent out a circular to the 
regional committees which gave details of the agenda for the upcoming national congress. 
On the matter of Alianza Revolucionaria, the National Committee emphasized the 
importance that the idea of unity held to the working classes, and accordingly warned those 
who were hostile to pro-unity positions to take care, when formulating a position on the 
matter ‘not to clash with popular sentiments by declaring a firm hostility towards this 
slogan that inspires numerous proletarians’.5  
 
The possibility that an alliance proposal with the UGT could be used not just to appeal to 
popular sentiment in favour of unity but also to undermine the UGT’s own unity 
credentials was raised at the Zaragoza congress as the alliance question was being debated. 
The delegate for the Barcelona fishermen, in defending the draft proposal on unity, did not 
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do so based on the premise that the UGT’s leaders would be reliable alliance partners, 
claiming that, ‘we must not let ourselves be taken in by the sectarianisms and prejudices by 
the leaders of Marxism, who have a bourgeois mentality, and do not want the CNT and the 
UGT to come to an understanding’. Rather, the desire to take the initiative over an alliance 
was based on proving that it was the Marxist left and not the CNT who were against unity: 
‘We do not want to give the pretext to the [socialist] leaders to say to us that we did not 
want an alliance’.6  
 
However, it was after the Alianza Revolucionaria proposal was formulated that this 
perspective really came to the fore amongst some CNT leaders. Unsurprisingly this idea 
was not voiced publicly, but is clearly visible in the private correspondence of CNT 
members in positions of responsibility within the organization. In a letter written at the end 
of May regarding his impressions of the disposition of workers towards the CNT, Manuel 
Pérez, one of the writing staff of Solidaridad Obrera, opined that ‘I am sure that if the 
UGT rejected the Alianza the masses would flow towards us’.7 A similar view was 
expressed by the Regional Committee of the central region when writing to the National 
Committee on 27th May. The Committee reported that in propaganda meetings in the 
region they had made promoting the Alianza ‘a question of honour’ and spoke in favour of 
it at propaganda meetings. However, the Committee made it clear that they did this ‘not 
because we believe that [the UGT] will agree to it, since they have no honesty within 
them’.8  
 
This ulterior motive for championing alliance with the UGT is not something that has thus 
far been brought out in studies of the CNT. Instead, historians sympathetic to the CNT 
have commented on the importance of the putative gesture, arguing that it illustrated a 
genuine desire on the part of the CNT as a whole to enter into alliances with the UGT.9 
Meanwhile, other historians have simply taken the wording of the alliance proposal at face 
value.10 Such superficial appraisals miss perhaps the most important point about the 
alliance proposal. For it was, for those who truly mattered in the CNT – the propagandists 
and the militants who could exert control over assemblies and congresses – a vehicle 
through which the CNT could be promoted by tapping into pro-unity sentiment, not to 
mention through which the UGT as an organization and its leaders could be discredited.11 
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, there was a significant level of opposition, 
especially amongst Catalan militants, to the Alianza Revolucionaria proposal as it was 
being discussed. Amongst the National Committee and some regional committees, above 
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all that of Catalonia, the sending of the Alianza Revolucionaria invitation to the UGT 
Executive Commission certainly did not lead them to become better disposed to a 
convergence of the CNT and the UGT, least of all on the level of presenting a united 
propaganda front. In fact, following the Zaragoza congress, the Catalan Regional 
Committee, and to a lesser extent some other regional committees such as the central 
region, became more wary of the prospect of uncontrolled shows of CNT-UGT unity 
across the country. An instance of a prominent cenetista from Cádiz sharing a platform 
with Largo Caballero in May sent the Catalan Regional Committee on the offensive 
against CNT militants cooperating with ugetistas on a propaganda level. On 24th May, a 
propaganda rally was held in Cádiz, organized by the UGT’s graphic arts federation. As a 
UGT-organized event, Largo was the main speaker, and Vicente Ballester, a key figure 
amongst the Andalusian CNT movement, also spoke at the rally, telling the crowd that the 
CNT was willing to bring about the unification of the proletariat because it held ‘the 
general interests of the Spanish revolution above all others’. Ballester’s presence at the 
rally clearly served to boost Largo’s pro-unity credentials, as Claridad’s extensive and 
enthusiastic coverage of the event indicates.12  
 
However, the National Committee, various regional committees and even some individual 
unions were quick to express their horror at Ballester’s actions. It would not be an 
overstatement to classify the ‘Ballester affair’ as a scandal in CNT circles, particularly 
amongst militants in Catalonia. Before the national congress, the National Committee had 
instructed militants not to participate jointly with UGT individuals or organisms in 
propaganda events, on the grounds that it would compromise the fairness of the 
deliberations on the matter of Alianza Revolucionaria at the congress by pre-empting any 
agreement made there.13 Responding immediately to Ballester’s appearance with Largo, 
the National Committee released a public statement that stated that the ban on joint 
propaganda with the UGT was still in effect, in spite of the congress now having taken 
place. Indeed, although the justification for the original ban on joint propaganda with the 
UGT was explicitly based around the upcoming congress, the National Committee argued 
that the agreements subsequently made at the congress in fact ‘strengthened’ that ban, on 
the grounds that at the congress the ‘apolitical principles’ of the CNT had been 
reaffirmed.14 This justification, which perhaps referred to the discussion on the definition 
of libertarian communism which took place at the congress, was fairly tenuous and seems 
to have been the product of a National Committee that was seeking to carefully control any 
shows of unity with the UGT. The National Committee also contacted the Cádiz Local 
Federation to demand an explanation of the incident.15 The Local Federation held a local 
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plenum at which it agreed that its and Ballester’s actions had been justified, and that it 
would reject any punishment handed down to it.16 The National Committee arranged for 
the case to be discussed at the next national plenum, with a view to sanctions being made 
against the Local Federation, but the outbreak of the war intervened before any plenum 
could be held.17  
 
The National Committee was not the only leading body within the CNT that expressed a 
disapproval of Ballester’s actions. Within a day of the event being reported in the press the 
Barcelona wood workers’ union sent a telegram to the National Committee to demand that 
Ballester be punished.18 The Regional Committee of the central region also wrote to the 
National Committee to voice their anger at Ballester.19 However, it was the Catalan 
Regional Committee that was most enraged by the Ballester affair. Its anger did not merely 
lead to it protesting to the National Committee, but to it also actively pursuing the Cádiz 
Local Federation over the matter, especially after the Local Federation tried to justify 
Ballester’s actions. The Regional Committee contacted the National Committee on more 
than one occasion to press for a national plenum to be held to determine a punishment for 
the Cádiz cenetistas.20 It also rejected any justifications of the incident on the part of the 
Cádiz Local Federation, which argued that it had authorized Ballester’s attendance at the 
meeting, that the meeting had been arranged before the National Committee’s April ban on 
joint propaganda with the UGT, and that it was not for other organisms of the CNT to 
control its actions, an argument that tallied with the anti-authoritarian principles of the 
organization.21 Solidaridad Obrera even refused to publish a statement by the Local 
Federation to argue its case.22  
 
Indeed, this defiant stance provoked the Catalan Regional Committee to contact the Cádiz 
Local Federation directly and rebuke them for their actions. Showing a certain lack of self-
awareness regarding its own actions, the Regional Committee interpreted the gaditanos’ 
refusal to repent for their actions as an attempt to impose their stance on joint propaganda 
activities with the UGT on the rest of the organization. The Committee advised the Cádiz 
cenetistas that their stance was damaging the CNT in Catalonia by ‘favouring the growth 
of other syndical organizations which we have no reason even to show tolerance towards’. 
The Committee elaborated on this claim by outlining their interpretation of the balance of 
power within the workers’ movement in Catalonia. Acknowledging that they had no 
knowledge of the situation in Cádiz, the Committee mentioned that it ‘imagines that 
circumstances oblige you to treat the UGT as equals’, a statement that reveals an 
underlying assumption that compulsion was the only reason that cenetistas would 
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cooperate with their UGT counterparts, echoing the stance taken by Diego Abad de 
Santillán regarding the events of Asturias in October 1934. But in Catalonia, the 
Committee argued, treating the UGT as equals ‘neither interests us and nor do we accept it, 
because we know only too well the elements that the socialist labour federation have 
cultivated in Catalonia’.23 
 
Julián Casanova rightly highlights that during the Civil War the top committees of the 
CNT came to assert a fairly heavy-handed – possibly even authoritarian – control over the 
grassroots of the organization, something which went against the premise of grassroots 
autonomy on which the libertarian movement was supposed to be based.24 The handling of 
the question of cooperation between CNT and UGT organisms in early 1936 by the 
National Committee and the Regional Committee – some of whose members, such as 
Mariano Vázquez, would run the National Committee during the war – illustrates that this 
shift towards top-down control of the grassroots was in fact underway before the war had 
started, with the Catalan leadership in particular viewing itself as having the authority to 
intervene in the activities of grassroots where they were deemed to be breaking CNT 
principles, something that in practice amounted to imposing a line of discipline on the 
base. In a similar vein to the irregular and loaded decision-making process through which 
the CNT’s new stance on the UGT was brought about, the management of the CNT’s top 
committees of interactions with the UGT reveals that the CNT was not the non-hierarchical 
organization that freed its members from being dictated to which it styled itself to be. If the 
responses of the National Committee and the Catalan Regional Committee are anything to 
go by, the leaders of the CNT in early 1936 acted in a manner that was not dissimilar to 
that which they had so vociferously attacked the UGT leadership over in the past, in the 
respect that they attempted to oppose a line of discipline from above and to overturn the 
decisions made by organisms at the grassroots level.    
 
The Catalan CNT and the UGT 
 
The Catalan leadership’s stance on the Ballester affair was just one facet of a wider 
exasperation on the part of the Regional Committee in response to other manifestations of 
CNT-UGT cooperation across Spain. The Committee responded to these developments, 
like it did with the Ballester affair, by attempting to put a stop to them, either through 
exerting pressure on the National Committee or by contacting the CNT organisms involved 
directly. In June the UGT’s Sindicato Nacional Ferroviario and the CNT’s Federación 
Nacional de la Industria Ferroviaria reached a pact to fight for a new set of bases de 
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trabajo and the reinstatement of workers who had been sacked following October 1934. 
The Regional Committee wrote to the National Committee to protest at the actions of the 
CNT’s rail federation.25 Similar protests were lodged to the National Committee by the 
Catalan leadership over the CNT’s initial cooperation with the UGT in the Madrid 
construction strike in June, a conflict which will be discussed later in this chapter. Based 
on an erroneous belief that the cenetistas of Madrid had endorsed government arbitration 
as a result of their cooperation with the UGT, the Regional Committee called on the 
National Committee to try to intervene and bring these CNT organisms into a disciplinary 
line demanded by the Catalan leaders.26 
  
The Ballester affair and the two aforementioned labour conflicts were for the Regional 
Committee part of a wider, highly troubling phenomenon. With regards to CNT-UGT 
cooperation in labour conflicts, the Regional Committee believed that it was unwise for 
CNT unions to ‘enter into circumstantial pacts with the UGT, because from these our 
principles and tactics will be disrupted’. The Madrid construction strike was used as 
evidence of this scenario, with the committee saying that what had been a ‘good group of 
militants’ had been led astray by the UGT.27 On more than one occasion the Regional 
Committee explicitly outlined its rationale for opposition to CNT organisms entering into 
localized cooperation with their UGT counterparts, as well as chastising the National 
Committee for not having explicitly forbidden them itself. On 30th May, for example, the 
Regional Committee wrote to the National Committee to complain that a recent National 
Committee manifesto had permitted such agreements, arguing that  
 
the affirmation that unions can reach an understanding with the UGT over economic and 
local questions will have the result that they become generalized in such a way that there 
will be a confusion of organizations, and that there will be no possibility of making 
minorities in workplaces join the CNT, “because [the UGT] is the same [as the CNT]”.28  
 
For the Catalan leadership, then, localized cooperation with the UGT had to be stamped 
out as it ran the risk of damaging the CNT’s own chances of reorganization and expansion. 
The Regional Committee took this stance to such an extreme that it even argued that the 
appearance of official CNT statements in Claridad, as well as being damaging in the 
respect that it would give off the impression that CNT members read the paper,29 would 
also damage the popularity of the CNT by associating it with an organization that ‘tries to 
take our members from us, just as we try to take theirs’.30 The Regional Committee 
remained committed to its position on cooperation with the UGT, telling the National 
Committee on 22nd June that ‘circumstantial pacts made with the UGT will only be to our 
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detriment’.31 As can be seen, these objections voiced by the Regional Committee were all 
grounded first and foremost in organizational considerations – the fear that the CNT could 
lose existing and potential members to a rival – and not ones of anarchist or syndicalist 
principles. 
 
The Regional Committee’s agenda of attempting to dissuade grassroots militants from 
closer ties with their UGT counterparts, as well as repeatedly putting forward the message 
that workers in Catalonia should feel compelled to join the CNT and that the alliance 
resolution did not place the organizations on an equal footing, was articulated through 
several sternly worded and prominent articles in Solidaridad Obrera.32 The paper told 
workers, for instance, that the alliance did not ‘imply a confusion of functions nor ideas, 
nor an abandonment of principles, which always must be defended, above everything 
else’.33 Such clarifications soon came to be expressed with far more emphasis than did 
promoting the alliance itself. 
 
That this was the prevailing position amongst the Catalan leadership must be considered 
alongside the fact that it was also the leading lights of the CNT in Catalonia who drew up 
the idea for the Alianza Revolucionaria with the UGT. For them, the question of an 
alliance with the UGT was simply not one that had a legitimate place in the realm of 
grassroots cooperation or with aims that were only of a limited scope. There continued to 
be an assumption on the part of the Catalan leadership that, at root, the CNT was still a 
rival of the UGT, and that any lower-level cooperation would jeopardize the CNT’s 
fortunes in winning this rivalry. The Alianza Revolucionaria proposal was not formulated 
by the Catalan cenetistas as the starting gun for a free-for-all of CNT-UGT convergence, 
but rather a process to be strictly controlled from above which required other, more 
spontaneous forms of CNT-UGT unity to be halted. For an ideological current that had 
previously prized the idea of spontaneous revolutionary cooperation at the foot of the 
barricade, this position was somewhat contradictory, and reflects the fact that for the 
promoters of the Alianza Revolucionaria the primacy of the CNT could not be sacrificed to 
such ideals. And by July the Regional Committee had almost discounted even cooperation 
coming about through a process controlled tightly from above, pointing out in a letter to 
the National Committee that that ‘the reality is that as time passes the UGT has not made a 
resolution’ on the proposal.34 
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Cooperation and hostilities between CNT and UGT unions 
 
The fear of cooperation between CNT and UGT unions in Spain expressed by the Catalan 
CNT elite was not merely a figment of their imagination, and nor was it limited to a 
handful of instances of cooperation. Although Solidaridad Obrera, as will be discussed, 
chose to focus on confrontations between CNT and UGT unions, thus obscuring examples 
of CNT-UGT cooperation, such instances did occur across Spain in 1935 and 1936, 
principally outside of Catalonia. To a large extent, this cooperation was made possible by 
the fact that UGT entities in some regions and industries were willing to resort to strikes 
without attempting first to go through arbitration mechanisms, thus removing the central 
barrier between themselves and their CNT counterparts when it came to industrial 
relations. In December 1935, the metal unions of the CNT and the UGT in Vigo jointly 
went on strike.35 In March 1936, CNT and UGT sailors in Valencia formed a joint strike 
committee in a conflict against Altos Hornos de Vizcaya.36 In Valladolid in March, the 
CNT and the UGT jointly carried out a strike in the face of the intransigently anti-union 
attitude of employers in the province.37 
 
In some cases, cooperation between CNT and UGT organisms went beyond the confines of 
the joint presentation of demands to employers, becoming focused instead on protest 
actions against the local authorities. The CNT and UGT in Cádiz engaged in a particularly 
strong process of spontaneous convergence, as José Luis Gutiérrez Molina has 
highlighted.38 In April, the CNT and the UGT in the town jointly called a general strike in 
support of an ongoing strike at the shipyard. The strike resulted in the swift resolution of 
the conflict, and understandable jubilation amongst the working population. The report 
submitted to Solidaridad Obrera by the cenetistas of Cádiz regarding the joint general 
strike with the UGT was one of the few that appeared in the paper during these months 
which truly celebrated grassroots-level unity between workers in the CNT and the UGT, 
emphasizing that the strike represented a major milestone in the unification of the local 
proletariat and a key factor in the victory.39  
 
Even in some areas of Catalonia a change in attitude towards the UGT could be detected, 
though often this did not extend beyond individual workplaces. In March 1936, for 
example, the crew of a freighter, who were variously affiliated to the CNT, the UGT and 
an autonomous union, jointly went on strike in the face of their employer attempting to cut 
the level of staff.40 Similarly, CNT and UGT peasants around Mataró jointly entered into 
conflict in April 1936 to enforce previously agreed pay and conditions arrangements.41 In 
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Reus in May 1936, the CNT and the UGT’s employees on the tram that linked the town 
with Salou jointly went on strike to force the tram company to dismiss two employees who 
had formerly worked in the Guardia Civil and the Carabineros respectively. Like other 
conflicts in Catalonia in which CNT and UGT militants worked together at this time, 
although there was mention of the fact of cooperation, there was no particular effort made 
in the reporting of the events in the CNT press to present this cooperation as indicative of a 
trend of further CNT-UGT convergence or something that in itself was worth celebrating.42  
 
However, cases of cooperation between the CNT and the UGT in Catalonia were certainly 
not symptomatic of a fundamental shift in how CNT union organizers in the region 
regarded their UGT counterparts. Even after January 1936, when the CNT unions of 
Catalonia had agreed that their organization should carry out a revolution in tandem with 
the UGT, in many cases cenetistas across the region continued to regard their UGT 
counterparts with the same contempt that they had between 1931 and 1934. 
  
The most notable continuity between the outlook of grassroots cenetistas between 1931 
and the post-October 1934 period was a continuing belief that the CNT could be the only 
organization in which workers could organize themselves. Writing about the process of 
rebuilding the CNT in Vic in December 1935, a local militant commented in Solidaridad 
Obrera that ‘the workers of Vic organize themselves within the CNT, or they do not 
organize themselves within any other union’.43 Similarly, in March 1936 a member of the 
CNT’s construction union in Barcelona argued, through an article in Solidaridad Obrera, 
that ‘only the CNT and the construction union will be able to get your moral and material 
gains’.44 Sometimes this attitude was linked explicitly to a suspicion of UGT counterparts. 
For instance, the metro section of the Barcelona transport union asserted that workers 
needed ‘to understand that there was no other way to make gains nor moral and material 
improvements other than within the Confederación Nacional del Trabajo, the only 
organization that represents a real guarantee for workers’, in the context of warning them 
of ‘the manoeuvres of the UGT elements as they look towards the next electoral battle’, the 
stimulus of this accusation being the publication by UGT metro workers of a manifesto 
calling for the unity of workers in the industry.45 
 
The cenetistas of San Feliu de Llobregat were similarly flatly opposed to any attempts to 
accommodate the UGT in their locality after the regional congress. At the beginning of 
April, the CNT’s local construction union held a meeting, at which militants and members 
discussed the development of a group of workers in the town attempting to set up a UGT 
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union. Those who spoke were strongly opposed to the development, which, according to 
the report published in Solidaridad Obrera ‘cannot be anything other than a divisive 
manoeuvre against the workers, and in consequence in favour of the capitalists’.46  
 
Cenetistas in Tarragona were equally opposed to the possibility of a UGT presence in their 
town. Indeed, their opposition, as expressed by one of the local militants from Tarragona in 
Solidaridad Obrera in May 1936, was an explicit rebuttal of the argument that ‘workers 
must join one of the two labour federations’. The reason this line was erroneous, according 
to the contributor, was that ‘the UGT is not the same as the CNT; the UGT is detrimental 
to workers’. The event that had prompted this venting of frustration stemmed from the 
UGT’s backing of a recruitment system for the construction industry based on a list of 
names administered by the Delegado del Trabajo. The fear on the part of the cenetistas was 
that if workers thought that joining the UGT was as acceptable as joining the CNT, they 
might join the socialist union, thus perpetuating the recruitment systems that the CNT 
opposed.47 
 
Cenetistas in the Barcelona construction sector appear to have been particularly opposed to 
the possibility of workers joining the UGT. At the end of May 1936, members of the union 
adopted the tactic of disrupting the assembly of an autonomous union of plasterers, at 
which the principal issue of discussion was to be whether the union should join a labour 
federation, with the goal of ensuring they joined the CNT. These attempts went as far as 
criticizing the UGT’s industrial relations methods and shouting down the junta of the union 
as it attempted to discuss options other than joining the CNT.48 Such activities by the 
Barcelona construction union are particularly worth drawing attention to given that, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, it was this union that had presented the idea to the 
January 1936 regional congress that all workers should join the CNT or the UGT in a bid 
to strengthen the revolutionary potential of an anti-political CNT-UGT alliance. From the 
actions of the construction union and several other CNT entities in the region, it would 
appear that the official adoption of this position did not translate into the UGT being 
allowed to have a presence in Catalonia. Just two months after the regional congress the 
Barcelona construction union released a manifesto to assert that suggesting that it was 
acceptable for workers to join the UGT was a divisive ploy and was designed to prevent 
the unity of workers in Catalonia. This was not so much an attack on the basic message of 
workers joining the CNT or the UGT to carry out revolution as espoused by figures such as 
Juan García Oliver so much as a clarification that the message did not mean that, in 
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Catalonia at least, where the CNT regarded itself as dominant, it was acceptable for 
workers to choose the UGT over the CNT.49  
 
In the months immediately before the war, the themes of esquirolaje, arbitration and 
legitimacy to handle conflicts that were discussed in chapter seven showed signs of 
returning to become a key stimulus for hostility between the CNT and the UGT in 
Catalonia. In June 1936, the junta of the CNT’s food union vehemently attacked the UGT 
as a result of UGT members continuing to work at a chocolate factory at which the CNT 
had called a strike. The junta’s response to these events in Solidaridad Obrera was 
virtually indistinguishable from how CNT juntas of other Barcelona unions attacked the 
UGT between 1931 and 1934. Workers were warned that the UGT, not just the specific 
union involved but the organization as a whole, were ‘eternal traitors’ who were ‘using the 
same low methods as ever’.50 In July, the CNT barbers attacked their UGT rivals for 
having negotiated new bases for the sector through the ‘usual comedy’ of the jurados 
mixtos. As well as questioning the legitimacy of the UGT representatives in carrying out 
this task, since ‘it has been a long time since they have picked up work tools’ the 
agreement that they had won was also roundly criticized for being worse than the one that 
had been in place beforehand. Just as seriously, the agreement had provision for creating a 
list of workers that would require individuals to get an official work card, a move that the 
CNT union interpreted as meaning that ‘anyone who is not fascist’ would be unable to 
work in the sector.51 That same month, the wood workers’ union launched a stinging attack 
on the Catalan UGT in response to the UGT’s wood workers’ union attempting to hold a 
public assembly to discuss the creation of a set of bases to be presented to employers, 
inviting the CNT to attend and asking them to participate in the venture. The cenetistas on 
the junta of the wood workers’ union were incensed that the ‘grupito’ of the UGT union 
were trying to organize a conflict in the industry, believing this to be the job of the CNT, 
and certainly not one that it would be willing to go about with the UGT as a joint partner.52  
 
As 1936 progressed, it was clear that the overall trend in Catalonia with regard to CNT-
UGT interactions was of a steady return to the levels of acrimony that had characterized 
the first three years of the Republic. By July, several CNT unions in Barcelona were 
openly accusing their UGT counterparts of treachery. The petrol workers in the CNT’s 
transport union made this very accusation against the ‘politicians and jefecillos’ of the 
UGT, who had entered into agreement with employers to continue working during a CNT 
strike in the sector. The strike committee accused them through the pages of Solidaridad 
Obrera of being motivated to provide scab labour because they were ‘always at the service 
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of the interests of the bourgeoisie and politics’ as well as ‘having the aim of knocking 
down the CNT’. Similar accusations were made on the very same day by CNT metro 
workers.53 It was a similar story outside of Barcelona. By July, the CNT in Badalona had 
grown tired of the developing UGT movement there, and sent a warning to them through 
the CNT press. Reminding the UGT that the workers of Badalona had ‘always’ been 
affiliated to the CNT, a local militant spoke of how the UGT in the town ‘uses coercion as 
a norm, and repugnant political orientations are inserted into its propaganda meetings’ as 
well as accusing the ugetistas of routinely attacking the CNT at public meetings.54 This 
overall trajectory of return to hostilities and the notion that cooperation between the CNT 
and the UGT in Catalonia was impossible was most clearly articulated by the wood 
workers’ union in July, who bluntly informed their UGT counterparts through Solidaridad 
Obrera that ‘we do not want to work jointly, because we know what you are like’.55 Such a 
stance illustrates that the assumption that CNT-UGT grassroots tensions were simply a 
result of a clash between the two movement’s traditional approaches to strikes does not tell 
the whole story.  
 
Solidaridad Obrera’s leader writers and the region’s leading propagandists were equally 
keen to express the notion that the UGT was not welcome in Catalonia. At a rally in Lérida 
in April 1936, Juan García Oliver lamented to the crowd that ‘not only has [the UGT] not 
answered our requests [on Alianza Revolucionaria], but it is trying to organize unions in 
the face of those of the CNT’ and ‘dismember our organizations’. It was an ambition that 
the UGT must drop, according to García Oliver, because, ‘Catalonia has been and will 
continue to be confederal’.56 In July, Solidaridad Obrera published a comment piece on 
the UGT in Catalonia in which it argued that the UGT had ‘always been an outsider in 
Catalonia, with no rooting in the soul of the Catalan proletariat’. The piece even made the 
claim, echoing those of the pre-October era, that the Catalan UGT was even recruiting ‘the 
same elements who the yellows previously took on’, including ‘all those who have come 
from the Libres’.57 
 
It is possible that Catalan cenetistas’ fears that the UGT would gain ground in Catalonia if 
the idea was put forward that the two labour federations were equally valid were fuelled in 
part by a growth of the UGT in the region over the course of 1936. It is generally accepted 
by scholars that the UGT experienced a very rapid growth in Catalonia during the Civil 
War, even if this growth is sometimes simplistically put down to being a result of the petite 
bourgeoisie ‘saving themselves’ from the CNT’s social revolution.58 What is less well 
known, however, is that the socialist labour federation grew at a fairly rapid rate in the 
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months immediately prior to the war.59 This growth was all the more surprising given that, 
from the end of 1935 and until just before the outbreak of the war, the upper echelons of 
the Catalan UGT were in disarray, with different factions vying for control of the 
organization’s apparatus.60 Although no overall figure exists for prior to the war, 
immediately after the outbreak of the conflict the Catalan UGT had 86000 members 
according to Pere Gabriel’s calculations, a figure nearly double that of its peak 
immediately before its spring 1934 schism.61 The indicator of Catalan UGT growth 
deployed in chapter five of this thesis also highlights an unprecedented growth of the 
organization in this period. Between 26th September 1935 and 16th July 1936, the 
Executive Commission registered sixty-eight new unions in the region, with 13257 
members in total where a membership figure was given.62 Of these entries, the most 
revealing is that of a 6000-strong manufacturing and textiles union from Barcelona in early 
July.63 This sector was traditionally one of the CNT’s core constituencies of support, and 
whilst the UGT’s union was not rivalling the 1931 membership peak of 30000 of its CNT 
counterpart, by May 1936 the CNT union’s membership had fallen to 14500.64 It is 
certainly not inconceivable that a proportion of those who had left the CNT ultimately 
joined the UGT union in 1936. 
 
Part of the reason for the rapid growth of the Catalan UGT could be put down to the 
organization’s new-found willingness to adopt a more aggressive stance in strikes. It was 
argued earlier in this thesis that between 1931 and 1934 the activities of the Catalan UGT 
corresponded closely to those of other UGT unions in Spanish cities in terms of its unions 
seeking first and foremost to work with arbitration systems. It seems that in 1936 the 
Catalan UGT also underwent the same changes in its outlook on labour conflicts as did 
UGT unions in other Spanish cities in the respect that, whilst not rejecting the possibilities 
of the jurados mixtos, many UGT unions were more than prepared to convoke strikes. For 
example, in July the UGT’s packaging workers in the lumber industry decided to call a 
strike to demand a new set of pay and conditions. However, at the same time the CNT’s 
own section of its wood workers’ union was in the process of negotiating a new deal with 
employers, meaning it had to publish a notification in Solidaridad Obrera for workers to 
disregard the UGT’s own strike call, a reversal of the usual dynamic of UGT unions 
counselling against joining CNT strikes as they attempted to persist with negotiations.65 
Even the UGT’s more skilled, niche profession unions appear to have embraced this more 
forthright approach to labour relations. In May, for instance, the UGT’s mosaic makers’ 
union in Barcelona contacted its corresponding CNT section in the construction sindicato 
único with an invitation to join them in presenting a new set of bases to employers, 
  
197
counselling their CNT counterparts that ‘we workers must not remain disunited in our 
struggle because this will only benefit capitalism, which we must all work together to bring 
down as it is the true yoke of our oppression’.66 
 
As has been discussed in this chapter, the period following the end of the bienio negro 
brought with it instances of CNT and UGT local actors cooperating with one another 
qualitatively and quantitatively as they had never done before during the Republic. Often 
this cooperation was restricted to specific labour conflicts, but in some cases, such as in 
Cádiz, the convergence was more closely integrated into the battle against the right. 
However, it was equally the case that there was also a concurrent trend of CNT and UGT 
unions in Spain coming into conflict with one another in a manner that had echoes of the 
most hostile times of the bienio reformista. Crucially, these events were picked up on by 
the CNT and socialist press far more so than the instances of cooperation.  
 
In Oviedo in December 1935, for example, a strike was called in the construction industry, 
partly to demand the release of local prisoners. The conflict had initially been entered into 
jointly by the CNT and the UGT, but the UGT representatives then withdrew their support 
for it. According to the strike committee, this was because the leader of the UGT’s national 
federation of construction workers de-authorized the conflict. Elements of the local 
socialist party had apparently also intervened to ensure the release of UGT members, on 
the condition that they returned to work. All this led, as had happened so frequently in 
previous years, to accusations of ‘cowardice’ and ‘treachery’ being levelled at the UGT 
leaders in the sector.67 
 
The waiters’ strike in Madrid was another area in which CNT and UGT unions clashed. 
Here, the CNT’s waiters’ union agreed to strike, but its UGT counterpart refused to second 
the call. The conflict was given more coverage than instances of CNT-UGT cooperation 
were in Solidaridad Obrera, with the paper suggesting that the UGT were returning to ‘the 
tactics of the past’. The conflict was one of a selection of clear-cut instances of hostilities 
between the CNT and the UGT, all of which were given prominence in the CNT’s paper, 
seemingly as part of an effort to imply that, on the level of industrial relations, the UGT 
had inexorably returned to the very same methods that had made it the CNT’s greatest 
enemy in the first years of the Republic.68 
 
The CNT’s waiters in Madrid decided to press ahead with the strike despite the CNT’s 
refusal to back it. The coverage of the conflict in Solidaridad Obrera, which was 
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disproportionate relative to the nationwide significance of the strike itself, was firmly 
anchored in the premise that the UGT had betrayed the waiters by refusing to participate in 
it. In a manifesto released by the strike committee and published in the paper, the leaders 
of the UGT’s hospitality union were accused of ‘having no scruples over betraying the 
exploited and the oppressed’. The anti-fascist credentials of the socialists was mocked as 
they were branded as ‘not hesitating to put themselves on the side of the fascists’ as a 
result of their opposition to the CNT strike. The UGT union leaders were also labelled as 
‘guardians of the bourgeoisie’. Indeed, the strike committee’s public statements on the 
strike were focussed first and foremost on attacking their UGT counterparts in terms that 
suggested that the entire socialist movement was treacherous and collaborationist. In this 
fundamental respect, the conflict and the CNT’s interpretation of it and the UGT’s role in it 
were no different to countless conflicts that took place during the first years of the 
Republic.69 
 
In some cases, CNT unions started out cooperating with their UGT counterparts, only to 
then enter into disagreement with them over handling the conflict in question. This was the 
case in Bilbao in April 1936, where the CNT entered into a conflict in the construction 
industry with the UGT and Solidaridad de Trabajadores Vascos (STV), the Basque 
nationalist labour federation, with a strike committee formed out of the three organizations 
being set up. However, the CNT representatives then left the strike committee after their 
UGT and STV counterparts voted in favour of accepting a solution to the conflict drawn up 
by the Civil Governor. Setting up their own strike committee, the CNT then decried the 
‘low’ attempts made by the UGT and STV committee to instruct workers to disregard the 
CNT’s own committee.70 It was a similar story elsewhere in the Basque Country, where the 
CNT initially entered into another construction conflict with the UGT in San Sebastián in 
May. However, in the words of the CNT organizers involved, throughout the three weeks 
of the conflict ‘we have only been able to clearly ascertain one thing: the malice of the 
elements who call the shots from the UGT against the wishes and the agreements of the 
strikers and of their own members’. The basis for this accusation was that, after the conflict 
had been called, local UGT leaders attempted to intervene in it by trying to impose a 
solution that they had negotiated with the Civil Governor.71 The CNT’s gastronomy union 
in Málaga was left similarly outraged by the local UGT leadership in June, condemning 
them as ‘arriviste’ politicians who were holding back workers after they forbade the UGT 
hospitality workers from accepting the CNT’s offer of presenting bases to employers with 
them.72 The CNT’s interpretation of these events was almost identical to one of the key 
threads of the CNT’s discourse on the UGT since the start of the Republic, namely that its 
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leaders interfered in conflicts, in the process betraying the aspirations of the workers 
involved in them.  
 
What is most significant about Solidaridad Obrera’s coverage of labour conflicts 
involving the CNT and the UGT during 1936 was that it prioritized coverage of CNT-UGT 
hostilities at the grassroots level over instances of cooperation between CNT and UGT 
unions. As discussed, there were a number of conflicts during 1936 in which CNT and 
UGT unions either jointly presented terms to employers, or in which one union seconded 
the strike call of the other. And yet Solidaridad Obrera paid relatively little attention to 
these cases and instead gave far more coverage to incidents in which the UGT was seen to 
be deploying the same methods as it had earlier in the Republic, damaging the CNT’s own 
handling of conflicts in the process and presenting this as being detrimental to the interests 
of workers in the conflicts in question.  
 
The coverage afforded to the Madrid construction strike of June and July 1936 highlights 
this tendency to emphasize instances of conflict over cooperation. The CNT and the UGT 
construction unions had initially entered into the conflict jointly, having presented bases to 
employers together in May. The conflict began on 1st June, with Solidaridad Obrera 
referring to the ‘perfect unity of action’ that it represented.73 Initially, the two unions had 
created separate sets of demands, and the socialist union leaders had wished to put theirs 
through the jurados. However, under grassroots pressure, they reluctantly agreed instead to 
allow the conflict to be pursued the CNT’s way, with the strike committee, in the 
perspective of cenetistas at least, committed to pursuing the conflict to its conclusion 
through direct action.74  
 
After a month of deadlock, however, the government attempted to force a solution to the 
conflict by setting up a jurado mixto for it, with the local socialist leaders agreeing to 
participate in it. The UGT had somewhat unilaterally attempted to bring a close to the 
strike, something their CNT counterparts were unsurprisingly incensed about given that it 
had effectively cut out the CNT as a leading element of the strike. The claim made by 
Claridad that the CNT only refused to accept the solution to the conflict because it 
emanated from the state, and was thus a knee-jerk, dogmatic response, was certainly not 
one that the CNT appeared to accept.75 Indeed, Claridad was roundly dismissive of the 
CNT’s complaints, insisting that were the conflict to continue to be fought through direct 
action, it would inevitably end in total defeat for the workers.76  
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Solidaridad Obrera immediately took a far closer interest in the conflict once it became 
apparent that the CNT and UGT there were at odds regarding how to handle the conflict. 
The UGT’s actions were reported as ones of outright ‘treachery’ in Solidaridad Obrera, 
with José García Pradas, one of the paper’s correspondents in Madrid, devoting a series of 
lengthy articles to outlining this betrayal in detail. García Pradas came to present 
developments in the conflict almost exclusively as a set of attempts by the socialist 
leadership to betray the CNT, such as their advice to UGT members not to attend the 
assembly convoked by the CNT for construction workers to decide how to proceed with 
the strike after the UGT leaders had made an agreement through the jurados.77 The CNT 
claimed to have the overall backing of workers in the industry to continue the strike; 
though it is difficult to gauge the precise split of opinion, it would certainly seem that the 
larger proportion of workers did back the CNT’s position. By this point, for Solidaridad 
Obrera, there continued to be an emphasis on worker unity attached to the conflict; but 
now this unity was presented as workers jointly backing the CNT and rejecting the UGT.78 
It is important to note, however, that although Solidaridad Obrera was openly hostile 
towards the UGT’s actions in Madrid, presenting the UGT there as essentially treacherous, 
it did come out strongly against the instances of violence that developed after some UGT 
members returned to work, demanding that workers from both sides desisted from 
attacking one another.79 This explicit rejection of worker-on-worker violence had been 
largely absent in the CNT press in previous years. 
 
At the same time as emphasising instances of CNT-UGT conflict over cooperation, 
Solidaridad Obrera also started to return to the same interpretations of the UGT that had 
dominated the CNT press between 1931 and 1934. For example, throughout the pre-war 
period of 1936, the paper drew attention to instances of UGT unions abandoning the 
socialist labour federation to join the CNT, just as it had done between 1931 and 1934. In 
November 1935, for example, a militant in Sevilla proudly reported on how workers were 
‘deserting’ the UGT and the communist labour federation in the city as they became aware 
that the CNT was ‘the only [organization] that defends their interests’.80 In April 1936, the 
paper celebrated telephone workers in Santander leaving the UGT for the CNT.81 Local 
leaders of the UGT continued to be presented in such terms as ‘opportunists’82 or 
‘jefecillos’.83 
 
The national leaders of the UGT were equally accused of unaccountably controlling the 
destiny of the workers within the UGT. In April, Solidaridad Obrera went on the attack 
against Largo Caballero’s continual public promotion of unity whilst no practical steps 
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were taken by the UGT to bring it about.84 Similarly, Largo’s role at the head of the UGT 
was also attacked in June 1936, with an editorial in the paper hoping that ‘the workers of 
the Unión General de Trabajadores go over Largo and his minions’ heads’ to accept the 
CNT’s alliance proposal, a desire that contradicted both the fact that the CNT had 
presented its proposal specifically to the UGT national leadership and the paper’s support 
for the currents within the CNT that were attempting to prevent grassroots CNT-UGT 
cooperation.85 Indeed, from June onwards, Solidaridad Obrera significantly stepped up the 
frequency of its attacks on the socialist leadership, often linking its criticisms to their non-
response to the Zaragoza Alianza Revolucionaria proposal.86 Whilst these challenges laid 
down to the UGT over its lack of concrete reply to the CNT proposal undoubtedly partly 
articulated the frustrations of some cenetistas who genuinely hoped the two labour 
federations would work towards an alliance, it must also be highlighted that making such 
public accusations corresponded to the agenda of those who hoped to discredit the UGT by 
exposing its lack of commitment to an alliance with the CNT. In effect, Solidaridad 
Obrera was helping to carry out the final part of this strategy. 
 
On the part of the socialists, from late spring onwards there was likewise a creeping return 
to the sorts of criticisms and attacks that it had directed at the CNT between 1931 and 
1934. By July 1936 both El Socialista and Claridad, in spite of their own differences, had 
adopted a roughly similar stance in their presentation of the CNT as a national movement, 
which was characterized by a very restrained re-articulation of the sorts of criticisms that 
had been made in socialist discourse of the CNT throughout the earlier years of the 
Republic. These criticisms were made in response to the activities of CNT organisms, 
especially those in Madrid during the construction strike held there. Claridad went as far 
as criticising the CNT’s refusal to accept the settlement of the jurado in the conflict under 
the heading of ‘the myth of direct action’;87 their stance over the strike was likewise 
described as ‘suicidal and fratricidal obstinacy’.88 Whilst the tone adopted was nowhere 
near as hostile as that of El Socialista between 1931 and 1933, an outright rejection of the 
CNT’s methods, not just for the conflict in question but on a general level, was 
unmistakable.  
 
In any case, even before the construction conflict in Madrid Claridad had to a degree 
lapsed into the critical discourse against anarchism and syndicalism from a theoretical 
standpoint that had historically been so characteristic of Spanish socialism. In late May 
1936, the paper published a couple of different articles of this nature. One labelled the 
CNT’s commitment to direct action as ‘mistaken’ and in doing so described direct action 
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as ‘seeing in constant and staggered strikes not just a legitimate method of obtaining 
economic improvements, but also a debatable procedure of agitation and promoting the 
union’.89 In another editorial the paper hit back at the criticism of socialism and 
communism that was expressed at the same time in Solidaridad Obrera, in the course of 
which anarchist objections to the notion of the dictatorship of the proletariat were 
dismissed.90 At the same time the paper maintained its rhetorical commitment to promoting 
both alliances in general and also unity specifically between the CNT and the UGT, 
seemingly with little consideration of how public criticisms of the most fundamental tenets 
of CNT practice would be perceived by cenetistas. Nevertheless, the temptation to revert to 
the discourse of yesteryear proved to be too strong for the socialists as well as the anarcho-
syndicalists. As Santos Juliá argues, the socialist left, for all its rhetoric on unity, did not 
fundamentally alter its negative interpretation of anarcho-syndicalism between 1934 and 
1936.91 
 
Conclusions 
 
By the time an uprising against the Republic seemed imminent, the CNT and the UGT on 
the national level and between many sections of their grassroots were well on their way to 
returning to the same open hostilities that had characterized their relationship between 
April 1931 and October 1934. The socialists failed to show any interest in the Alianza 
Revolucionaria proposition of the CNT, and as Helen Graham highlights, offered no 
alternative proposal.92 The actions of the CNT leadership reveal that they were not so 
much interested in signing an alliance with the UGT as much as they were in exploiting the 
notion of unity for their own organizational interests. Privately, members on the CNT’s top 
committees, staff at Solidaridad Obrera and a whole host of militants expressed the belief 
that the proposal that they had formulated could be used to win members from the UGT 
and also discredit the UGT leadership. But it was the leading lights of the Catalan CNT, 
who had masterminded the Alianza Revolucionaria initiative, who proved themselves to be 
most cynical in their use of the question of CNT-UGT unity. The region’s leaders did their 
utmost to prevent grassroots fraternization between the CNT and the UGT across Spain, 
citing the goals of the Alianza Revolucionaria and the agreed procedures to bring it about 
as a pretext to try and prevent CNT unions acting in tandem with UGT counterparts. At the 
same time, cenetistas in Catalonia, in spite of their launching of a strategy of instructing all 
workers to join the CNT or the UGT according to their preferences, were singularly 
unwilling to accept the expansion of the UGT in their region. The attitude of many CNT 
militants in Catalonia, and also some elsewhere in Spain, reveals that a significant 
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proportion of the CNT held fundamentally the same anti-UGT mentality, grounded in the 
same assumptions and beliefs, as they had held since the start of the Republic and even 
before. As a manifestation of this, the press of both movements chose to focus on instances 
of hostility between the CNT and the UGT, presenting them in the same terms as those 
deployed between 1931 and 1934, rather than promoting cases of cooperation. Across 
Spain, there were unquestionably instances of CNT and UGT militants converging, not just 
over labour conflicts, but also in terms of their overall outlook on the possibilities of CNT-
UGT unity, as José Luis Gutiérrez Molina has illustrated with regard to Cádiz.93 But these 
were decisively pushed into the background by the efforts of the most influential sectors of 
both the anarcho-syndicalist and socialist movements. 
 
If one event highlights the risky game both the CNT and the UGT were playing in adopting 
this approach of simultaneously espousing unity whilst treating the other movement as a 
rival, it is the bloody events that occurred in Málaga in June, stimulated by a conflict in the 
food production industry, where the CNT had called a strike but their UGT counterparts 
refused to second it. Beginning with the murder of a socialist, over the following few days 
Málaga was beset by tit-for-tat murders of socialist, communist and anarcho-syndicalist 
militants. CNT and UGT leaders in the city hastily convoked a meeting to attempt to bring 
an end to the violence, with representatives from Madrid and Barcelona travelling to the 
region to assist. El Socialista, Claridad and Solidaridad Obrera all produced front-page 
editorials appealing for calm, with each warning that such actions would either help 
provoke a fascist takeover or were deeply unwise in the context of the mobilization of the 
extreme right.94 Whilst these newspapers, as discussed, sought to draw attention to 
instances of grassroots rivalry, and even used them to discredit the other labour federation, 
neither side wanted the rivalry to lead to a civil war within the proletariat, nor give a 
pretext for a right-wing grab for power. This essentially contradictory labour of 
simultaneously trying to discredit or criticize rival organizations whilst maintaining an 
overall united front with them against a common enemy would become a much more 
frequent – and dangerous – aspect of the left’s behaviour during the war. 
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Chapter Ten: CNT-UGT Interactions in Igualada, 1931-1936 
 
This chapter will provide an analysis of interactions between the CNT and the UGT in 
Igualada, a town approximately seventy kilometres west of Barcelona. Although it would 
be unwise to suggest that CNT-UGT interactions in all Catalan towns followed precisely 
the same path as those of Igualada given the level of variation between different localities 
in important factors such as the relative sizes of the local CNT and UGT movements at the 
start of the Republic, there is little to suggest that interactions between the two 
organizations in the town were unrepresentative or exceptional. Certainly the CNT 
movement here corresponded in terms of the ideas its militants espoused in their 
propaganda and their methods of fighting labour conflicts to the Catalan CNT archetype. 
As such, Igualada serves as a suitable town to use as the subject of a case study of 
grassroots-level CNT-UGT interactions. The more specific focus of the chapter will allow 
the CNT and UGT’s struggles with one another to be examined with a much greater level 
of context and detail. Above all, the local CNT movement can be reconstructed more 
thoroughly, especially with regard to highlighting the role the local cenetistas believed that 
their movement played amongst the igualadí working classes and their level of 
commitment to defending their local organization and the cause they associated with it. In 
addition to studying interactions between the CNT and the UGT specifically in Igualada, 
the chapter will study how the local militants of the CNT saw the wider national and 
regional narratives of CNT-UGT interactions as relevant to their own interactions with the 
UGT in Igualada, as well as how far their stances on the UGT as a national actor and a 
presence in Catalonia matched those outlined in the previous chapters of this thesis. 
 
The Igualada working classes and the CNT 
 
Igualada had a population of 13871 in 1931.1 The town expanded over the first third of the 
twentieth century, stimulated by the expansion of the town’s industrial sector.2 Like many 
towns in Catalonia, Igualada experienced a large industrial growth in particular during 
World War One. The two industries most predominant in Igualada were leather and 
textiles, in particular cotton.3 According to figures provided by Soledad Bengoechea, by 
1922 in Igualada there were 250 leather processing businesses, employing some 3000 
workers.4 The cenetista militants of Igualada were closely associated with this industry, 
with many of the Local Federation’s most active militants working or having previously 
been employed in the sector. The textile industry experienced a boom in Igualada over the 
late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, but began to stagnate towards the end of 
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World War One. By 1922 there were seventeen textile factories in Igualada, employing 
approximately 3000 workers.5 As is to be expected, the town also had a local construction 
industry.6  
 
The key development in the Igualada workers’ movement was the formation of a 
Federación Local Obrera affiliated to the International Workingmen’s Association during 
the politically turbulent years of 1868 to 1874. This Local Federation and its constituent 
sections were guided by a Bakuninist, communalist philosophy.7 This organization 
remained in existence until 1885; its paper La Federación Igualadina, which was in 
publication from 1883 to 1885, bore the slogan of ‘Anarchy, Federation and 
Collectivism’.8 
 
By the turn of the twentieth century trade unions began to form again in Igualada after a 
period of repression at the end of the nineteenth century; once more they were guided by 
anarchist ideas, but also incorporated newer syndicalist principles as well. According to the 
recollections of Joan Ferrer, who was the Igualada CNT’s leading militant throughout the 
1930s, a significant proportion of the protagonists of this new movement were some of the 
main militants of the old Federación Local Obrera, who provided organizational and 
ideological guidance to a new generation of labour activists.9 The ideas of these unions 
were transmitted locally through their paper El Obrero Moderno.10 Though not of 
anywhere near the size or strength that the CNT would attain in 1919, the nucleus of the 
unions and militants that would ultimately go on to form this organization had by this point 
been formed.  
 
Delegates from Igualada’s leather union were present at the founding congress of the CNT 
in 1910.11 The Igualada unions were therefore connected to the CNT from the moment of 
its founding. Over the course of the 1910s, these unions would consolidate within the 
CNT, culminating in the spectacular growth of the local organization at the end of the 
decade. Nineteen-ten was also the year in which Joan Ferrer joined the local CNT at the 
age of fourteen.12 Over the course of the 1910s many of the individuals who would 
comprise the key core of militants of the CNT during the Republic and the war, such as 
Ángel Amenós, Daniel Alcaide, José Anselmo, Ramón Guitart and José Cuatrecases, also 
began their long associations with the Local Federation;13 many of these figures were 
signatories of the petition by the CNT made to the Mayor in April 1931 for legal 
restrictions on their union to be removed.14 
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The trajectory of growth for the Igualada CNT corresponds to a large degree to that of the 
organization in Barcelona, with the organization remaining a small core of militants until 
World War One, then subsequently experiencing a moderate increase in membership 
between 1916 and 1918, and then finally experiencing a massive growth in its popularity in 
1919.15 According to the organization’s own figures, local membership ballooned from 
1607 members in 1918 to 5600 at the end of 1919.16 Given that the local population of 
Igualada at this time was 12512, this figure, though perhaps exaggerated, demonstrates the 
importance of the CNT in Igualada.  To a very large extent, then, in 1919 the Igualada 
CNT represented the working classes of Igualada almost in their entirety, and could call on 
an unprecedented level of collective strength in local labour conflicts.  
 
The combination of the Igualada CNT’s spectacular growth and brief preponderance in the 
1910s with the fact of many of the militants of the re-founded CNT of 1930 belonging to 
the earlier incarnation of the CNT is highly important when considering the position taken 
by the Igualada CNT over a nascent UGT presence in the town during the Second 
Republic. Joan Ferrer makes it clear in his memoirs that he viewed the CNT as having a 
long-standing historical lineage in Igualada. In the view of Joan Ferrer, the re-founded 
CNT of 1930 was ‘indisputably the home of the igualadí worker’.17 Like the CNT 
elsewhere in Catalonia, its militants viewed their organization and the local working class 
as synonymous.  Just as importantly, Ferrer viewed this implantation of the CNT in the 
town being a result of not just the receptiveness of the local working classes to anarchist 
and syndicalist ideas, but specifically down to the efforts of himself and a dedicated group 
of militants who joined the organization in the 1910s and had continued struggling 
throughout the dictatorship to ensure the movement’s survival in the town.18 As will be 
seen, the Igualada CNT were resolutely opposed to the possibility of the UGT developing a 
presence in Igualada during the Republic; this stance was undoubtedly in part a product of 
the sacrifices and commitment that the movement’s militants had made over the course of 
decades, in combination with their interpretation of their organization being the current 
manifestation of a decades-long lineage of the local working classes’ union organization. 
 
It is difficult to identify any significant union alternatives to the CNT and its antecedents 
that existed in Igualada until the contentious arrival of the Sindicatos Libres in Igualada in 
1920, which was aided by the authorities and employers as it was elsewhere in Catalonia.19 
However, there did exist another convergence point for workers in the town, though not a 
trade union organization, which outdated the CNT by several decades. This entity was the 
Ateneu Igualadí de la Classe Obrera. Set up in 1863, this was for the most part a cultural, 
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educational and social institution, though according to Bengoechea also offered advice and 
encouragement to workers in the event of labour conflicts. The Ateneu in the 1910s had a 
membership of roughly 1000.20 It was founded on the notions of worker liberation through 
education and personal betterment and inter-class cooperation rather than the anarcho-
syndicalist emphasis of violent class conflict. The Ateneu offered a very different vision of 
society and the possible role of the working class in it to the anarcho-syndicalist 
alternative, and that it continued to flourish even after the CNT had set up their own 
alternative Ateneu in 1918 shows that although the CNT were the only significant labour 
union, their doctrine was not the only one endorsed by sectors of the Igualada working 
class.21 However, it seems highly likely that the UGT had no representation in Igualada 
before the Second Republic. Miquel Termens i Graells states categorically that the UGT 
did not exist in Igualada prior to the Second Republic;22 David Ballester makes no mention 
of a local federation in Igualada in this era.23 There appears to be no documentary trace of 
a UGT presence in Igualada before the Second Republic. 
 
When the CNT returned to some form of legality in 1930, the CNT in Igualada began to 
rebuild and take in new members extremely quickly, as happened in towns across 
Catalonia. The Sindicatos Libres, in which many former cenetistas had been enrolled, 
quickly began to disintegrate.24 As in previous eras, the strongest sections of the Igualada 
CNT at the beginning of the 1930s were its textile, leather and construction unions, with 
metal, transport and woodworking unions also having significant membership levels.25 The 
Local Federation’s newspaper, El Sembrador, went into publication on 15th June 1930, 
first on a bi-weekly basis and then weekly from mid-1931. Overall, it is clear that the CNT 
militants of Igualada had spent the 1920s waiting for the moment in which their 
organization could be rebuilt, and in the latter days of the Monarchy and the early months 
of the Republic they set about this task with considerable success.  
 
According to Eulàlia Vega, the Igualada CNT Local Federation was among the more 
efficient of the CNT local federations in Catalonia in terms of its abilities to organize the 
local workforce and conduct the internal business of the organization, such as meetings 
and assemblies.26 By June 1931, the Local Federation had a total of 5100 members, with 
this figure representing the peak for the CNT in Igualada before the war.27 This figure is 
comparable with that of December 1919, and as such represents an impressive rebuilding 
of the organization in a relatively short space of time. According to Vega, in late 1931 
seventy-five percent of Igualada’s working classes were enrolled in the CNT.28 The 
Igualada CNT’s activities in the first months of the Republic consisted principally of 
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concentrated verbal and written propaganda campaigns to expand the organization, and 
also entering into labour conflicts across all industries to gain new pay and conditions 
agreements, with all eight of the Local Federation’s constituent unions initiating strike 
activity in 1931.29  
 
However, the level of dominance that the CNT initially enjoyed was to an extent illusory. 
By 1932, the organization began to lose members and suffer the effects of government 
repression. The effects of the factional split within the CNT movement would also play a 
decisive role, ultimately leading to a split in the local organization. A loss of enthusiasm on 
the part of the local workforce must also be considered an important factor in the decline in 
membership. By April 1932 the membership of the Local Federation had fallen to 3230 
members; by March 1933 it was as low as 1245.30 As Vega highlights, this represents a 
seventy-five percent decline in membership from the June 1931 levels. The most marked 
decline was experienced by the textile union, the membership of which fell from 3700 
members in June 1931 to just 400 in March 1933.31 Part of this decline, particularly in 
textiles and leather, can be attributed to the schism that took place in the Igualada CNT in 
1934.32 The collapse in membership shows that, to a large extent, the CNT in Igualada was 
held together by a small nucleus of committed militants, who had only temporary success 
in winning the bulk of the workforce over to their cause, rather than the organization 
enjoying committed widespread support. This was a state of affairs acknowledged and 
publicly lamented in El Sembrador in December 1933.33 At the same time, however, for 
the local militants who witnessed this decline in their organization after both the decades 
they had committed to the organization and the initial, rapid expansion of it, the situation 
must have been particularly exasperating. Like militants all around Catalonia whose CNT 
organisms experienced the same setbacks, there must have been a temptation to look to 
exterior forces – above all competitors to the CNT – to blame.    
 
The Igualada CNT and their general perceptions of the UGT, 1931 to 1934 
 
Although the Igualada CNT did come into direct contact with a nascent local wing of the 
UGT over the course of the Second Republic, it is important to recognize that this more 
tangible type of contact was not the only way in which the Igualada CNT interacted with 
the UGT. As members of a national labour federation that articulated goals that had a 
nationwide impact it is also important to recognize that the Igualada cenetistas viewed the 
UGT and the CNT’s relationship with it as something of relevance far beyond the confines 
of their town.  
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El Sembrador’s stance on the UGT on the national level was to a very large extent the 
same as that of other CNT newspapers from across Spain which have been outlined earlier 
in this thesis. The following excerpt of an editorial from El Sembrador, referring to Largo 
Caballero – who was used to personify the UGT as a general entity in El Sembrador 
attacks, in much the same way that he was in Solidaridad Obrera – serves as a good initial 
orientation of the line taken towards the UGT and its national figureheads throughout the 
period 1931 to 1934: 
 
We have known for some time about [Largo’s] actions and life. We know that he 
belongs to the Unión General de Trabajadores (?), and that he is one of its key 
members. We are not ignorant of the reformist qualities of this organization, nor the 
bourgeois or reformist character that drives it. We remember the unconditional support 
provided by this gentleman during the Primo de Rivera dictatorship. We do not know 
to exactly what height or depth his statist socialism permits him to go; because in the 
politics of the state moral flexibility is so dilated that anything can be justified or 
approved, no matter how unjustifiable it may appear.34 
 
Like the rest of the CNT press, the anti-UGT line of El Sembrador would only intensify in 
the following months. The Telefónica strike of the summer of 1931 marked the first point 
that the UGT on the general level came under sustained attack in the pages of El 
Sembrador. In line with Solidaridad Obrera’s interpretation of events, the UGT as a whole 
was presented as intentionally betraying the CNT. In the midst of the conflict, El 
Sembrador advised its readers that ‘who takes the prize in the field of treachery is the 
UGT’.35  
 
Like Solidaridad Obrera, El Sembrador argued that the socialists in government were out 
to crush the CNT and replace it with the UGT. The paper’s editorials made statements such 
as ‘by the order of a democratic government, the CNT will be made illegal because this 
suits the enxufistes of the UGT’.36 Similarly, a May 1933 editorial spoke of CNT resistance 
to ‘legislation designed to destroy our labour federation to favour the interests of the 
primates of socialism’.37 Largo’s jurados mixtos came under particularly heavy attack, 
being represented as a method of the socialist leadership to repress the CNT and receiving 
comparison with the arbitration schemes of Mussolini’s Italy.38 These depictions of the 
UGT on the national level remained prominent throughout the bienio reformista and 
continued after it, with the paper proclaiming Largo as ‘lackey of yesterday’s dictatorship 
and today ex-minister of the Republic’,39 and blaming the UGT ministers’ activities in 
government for the rise of the right.40   
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It is important to consider why the UGT on the national level was such a target for El 
Sembrador’s hostility. The most obvious answer, and certainly not an incorrect one, is that 
the UGT and its leaders were playing an important role in damaging the CNT through 
repression, and fully endorsed policies which were anathema to the CNT’s ideology, such 
as the jurados mixtos. However, this on its own is not a fully satisfactory explanation. As 
highlighted here, the vast majority of El Sembrador’s anti-UGT line was a replication of 
that which was produced in Solidaridad Obrera. It is unlikely that the local paper repeated 
Solidaridad Obrera’s line because local militants would have otherwise not been exposed 
to it. Nor is it the case that attacks on Largo Caballero and on the UGT as a whole were 
made because the Igualada CNT was experiencing any particularly acute local competition 
from the UGT. As will be discussed later, the local UGT movement, when it did begin in 
1932, was very small. Moreover, El Sembrador’s attacks on the UGT took place from 
virtually the first days of the Republic, before the UGT had even the smallest presence in 
the town. 
 
Rather, one of the key reasons the UGT as a national actor was given such heavy coverage 
in the Igualada CNT’s propaganda is due to the pivotal function it played in the 
organization’s promotion of the CNT in the town. The UGT when presented in a 
generalized fashion in cenetista discourse was an embodiment of everything the CNT 
opposed, and so served in the propaganda of the Igualada CNT as a negative counterpoint 
against which the CNT could be presented as the only valid representative of the working 
classes. This function is recurrent throughout the local paper’s articles that attacked the 
UGT. Articles in El Sembrador that argued that the UGT was attempting to destroy the 
CNT, such as its attacks on the Ley de Orden Público, also promoted the CNT as being 
synonymous with the working classes and referred to the CNT method of direct action as 
the only legitimate course of action. 41 In an editorial entitled ‘Two Socialisms’ the UGT 
and Largo were attacked at length, before providing the counterpoint that ‘we are 
socialists, but anarchist-socialists. We possess a confederal organism of libertarian 
tendency which truly represents the exploited class of Spain: the Confederación Nacional 
del Trabajo’.42 Similarly, in August 1931, José Cuatrecases argued that 
 
in parallel to the repressive methods that are deployed against the CNT, the UGT 
receives favourable treatment. Why? To divert the revolutionary spirit of the workers 
towards reformist causes. The Spanish proletariat, organized in the CNT, must move 
forward, in spite of all the repressions and all the crises that have been provoked, 
towards the destruction of the oppressive system.43 
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The fact that such a heavy emphasis was placed on criticizing the UGT as part of an 
attempt to promote the CNT in a town with such a negligible UGT presence as Igualada 
demonstrates just how important a function the UGT on a general level played in the 
discourse of CNT militants. Even in Igualada, where the role of these attacks as a means of 
attacking a local UGT rival was largely redundant, the UGT was a key element of the local 
militants’ discourse. For the local cenetista militants the UGT on the general level was not 
just one of the key props of the system the CNT sought to overthrow; its mention was also 
a key method of asserting that the CNT was the only legitimate working class organization. 
Even in the areas of Catalonia that had the strongest historical connections to the CNT, the 
UGT – if only as a notional entity – was therefore deeply rooted in the consciousness and 
discourse of the local militants. 
 
The Igualada CNT’s public stance on the question of alliances was also a direct re-
articulation of Solidaridad Obrera’s stance on the matter. Joan Ferrer passed comment on 
several occasions on the issue of anti-fascist unity. In September 1933, for example, he 
opined in El Sembrador that the current anti-fascist unity initiatives were unworkable 
because they were led by organizations that had proven themselves to be hostile to the 
CNT and workers.44 Likewise, Ferrer also shared Solidaridad Obrera’s line that the CNT 
was not opposed to working with other members of the left, on the condition that this unity 
came about spontaneously and in the course of revolution:   
 
Revolutionary unity? For us it is no longer necessary that we be invited to a unity of 
this sort. Because we never fail. If a revolutionary movement does arise, they will meet 
us in the street. We make revolutionary unity at the foot of the barricade.45 
 
Interactions between CNT and UGT grassroots in Igualada, 1931 to 1934 
 
Before examining the hostilities between the CNT and the UGT in Igualada after UGT 
unions started being founded in the town from 1932, it would be worthwhile to consider 
first the Igualada CNT’s more general position regarding workers who were seen to be 
dissenting from the Local Federation. Throughout the period stretching from the start of 
the Republic until October 1934, the Igualada CNT on various occasions ran public 
campaigns which targeted non-unionized workers in a particular industry or workplace in a 
bid to force them to join the CNT. These campaigns typically entailed an initial naming 
and shaming of the targeted workers in El Sembrador, followed by the threat of some form 
of boycott. On 11th July 1931, for example, the paper published the following warning to 
the employees of the Manuel Arolas electrical workshop: 
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We have invited [these] workers on more than three occasions to join our union and 
they have always refused. Since they refuse to cooperate in our syndical task, the least 
that us workers in the CNT can do is likewise refuse to cooperate in any works in 
which these workers are involved, which is to say: boycott them.46  
 
Similarly, in January 1934, an article in El Sembrador attributed to ‘a group of waiters’ 
sent a warning out to the employees of a local bar who had left the CNT. Publishing the 
names of the individuals in question, the article warned them ‘not to forget that we have 
sufficient influence to have you replaced [in your jobs] with men more sensible and more 
willing to fulfil their duties to the workers’ cause’. The message ended with a warning to 
the bar owner that ‘a boycott of your establishment would be very appropriate for you if 
you try and provoke conflicts’.47 As can be seen in these two examples, not joining the 
CNT was effectively equated with opposing it, and as such aggressive measures such as 
these were deemed acceptable to counteract reluctant workers. These examples also 
demonstrate that the priority for CNT organizers was to recruit workers into their 
organization as though it were a form of natural obligation for the working classes, 
regardless of whether the workers in question endorsed the CNT’s principles or methods.  
 
The minutes of the Igualada CNT’s leather goods union also hint at the possibility that 
inflammatory accusations were even at times levelled at cenetistas by one another. At one 
meeting of the leather goods union, one CNT member was accused by another of ‘being 
stained with bad conduct and betrayal of [his] colleagues to the boss’.48 At another meeting 
an argument erupted when it emerged that the father of two members of the union was 
working in the Casa Vich, a workplace which the CNT were boycotting. The sons of this 
individual attempted to defend their father, in the process finding themselves coming under 
attack from other militants.49 In this particular case, family ties conflicted with union ones. 
Such incidents can only have alienated some workers from an organization in which they 
were the subject of accusations such as collaboration with the bourgeoisie.  
 
This combination of hostile campaigns directed at those who did not adhere to the CNT’s 
activities and the fact that individuals within the same union were prepared to accuse their 
fellow cenetistas of yellow practices suggests that in no small measure, due to the labour 
practices of the Igualada CNT and the attitudes of its individual members, a certain level of 
divisiveness and mistrust was present amongst workers in Igualada. It seems highly 
probable that although the CNT was by some distance the strongest labour organization in 
Igualada, this status was maintained at a cost of sectors of the workforce inevitably 
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harbouring some form of antipathy towards the organization, and others becoming a target 
of public criticism.  
 
The first instance of definite CNT-UGT interaction in Igualada came about in the 
construction industry. It stemmed from attempts by the CNT to regulate the control of the 
allocation of work in the Igualada building trade as a solution to the widespread 
unemployment experienced by workers in this sector. The CNT initiated a scheme through 
which work would be distributed evenly amongst workers in the industry, which was 
formalized in an agreement negotiated with employers. However, nine workers attached to 
the Casa Cinto business refused to adhere to the CNT’s scheme, with the business refusing 
to share its work with unemployed cenetistas.50 These workers had previously been 
members of the CNT.51 A boycott in an attempt to marginalize these workers was made by 
the Local Federation of the CNT.52 On 6th February, the workers of the Casa Cinto who 
were refusing to accept the CNT’s work-sharing scheme were named publicly in El 
Sembrador, along with a full account of their ‘shameful’ activities.53 Regular updates on 
the campaign against these workers were then published in the paper, including requests 
for readers to ‘comply as they should in the conflict against the Casa Cinto’.54  
 
Initially, this campaign against the Casa Cinto began as much as one against the owner of 
the company as it was the workers who continued to work for him and in so doing 
undermined the CNT’s work-sharing scheme.55 However, once the builders of the Casa 
Cinto had joined the UGT by February 1932 the course of CNT-UGT interactions in 
Igualada took a markedly more tense turn, with the looming prospect of violence between 
cenetistas and the ugetista builders.56 This already tense situation was inflamed even 
further when, in August 1932, a bricklayers’ strike was called in the town by the CNT over 
pay and conditions.57 The UGT bricklayers ignored the call and continued to work, and 
UGT members from nearby Pobla de Claramunt were also brought in as strike-breakers.58 
El Diari d’Igualada in its reporting of the strike indicated that more than one workplace 
remained operational due to UGT labour, raising the possibility that other workers outside 
the Casa Cinto joined the UGT so that they could continue to work.59  
 
Unfortunately, it is difficult to ascertain precise details of incidents of physical 
confrontation between cenetistas and the ugetistas of the Casa Cinto; both parties made a 
series of accusations and counter-accusations of attempts at violence by their opponents. El 
Sembrador for its part refuted all accusations against cenetistas made by ugetistas via the 
pages of El Diari d’Igualada, whilst accusing the ugetistas of committing similar acts of 
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aggression.60 For example, in April 1932 the CNT publicly accused the local UGT of 
preparing to usher in an era of pistolerismo in the town, stating that ‘some strike-breakers 
from the UGT’ had acquired ammunition for pistols, for use against ‘the workers of the 
CNT’.61 Nevertheless, the accusations themselves made by the CNT and the language 
employed in presenting the local ugetistas of the construction industry reveal much about 
the nature of interactions between the two groups. For example, a September 1932 edition 
of El Sembrador carried the following account of an altercation between cenetistas and 
ugetistas from the Casa Cinto at the height of the bricklayers’ strike: 
 
There was a light skirmish between a turncoat of the CNT, a professional esquirol 
affiliated to the trash of the Igualada UGT [and] worker at the Casa Cinto and a group 
of our comrades, who with kind words informed him of the ignoble role he was 
playing, which he answered with insulting arrogance. But what shows the rotten core 
of the ugetistas of this town is that following on from this event and over the course of 
the night, they waited near the home of an important comrade of ours with the benign 
intention of blowing his brains out.62 
 
In the case of this incident it appears certain that some form of altercation did take place, 
given that the incident was reported to the police on behalf of the individuals in the UGT 
as an assault by the cenetistas.63 However, the charges against the cenetistas were later 
dismissed in court, diminishing the likelihood that an actual assault took place.64  
 
In December 1932 CNT-UGT hostilities reached their apex when there was an explosion 
in the premises of the Local Federation of the CNT, apparently at a time designed to 
coincide with a meeting of the CNT construction union.65 In covering the story in El 
Sembrador, Joan Ferrer conveyed the indignation of the local cenetistas, presenting the 
incident as a continuation of a historical campaign of terrorism against the CNT 
perpetrated by ‘enemies of ours in the form of workers, but in reality traitors to our 
cause’.66 The culprits were specifically identified by the paper as ‘mental deficients’ and ‘a 
gang of ugetistas’ whom the CNT’s construction union had already reported to the police 
for their links to an armourer.67  
 
The interactions between the CNT and the UGT in the construction industry were 
undoubtedly the most high-profile and intense of the CNT-UGT interactions in Igualada, 
with the dispute with the Casa Cinto workers, intensified greatly by the town’s 
bricklayers’ strike, running on from the spring of 1932 into 1933. The nature of the 
cenetistas’ stance over the nascent UGT and its activities in the construction industry was a 
curious mixture of rhetorical and physical aggression and also victimhood. Whilst no 
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explicit message was made that the UGT nucleus in construction should be destroyed, the 
nature of the CNT’s attacks and the emphasis on the yellow, violent and anti-working 
classes nature of these workers made it clear that this was their intention, even if it was not 
formulated into a definite plan of attack. Moreover, it is clear that the cenetistas were 
willing to confront physically ugetistas at their workplaces and in the street to prevent 
them working and to intimidate them with the goal of breaking their allegiance to the 
UGT. At the same time, however, much of the discourse on the construction workers was 
focused on illustrating their anti-CNT – and by extension anti-worker – violence. In doing 
this, the CNT-UGT conflict in construction was presented as a case of ugetistas in fact 
waging a campaign of violence to extinguish the CNT, this violence being presented as 
‘[their] only possible argument against the workers of the CNT’.68 In effect, the local UGT 
was presented as pistoleros and strike-breakers cut from exactly the same cloth as the 
Sindicatos Libres, with direct comparisons at times being made.69 Although the truth 
behind the accusations of violence on either side is difficult to establish, there does appear 
to have been a degree of weight to the general accusations of yellow practices on the part 
of the UGT construction workers, given their refusal to participate in the work sharing 
agreement, their subsequent role as strike-breakers in a local construction dispute, as well 
as the further provocation of the use of UGT workers from outside Igualada as strike-
breakers in the town. 
 
The other main area in which the CNT came to interact with the UGT during the Second 
Republic was in the printing industry. In late April 1933, it was announced in El 
Sembrador that the town’s print workers had joined the UGT.70 In addition to attacking the 
printers, the decision was also taken to boycott the local print works, and from henceforth 
El Sembrador was printed in Manresa.71 By any measure, this decision to boycott 
immediately the local print works because its employees had joined the UGT was a drastic 
course of action, and demonstrates the lengths to which the local CNT militancy were 
willing to go to prevent the spread of the UGT. An important difference between the 
defection of the printers to the UGT and the incidents in the construction trade was that on 
this occasion the printers for a time defected en masse, rather than a minority of them 
joining the UGT whilst the CNT continued to dominate the industry.72 The circumstances 
of their departure were therefore different, and not based around a dissident minority who 
could be accused of strikebreaking. And yet the Igualada CNT’s reaction to the defection 
of the printers was of equal vehemence. El Sembrador informed its readers that ‘the 
employees of Igualada’s printworks have joined the UGT, the union of strikebreaking. 
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These “workers”, who suffer from the defects of Carlism, Catholicism, vileness and others 
besides, want to honour the ranks of Spanish socialism with their useless presence’.73 
 
The ugetistas in this sector were sufficiently well organized and connected to the regional 
UGT hierarchy as to have published information about their battle with the cenetistas in 
the UGT’s regional paper Cataluña Obrera. It is therefore possible to gauge their 
interpretation of events more accurately than in the case of the construction industry. And 
in the judgement of these ugetistas, they were locked in a battle to free themselves from a 
tyrannical organization that would resort to any measure to force them to join it. The 
ugetista print workers recounted that ‘such is the phobia that dominates their [the 
cenetistas’] minds, they have had no qualms about using all different types of coercion to 
try and win over the print workers.’ The print workers went on to describe how 
representatives of the CNT attempted to enter into negotiations and also threatened the 
bosses of the town’s print works to make their employees join the CNT. According to this 
account the pressure applied by the bosses to make these workers join the CNT only 
resulted in them joining the UGT en masse. It could not be argued in this situation, then, 
that the decision of these workers to join the UGT was one done as a measure of 
collaboration with the bourgeoisie, as could be argued in the case of the construction 
industry. These ugetistas also argued that ‘unfortunately for [the workers in Igualada not 
yet in the UGT] they let themselves be dominated by the coercion that they suffer on a 
daily basis at the hands of these ominous and lying anarcho-syndicalists’.74  
 
What is perhaps most intriguing about the printers joining the UGT was the reaction of the 
CNT to the speedy return of the printers of one print works to the CNT fold. This was an 
event which seems to have come about through pressure exerted by the CNT on the bosses 
of the business, and is also a fairly clear demonstration of the overall dynamic in Catalonia, 
discussed in chapter five, of the CNT being able to prevent the growth of the UGT in the 
region. Having decried the printers as traitors and enemies of the working classes, the 
Igualada CNT took a triumphalist stance over the return of a portion of these workers to 
the CNT: 
 
The workers of the Miranda printworks (we don’t know if of their own free will or 
through the urging of their bourgeois, though it is likely to be the latter), have sought to 
join our organization. The graphic arts workers, who have little enthusiasm for 
defending themselves through their own effort (due to their selfish mentality) had 
trusted their desires for improvement in the enchufistas in the UGT. We would like to 
advise the workers of the Miranda printworks that it would be very uncharitable of 
them to affiliate to the CNT for solely selfish, material reasons.75  
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The reaction of the CNT militants to the print workers rejoining the CNT also suggests that 
the hostility to the UGT in this case was based around sectarian, organizational rivalry 
more than it was around any ideological principle. The Igualada cenetistas were adamant 
that the print workers, including those who had opted to join the CNT from the UGT, were 
traitors to the working classes and reactionaries; yet they still elected to admit them to their 
organization. For an organization that presented itself as the only possible representative of 
the revolutionary working classes, the admission of such suspect characters seems 
somewhat incongruous, and points to the likelihood that for the Igualada CNT the 
recruitment of members of the local workforce against their will was seen as a legitimate 
method of building their organization.  
 
In common with other CNT organisms in Catalonia, the cenetistas of Igualada linked their 
attacks on local UGT rivals to wider discourses on the UGT that were produced by the 
anarcho-syndicalist movement. For example, the idea that the UGT in Catalonia was a 
replacement for the Sindicatos Libres served to prejudge and undermine the legitimacy of 
these local rivals before any account of their actions was given. It was announced that 
while the print workers had adhered to ‘the UGT, the union of strike-breakers’; these 
‘cowards’ had historically belonged to ‘the Sindicato Libre or the fiefdom of Largo 
Caballero, according to the circumstances’.76 The broader discourse on the UGT was used 
to provide proof of the dangerousness of these local rivals that did not require an account 
of their actions locally. It was, in effect, used for ad hominem attacks on the local 
ugetistas. 
 
The local cenetistas viewed the implantation of a UGT entity in Igualada as being a 
product of their wider interpretation of the UGT on the national level having an agenda of 
attempting to impose the UGT in areas where it had no influence. Joan Ferrer recounts that 
the attempt to set up the UGT in Igualada was spearheaded by outsiders who were 
historically unconnected to the local workers’ movement. Noting that Manuel Villar, the 
local UGT leader, was a Galician with no knowledge of Catalan,77 Ferrer also states that 
‘with Vila Cuenca [regional leader of the UGT in Catalonia] and a few print worker lads 
who we would like to believe acted in good faith, Villar had started the “Igualada” UGT, 
taking as for its base, its “masses”, the strike breakers of the Casa Cinto’.78 Ferrer 
maintains in his memoir that towards the UGT the population of Igualada had always been 
‘indifferent, if not averse’.79 These accusations were also made in the pages of El 
Sembrador with reference to the Casa Cinto dispute, with the paper claiming the affiliation 
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of these workers to the UGT was a result of the direct intervention of Vila Cuenca, referred 
to as ‘the viceroy of the UGT in Catalonia’ in the dispute.80 
 
Cenetistas in the leather industry also viewed the emergence of the UGT in the town as 
some form of manoeuvre enacted by those outside the local workers’ movement with a 
view to challenging the CNT. Their discussion of this matter stemmed from a boycott 
campaign they ran against the Casa Vich workshop, during the course of which a 
contingent of workers, who had formerly been members of the CNT, began to work in the 
Casa Vich, against the instructions of the CNT.81 The militants of the CNT’s leather union 
were concerned that these individuals had some connection to an emerging UGT 
movement in the town. In turn, they saw this local UGT movement as linked to wider 
attempts by the local bourgeoisie and the UGT in general to implant the UGT in the town. 
At a meeting of the union on 20th April 1932, José Rios, who was one of the men who was 
charged with the alleged assault on the UGT builders, in discussing the case of the Casa 
Vich alluded to ‘individuals that act in the UGT’ who were ‘traitors of the working class’.82 
Another militant in explaining the presence of a local UGT organism argued that it was a 
‘vehicle of Largo Caballero’.83  
 
This position of viewing the UGT in Igualada as a product of individuals from outside the 
town who were connected to the local bourgeoisie and the regional and national UGT 
hierarchy was a product of the local CNT’s presentation of itself, as discussed previously, 
as a movement with which the local working classes had a strong historical and spiritual 
bond, whilst also arguing that all other union movements that had been attempted in the 
town were a product of outside forces that had intentions of undermining the emancipation 
of the working classes. This rationale on the CNT’s part is to a substantial degree 
invalidated by the fact that the local CNT, through methods such as boycotting of 
businesses where workers would not affiliate to the CNT, attempted to ensure that no 
movement other than the CNT could emerge locally. Those who dissented from the CNT 
were subject to public attack; under such circumstances it was inevitable that a separate 
union movement could not have been produced locally. Indeed, the local militants had in 
certain respects operated as what could be considered ‘outside influences’ within certain 
sectors of the local working classes. The case of the print workers was a clear-cut piece of 
outside interference. The campaign against these workers, all of whom defected from the 
CNT, was not initiated by cenetista print workers, of which there were none at this point. 
The pressure exerted on the management of the print works further emphasizes the CNT’s 
role as an outside influence in this instance to recruit members. 
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Moreover, Joan Ferrer and the other local cenetistas’ premise that the initial organization 
of a UGT entity in Igualada by outsiders automatically invalidated the UGT as a legitimate 
local union also requires closer scrutiny. For in making this assertion, the local militants 
betrayed much about their understanding of what rights and agency individuals had to 
choose their union affiliation. The cenetistas appear to have somewhat illogically reasoned 
that, just because the first steps to organize the UGT were taken by individuals not 
historically connected to the local working class labour movement, this meant that the 
individuals who chose to join this movement and break away from the CNT were not 
entitled to make or capable of making a decision to affiliate to that movement themselves. 
The case of the print workers in particular demonstrates that there was a definite local 
agency amongst certain local workers to join the UGT, rather than them somehow being 
co-opted or tricked by outsiders into doing so. However, the leading CNT militants did not 
view the local working classes as entitled to make their own choices as to which labour 
organization they joined.  
 
After October 1934 
 
Following the October 1934 uprising, the Igualada CNT entered into a period of greatly 
reduced activity until the end of the bienio negro. Even before October, however, the CNT 
in Igualada had become a shadow of its former self, ravaged by a collapse in membership 
and the effects of the factional schism.84 After the end of the bienio negro, the local 
organization began to rebuild, though not with as great a momentum as it had at the 
beginning of the Second Republic. The organization was reduced to a single union as late 
as January 1936; El Sembrador never returned to publication. The level of documentary 
evidence relating to the Igualada CNT and the local workers’ movement more generally is 
far scarcer in this period of the immediate pre-war than for either the wartime period or the 
first years of the Second Republic. It is particularly difficult to put together a detailed 
picture of either the local UGT or the CNT’s interactions with it. Indeed, the local CNT’s 
main rivalry was against the autonomous unions in the town, in particular those with links 
to the POUM and which had been formed as a result of the factional schism that had beset 
the CNT earlier in the Republic. Through Solidaridad Obrera and other papers, local 
militants wrote of the threat that these organisms posed to the unity of the working 
classes.85  
 
What can be ascertained, however, is the Igualada CNT’s participation in the process that 
began in Catalonia in January 1936 to change the CNT’s national-level stance towards the 
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UGT to one of calling publicly for Alianza Revolucionaria. The Igualada CNT sent Joan 
Ferrer to this congress – though it is not known if the organization had held a meeting 
beforehand to agree positions on the items on the agenda, as was the case with many other 
CNT organisms – and the minutes of the congress record Ferrer as arguing that ‘a pact 
with the UGT is necessary, but with the formal agreement of moving towards the 
destruction of capitalism and the state’, with this agreement taking place ‘on the national 
level’.86 In other words, the Igualada CNT’s position on the matter of CNT-UGT alliance 
was closely matched to the position agreed upon by the regional congress, as well as the 
later agreement reached on the matter in Zaragoza. What this position held by the Igualada 
CNT reveals about the local organization, especially when taken into consideration with 
their violently hostile line against the UGT on the general level during the period 1931 to 
1934, is that the local militants largely followed the prevailing trends within the 
organization with regards to their position on the UGT on the national level. Previously, 
the local militants had enthusiastically endorsed and replicated the anti-UGT line of 
Solidaridad Obrera; now they were following the prevailing line of promoting a fairly 
undefined notion of a ‘national’ revolutionary alliance with the UGT on the condition that 
it was for the purpose of revolution and libertarian anti-state ends.  
 
The little documentation on the Igualada CNT in 1935 and early 1936 makes it difficult to 
say with certainty whether the local militants had undergone this shift in stance 
independently of the rest of the CNT in the region, or whether they simply followed the 
line put forward by García Oliver and his allies. However, an article written by Joan Ferrer 
in Terra Lliure just before the regional congress would suggest it was the latter. In the 
article Ferrer set out his opinion on ‘united fronts, syndical unity and workers’ alliances’. 
Ferrer did not attack the UGT, arguing that it was one of the two ‘traditional’ strands of the 
Spanish labour movement. However, Ferrer’s overriding argument was that alliance 
initiatives were the preserve of communist movements, who used them to divide the unity 
of the working classes. Exactly what Ferrer’s thinking on CNT-UGT relations was prior to 
the regional congress is therefore somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand his ideas 
correspond to those that would prevail at the congress of instructing all workers to join the 
CNT or the UGT; yet at the same time he hardly seemed to be endorsing the idea of an 
alliance between the two organizations.87 Given that Ferrer showed little inclination to 
promote a CNT-UGT alliance, and indeed questioned the intentions of pro-alliance 
campaigns, it would therefore seem likely that the Igualada CNT’s stance on national 
CNT-UGT relations was at root one of siding with the regional consensus on the matter. 
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It does not appear that the Igualada CNT in early 1936 adopted an as aggressively sectarian 
stance as it had between 1931 and 1934. Although the local movement was critical of the 
autonomous unions of the town, it did not run the sorts of campaigns against them as it had 
done to UGT unions or workers who refused to join the CNT. Indeed, the CNT’s leather 
union actually cooperated with its autonomous-poumista counterpart in a conflict against 
employers that took place over the course of the spring of 1936. From April the 
autonomous and CNT leather goods unions began to draw up a new set of pay and working 
conditions for leather goods workers in Igualada. In May the conditions were presented to 
the Employers’ Association. An agreement was not forthcoming, and so a strike was 
called. The formulation of the workers’ demands and the subsequent labour dispute were 
handled jointly by the CNT and the autonomous unions. In May and June public meetings 
arranged jointly by the CNT and the autonomous union were held in Igualada.88 
 
However, this instance of cooperation should not be viewed as indicative of a fundamental 
shift in stance with regards to the primacy the local CNT viewed itself as having over the 
local union movement. Through its notices in Solidaridad Obrera, local militants 
continued to attack the leaders of the local autonomous unions and the POUM movement 
with which they were associated, arguing repeatedly that through not rejoining the CNT 
they were damaging worker unity in the town.89 At the same time, the few references the 
local militants made to the local UGT – whose members continued to be in the 
construction and printing industries – were not indicative of any efforts to reconcile with a 
rival, even if they suggested a certain acceptance that the local CNT was not in a position 
to stop them. In March the CNT construction union agreed to exclude the Casa Cinto 
workers from their attempts to renegotiate bases for the industry with employers.90 In July, 
the militants mocked the efforts of the UGT print workers to bring about improved 
working conditions in their industry, suggesting that their adherence to the jurados mixtos 
was holding them back.91 Just two months earlier, they had accused the UGT printers of 
attempting to prevent workers from joining the CNT, an accusation that is unfortunately 
impossible to verify.92 Even if the Igualada CNT had endorsed the idea of a national CNT-
UGT alliance, and likewise cooperated with a rival union in a labour dispute, it would 
appear that its leading militants still held the same attitude, on the eve of the war, that the 
CNT was the only legitimate entity in the town. 
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Conclusions 
 
Overall, the experience of the Igualada CNT during the Second Republic was similar to the 
overall trajectory of the CNT in Catalonia during these years. This was as much the case 
with its growth, decline and factional squabbles as it was with its stance on the UGT. At all 
times throughout the Republic, the militants of the Igualada CNT closely followed the 
prevailing consensus of the rest of the organization in Catalonia. The endorsement of the 
anti-UGT line between 1931 and 1934, as we have seen, suited the Igualada CNT, serving 
as a rhetorical device through which it could promote itself to the working classes of the 
town. The stance of the Igualada CNT on national level CNT-UGT relations in 1936 shows 
the extent of the detachment between the national and local levels of UGT activity 
amongst cenetistas in Catalonia. The CNT in Igualada had only exhibited hostility to the 
local UGT movement, viewing it as reactionary and anti-worker, yet at the same time its 
members were prepared to endorse a national-level volte face on the UGT.  
 
With regard to the Igualada CNT’s interactions with the UGT in the town, it is clear that, 
throughout the Republic and even on the eve of the war, the local cenetistas had an 
unwavering belief in the unique place they felt that their organization held in the town, 
based on what they saw as a deep historical and spiritual bond with the local working 
classes. Their commitment to the CNT was not just based around the ideological posits of 
anarcho-syndicalism, but was in fact also deeply rooted in the specific role of the CNT in 
Igualada and the years of commitment of local militants to the movement. Joan Ferrer and 
his fellow militants were also spurred on by the past successes of the CNT in organizing 
the local workforce, particularly in 1919, not to mention the initial influx of workers into 
the CNT in 1930 and 1931. 
 
It is this combination of factors that explain the lengths to which the Igualada cenetistas 
would go to enrol workers in their organization and to fend off what they saw as the 
‘outside’ threats of other possible organized labour movements in the town. The cenetistas 
held the belief that it was the basic obligation of workers in the town to be in the CNT. 
And although an impressively large number of workers enrolled in the CNT at the start of 
the Republic, merely acquiring a membership card and having a deep commitment to the 
ideals, principles and methods of the organization were two different things. This conflict 
between cenetista expectations and the actual commitment of the workforce as a whole to 
the CNT led the local CNT movement to adopt highly strong-arm measures against those 
who did not conform to their expectations through the running of public boycotts and 
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naming-and-shaming campaigns. At the same time, even those who were in the CNT could 
potentially find themselves pilloried if they were seen to have a loyalty that conflicted with 
their duties as a CNT member.   
 
These different layers of the Igualada CNT’s interactions with the UGT were a key 
ingredient in the recipe for disaster that was the relationship between the labour federations 
during the war. The Igualada CNT would enter the conflict with a nominal support for the 
idea of alliance with the UGT on the national level, yet in their own locality only regarded 
the UGT with suspicion, often attempting to exclude it from the political and economic 
administration of the town. At the same time, the aggressive stance adopted by the 
Igualada cenetistas earlier in the Republic helps suggest that there were likely to have been 
workers who were rather reluctantly in the CNT or who would become alienated from it. 
In the context of compulsory union membership during the war, this legacy of divisions 
and hostilities undoubtedly contributed to the mutual antipathy that characterized relations 
between the CNT and the UGT in the town during the war, not to mention the rapid growth 
of the socialist labour federation in the town.93 
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Conclusions 
 
General conclusions 
 
The CNT entered the Republic with a hostile stance towards the UGT; on the eve of the 
Civil War the organization was, by and large, rapidly on its way to returning to that very 
same position. In spite of the monumental events of October 1934 and the effects they had 
on turning the left towards voicing pro-unity positions, viewing the peacetime Republic as 
a whole, and notwithstanding notable exceptions, in particular the Asturian CNT, the 
forces that exercised a most influential role in the CNT – its leading militants and its 
newspapers – not to mention significant sectors of its grassroots militants, retained the 
same basic stance of viewing the UGT, both in terms of its leaders and its unions, as rivals 
and even enemies. 
 
The hostilities that characterized much of the interactions between the CNT and the UGT 
during the Second Republic, at both national and grassroots levels, were not the product of 
the CNT’s decision-making processes. It was only when considering the ideas of alliance 
with the UGT that a position on the socialist labour federation was discussed; the rest of 
the time, the attacks on the UGT that appeared in the CNT press and the hostilities between 
the organizations’ unions were not a pre-meditated strategy. To a significant extent, they 
were simply carried over from the previous decade, though admittedly intensified 
substantially by the events of the first years of the Republic, and above all by the socialists’ 
legislation and their apparent complicity in government repression of the CNT. Although 
the hostile stance of the CNT during this period was based to a significant extent around 
both these events and differences of theoretical underpinnings and principles and different 
approaches to industrial relations, it is clear that they were also based around a much more 
emotive set of criteria, most notably the entrenched idea that socialists were ‘traitors’ and 
had the intent of undermining the working-classes. Guided by such sentiments, the CNT 
and its militants by default adopted a resolute hostility towards the UGT, making the 
formulation of an anti-UGT stance take place outside of the organization’s decision-
making procedures. 
 
What did fundamentally change between 1931 and 1936, however, was the willingness of 
the CNT to enter the fray of voicing a pro-unity position on the national level as part of its 
organizational strategy, just as the other organizations of the left had started to do, to 
greater or lesser extents, in different fashions and with different degrees of opportunism, 
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from 1933 and 1934. Somewhat perversely, the discourse of unity was one of the key 
vehicles through which the rivalries between the different organizations of the Republic 
attacked one another during the Civil War; the precedents for championing unity in this 
way must be seen as having been established in the pre-war period. For the CNT, however, 
its use of the unity question immediately prior to the war would have especially important 
ramifications during the conflict; throughout the CNT would make a great deal of use of 
the idea of alliance with the UGT as it attempted to navigate the treacherous political 
waters of the wartime Republic.   
 
Although there were sectors of the CNT who promoted the idea of alliance with the UGT 
because they viewed an alliance of the two labour federations as being a necessary pre-
requisite for either the overthrow of capitalism or a defence against fascism, the CNT’s 
moves towards a pro-alliance position were in fact the product of factions within the 
movement who had never adopted such a perspective. Instead, they viewed the idea of 
unity as something that could be exploited to boost the popularity of the CNT at the 
expense of the UGT. That the CNT could produce a formal position on alliance that was in 
reality designed to undermine the organization at which the alliance was ostensibly aimed, 
especially considering that there were in fact genuine pro-alliance sectors in the 
organization and that by the admission of leading cenetistas workers in general seemed to 
be enthused by the idea of unity, illustrates the bankruptcy of the CNT’s decision-making 
process. The organization, both in 1934 and 1936, produced positions that were designed 
to appear as being in favour of alliance with the UGT, and were in part designed to placate 
those in the movement who were, but which in reality served to mask an anti-alliance 
agenda of the dominant factions of the organization. To a large extent, this state of affairs 
was due to the Catalan CNT having a decisive influence over the organization at the 
national level. The Catalan CNT was the most virulently anti-UGT region of the anarcho-
syndicalist movement, and yet it played a decisive role in determining the stance that the 
national movement took on the UGT throughout the Second Republic.  
 
Even before the UGT’s own handling of CNT-UGT interactions is fully taken into account, 
it is clear the CNT and the UGT were overall no closer to any meaningful unity in July 
1936 than they had been in 1931. The only major difference was that by July 1936 both the 
CNT and the UGT publicly spoke in favour of the idea of unity of the organizations of the 
left. Some sectors within the CNT certainly were in favour of reaching an alliance with the 
UGT, as undoubtedly were many ordinary workers, but their position had effectively been 
neutered by the pro-alliance posturing that the Catalan CNT imposed on the organization. 
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In Catalonia, CNT militants at the helm of unions and local federations, not to mention the 
elite militants of the region, generally took the view during the Republic – a view that was 
expressed frequently to the workers of the region – that their opposite numbers in the UGT 
were the embodiment of a yellow, reactionary unionism that was designed to destroy the 
CNT and the workers’ movement. Although the Catalan UGT has not been the primary 
focus of the research presented here, this thesis has highlighted that the CNT’s depiction of 
the UGT in the region was a misleading one, with the organization being much more 
similar to the UGT elsewhere in Spain in the respect that it was not simply a haven for 
yellow workers, but to a large extent was driven by workers who bought into the 
‘management unionism’ model, in the process leading them into conflicts with the 
strongest CNT presence in Spain. 
 
The cenetistas of Catalonia adopted their stance against the Catalan UGT because, at root, 
they believed that the CNT was the only legitimate workers’ organization in Catalonia and 
also viewed the CNT and the working classes as synonymous. As the study of Igualada 
above all demonstrates, this belief was a result, as much as any ideological commitment, to 
the unwavering dedication of cenetistas to building up a local movement in their milieu, a 
commitment in many cases that stretched back to the 1910s and/or had forced operating in 
clandestinity or even jail or exile upon them. This belief empowered cenetistas in 
Catalonia, between 1931 and 1934 to attempt, in effect, to eradicate the UGT from the 
region, recurrently making use of practices such as boycotts and verbal threats against 
workers seeking to join the UGT and disruptions of meetings, not to mention running a 
sustained campaign through CNT propaganda to depict the Catalan UGT as nothing more 
than a haven for pistoleros and vehicle for Largo Caballero’s attempts to destroy the CNT. 
The extent of militant consensus on this approach was such that as a practice it was 
widespread and routine – almost a reflex action towards the creation of UGT rivals – but 
was not the product of any formal strategy created in the movement’s decision-making 
process. As much as any factors cited in existing studies of the workers’ movement for the 
failure of the UGT amongst workers in Catalonia – a perception that to an extent needs 
questioning, given the growth of the organization throughout the Republic – such as the 
unsuitability of employer-worker relations in industrialized Catalonia to UGT methods, it 
is also the case that a significant factor in the (relative lack of) growth of the UGT in the 
region was the campaign undertaken by cenetistas to marginalize UGT organisms. 
 
Whilst such sectarian tactics were generally not adopted in 1936, due to the looming threat 
of a full conflict with the right leading to a recognition that physical sectarian confrontation 
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against workers would be deeply damaging to wider working-class interests, CNT militants 
in Catalonia still held fundamentally the same view that the UGT was an illegitimate entity 
in Catalonia. That they did so, when considered in conjunction with the fact that it was 
these militants that had variously formulated, actively endorsed or agreed to go along with 
a plan for proposing a national alliance with the UGT, illustrates the true intentions of the 
alliance proposal they drew up in early 1936. 
 
However, in spite of the hatred of the UGT expressed by cenetistas in Catalonia, it is clear 
that the UGT – and especially the anarcho-syndicalist construction of the UGT – served a 
crucial function for the anarcho-syndicalist movement. The presentation of the UGT – on 
the national level as attempting to destroy the workers’ movement, and in the region as 
being a haven for reactionary gunmen – was used heavily to attempt to mobilize workers 
behind the CNT’s cause, as well as serving as something of an ‘anti-CNT’ through the 
depiction of which the CNT could be presented as the only legitimate workers’ 
organization, and indeed the only entity that would save workers from this reactionary 
menace. Even in Igualada, a town with no UGT presence until 1932, and probably fewer 
than one hundred members until the outbreak of the war, the CNT movement made heavy 
use of its construction of the UGT to mobilize workers behind the CNT.  
 
The CNT and the UGT in the Civil War 
 
It almost goes without saying that the outbreak of the Civil War had a profound effect on 
the Second Republic, with the state’s existence becoming defined by its struggle against 
the nationalists and its positioning all over the world as the international focal point of the 
battle against fascism. The war also had equally profound consequences for the two labour 
federations, and especially the CNT. Quite apart from the implications of the Social 
Revolution undertaken by the CNT in Catalonia and other regions and the organization’s 
initial hegemony in Catalonia, not to mention its allegiance to a state that it had for so long 
railed against, both the CNT and the UGT found, on a practical level, that their everyday 
roles changed completely. Having been vehicles for protecting workers in a capitalist 
system, the labour federations found themselves playing a pivotal role in the management 
of the Republic’s economy and wartime production. Whilst this thesis cannot provide a full 
account of CNT-UGT interactions during the wartime, especially with regard to Catalonia, 
where the configuration of the left changed so rapidly, it can highlight that, crucially, there 
were important continuities between the pre-war period and the war which to a very 
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significant extent conditioned how the CNT interacted with the UGT between July 1936 
and the end of the conflict. 
 
The most fundamental aspect of the CNT’s relationship with the UGT that has its 
foundations in the pre-war years was that, with the exception of its very first months, the 
CNT adopted throughout the war a national-level strategy of publicly promoting an 
alliance with the UGT. In the first two months of the war, the CNT press temporarily went 
quiet on the matter of alliance with the UGT. With the CNT at this point occupying a 
pivotal role in the defence of the Republic and the mobilization of militias against the 
Nationalists, the CNT in Catalonia was as coherent and secure a force as the state or any 
other organization. Moreover, the movement in its stronghold and birthplace was firmly 
engaged in furthering the Social Revolution that it had set in train during the first days of 
the uprising. Although privately some leading CNT figures felt wary that this position 
would be eclipsed, the public position adopted was nevertheless one of viewing Social 
Revolution as the method through which the war would be fought.1 This meant that, in 
these first few months, the anarcho-syndicalists did not promote an alliance with the UGT. 
However, its response to the situation was grounded in one important premise of the pre-
war months, namely that the ongoing execution of the Social Revolution would be carried 
out through the convergence of all workers into the CNT and the UGT, which would in 
turn ensure that political organizations would be swept away. The CNT’s newspapers 
argued that the Spanish working classes would ‘through their own free and spontaneous 
determination join together in one of the two existing federations: the UGT or CNT.’2 This 
would ultimately fulfil the anarcho-syndicalist movement’s long-term goal that political 
parties ‘will all have to disband. Because politics, once the fascist insurrection has been 
defeated, will no longer have a reason to exist’.3 In the first months of the war, then, the 
CNT’s outlook on the future of what it presented as an enduring Social Revolution was 
grounded in the ideas regarding workers joining the CNT and the UGT that had been 
presented by García Oliver and his allies in Catalonia at the January 1936 regional 
congress. 
 
However, later in September, the Zaragoza Alianza Revolucionaria proposal was brought 
back into the CNT’s public message in response to the political manoeuvring that took 
place over the formation of a new government. Having played such a fundamental role in 
foiling the July uprising, bringing the movement a leading position in Catalonia, there were 
concerns amongst the leadership that the formation of a government with socialist, 
communist and Republican participation in the context of the Republican state recovering 
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from its initial meltdown would put the brakes on the Social Revolution. An alliance of the 
CNT and the UGT was thus proposed by the CNT as a direct alternative to a Popular Front 
government, much as the Catalan CNT had hoped to present a revolutionary CNT-UGT 
alliance as an alternative to the Popular Front coalition in early 1936. A CNT plenum 
agreed to propose a ‘National Defence Council’ as an alternative to Largo’s cabinet, which 
would be dominated by the CNT and the UGT. The September plenum formulated the 
following position: 
 
The CNT proposed the revolutionary alliance at its Zaragoza Congress. Today it 
redoubles its efforts towards this and believes that if the Confederación Nacional del 
Trabajo and the UGT do not understand one another the Revolution will be diverted off 
course and fail. Spain cannot be led by party politics in these decisive moments, but only 
by a national bloc of those who are struggling at the front and in the rearguard.4 
 
In addition to the formulation of this stance by the leadership, Solidaridad Obrera 
published editorials to promote the ideas of a National Defence Council and a 
revolutionary alliance between the CNT and the UGT.5 However, the initiative was 
rejected by both the UGT leadership and the rest of the Republican side, and the CNT 
ultimately agreed to join Largo’s government alongside PSOE, PCE and Republican 
politicians.6 
  
However, what was in the autumn of 1936 essentially a gambit by a relatively bullish CNT 
evolved over the course of the war into a prop on which the CNT increasingly relied to try 
and maintain some form of influence in the governing of the Republic. In 1937 the 
Republican side’s public façade of unity in the face of a common enemy would unravel. 
Against a backdrop of setbacks at home and in the diplomatic arena, an ever escalating war 
of words broke out amongst the different organizations of the left, with the communists at 
the centre of much of the infighting. The CNT and the communists were at loggerheads 
over a whole range of issues that were fundamental to the war effort, foremost amongst 
them collectivizations and the organization of the armed forces. To counteract the 
communists, the CNT deployed a strategy of publicly calling, once again, for an alliance 
between itself and the UGT. This sustained propaganda campaign repeatedly presented 
CNT-UGT unity as being a panacea solution that would wrest power away from political 
parties, allow the Social Revolution to continue and, as a consequence, lead to victory in 
the war. 
 
  
234
It was agreed at a February 1937 national plenum that it was ‘essential’ for the CNT to 
come to come to ‘an understanding’ with the UGT, with the National Committee being 
given the authority to try and bring this about with the UGT leadership.7 But even before 
February, the CNT National Committee had written to the UGT Executive in the hope of 
arranging a meeting with them.8 Initially the National Committee found it difficult to 
convince the UGT leaders that a meeting that excluded representatives of political parties 
would be wise, with a meeting of CNT and UGT delegates not taking place until April. 
Although this meeting led to the elaboration of some shared positions on the economic 
management of the war effort, the National Committee warned that PCE members ‘with 
posts in the UGT are torpedoing an understanding’ between the labour federations.9 The 
crises of May 1937 made this overall process irrelevant.  
 
Although little progress was made in actually bringing about an alliance, the anarcho-
syndicalists were keen to publicly promote the idea as much as possible. The key issues 
that appeared on the front pages of the CNT press in the first half of 1937 were the 
question of how to consolidate the Social Revolution in the face of attacks on it, and the 
need for unity between the CNT and the UGT. These two objectives were presented as 
being, at root, one and the same. According to the CNT’s public stance, the CNT and the 
UGT were the only organizations that could guarantee both victory in the war and the 
prosperity of the Social Revolution. Solidaridad Obrera argued that ‘the Revolution and 
the War demand an immediate alliance between the CNT and the UGT’.10 It implored the 
UGT to join it in taking power.11 Above all, the CNT press identified a CNT-UGT alliance 
as the ‘only efficient antidote’ to fight the enemies of the Social Revolution.12 The CNT 
also argued that the politicians of the Republic – in particular the communists – were 
seeking at all costs to prevent an alliance between the labour federations because ‘everyone 
knows that the alliance of the worker organizations will bring the effective consolidation of 
the Revolution. The enemies of this [Revolution] will do everything they can to ruin the 
proposals for alliance that strengthen the workers’.13 The CNT’s position on unity 
simultaneously served as a vehicle for discrediting its political rivals through suggesting 
that they opposed unity, whilst also suggesting that the CNT and the UGT stood united 
against these enemies of unity.  
 
The Republic’s political nadir came in May 1937, through a combination of days of street-
fighting in Barcelona between pro- and anti-Soviet communist factions, and then through 
the fall of the Largo Caballero government and the subsequent acrimony over its 
replacement. These events all gravely damaged the influence of the CNT in the Republic; 
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by June its representatives were out of both the national government and the Generalitat. 
The CNT’s leaders pinned their hopes for fighting against this tide on an alliance with the 
UGT. 
 
Following the ejection of the CNT and the UGT from the government the CNT began a 
propaganda offensive that attacked the new government led by Juan Negrín and voiced 
solidarity with the UGT. Once again the idea of a CNT-UGT alliance was used to this end. 
The National Committee instructed the CNT’s organisms that they should with ‘absolute 
homogeneity’ promote ‘UGT and CNT as a guarantee of victory’ and ‘exalt the figure of 
Largo Caballero as a guarantee of impending victory’.14 Consequently, throughout the 
political crisis and in the following months, the front page of Solidaridad Obrera 
recurrently called for a pact between the labour federations.15 The CNT’s pro-unity line in 
these months amounted to an attempt to win the UGT’s backing in standing in opposition 
to the new government, a strategy agreed upon by the CNT’s leadership at a national 
plenum held on 23rd May. At the plenum it was agreed to place unequivocal support behind 
the UGT and ‘to gain agreement with the UGT to jointly take up the task of opposition to 
the government’.16 
 
This strategy of forming an alliance with the UGT was based around the calculation, made 
by the National Committee, ‘that Largo Caballero will emerge victorious from the battle 
within the UGT’ that broke out between himself and the communists after May; a defeat 
for Largo would inevitably render the strategy meaningless.17 Making this gamble was 
something that would be deeply lamented a year later.18 This strategy of hoping Largo 
would emerge victorious and thus bring the UGT into an alliance with the CNT was still 
being followed in August 1937, with the National Committee offering progress reports on 
his efforts to regional delegates at a national plenum.19 Its ultimate result was the creation 
of a national liaison committee between the CNT and UGT leaderships in July 1937, a 
development that would neither save Largo Caballero in his bid to stave off being ousted 
from the UGT nor rescue the CNT from its isolation. 
 
Although the CNT’s attempts to build an alliance with the UGT in 1937 were based 
fundamentally around fighting back against the ascendant communist movement and the 
marginalization of the CNT that this ascendancy brought about, seeking an alliance with 
the UGT in fact once more formed the basis of the anarcho-syndicalist labour federation’s 
strategy for seeking to come in from the cold once communist dominance over both the 
government and the UGT had been secured by the end of 1937. At the start of 1938 the 
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CNT’s public stance towards the new pro-communist UGT leadership that had ousted 
Largo Caballero became much more conciliatory. The anarcho-syndicalist leadership, 
through the CNT press, indicated a desire to negotiate a pact with the UGT. However, this 
new initiative was entirely different from those that had been proposed in 1936 and 1937. 
Rather than being framed as being a pact that would further the Social Revolution or 
banish politicians, the new pact would be based around 
 
the necessity of an agreement on regulations for the economic development of industries 
on a national level. The solutions must not refer to doctrinal disparities of principles or 
tactics, but questions of work, which are the same for everyone.20 
 
This strategy of seeking to bring the CNT into an alliance with the UGT based around the 
labour federations playing a largely practical and logistical role in the Republic reflected a 
change in perspective in the organization towards viewing the revolutionary battle as lost, 
and that in such circumstances it would be preferable to play a secondary role in 
government to prevent further losses than to remain permanently marginalized, a stance 
that was put forward by the CNT’s delegates to the AIT congress of December 1937.21 
After negotiating over the course of January and February, the national leaderships of the 
CNT and the UGT signed the Pact of Unity in March 1938. This was heralded by 
Republican and the communist propaganda as a great victory for proletarian unity and a 
source of strength that would turn the course of the war in the Republic’s favour.22 For the 
CNT, however, the pact was a measure of how far its original agenda of the early days of 
the war had been put out of reach.  
 
After the CNT-UGT pact was signed in March 1938, the CNT leadership turned its 
attention to ensuring that the terms of the pact, especially those relating to economic 
management, were fully implemented. From the moment the pact was signed, the National 
Committee instructed CNT unions and local federations to pressure their UGT counterparts 
into seeking to implement its terms on the local level as soon as possible.23 It was a process 
the National Committee found frustrating, reporting to the CNT national plenum of June 
1938 that the implementation of the pact was not proceeding as hoped,24 and also writing 
to the UGT National Executive in August to complain about what it perceived as a lack of 
UGT interest in the functions of the national CNT-UGT liaison committee.25  
 
It is also worth noting that though the pact was at root a pragmatic measure to maintain 
some level of CNT influence, even with this objective in mind the National Committee still 
saw it as an opportunity to present the negotiations of the pact as offering the CNT the 
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opportunity to win over UGT unions into the CNT through its pro-unity stance, with the 
National Committee even instructing the grassroots in March 1938 to criticize the UGT 
leaders in front of their UGT colleagues in the hope that this would place pressure on the 
leadership to make the pact more revolutionary.26 Likewise, to try and implement the pact, 
the National Committee resorted to the same tactic, leading to a strong private rebuke from 
the UGT leadership.27 There was thus a continuity with the 1931 to 1936 period throughout 
the war regarding the CNT leadership’s handling of relations with the UGT, namely that it 
was willing to use the question of CNT-UGT alliances to undermine the UGT’s leadership. 
 
Overall, then, the events of 1931 to 1936 conditioned to a significant extent how the CNT 
interacted with the UGT over the course of the Civil War. On a most basic level, the turn 
towards an ostensibly pro-alliance strategy at the beginning of 1936 was a key aspect of 
how the CNT fought its political battles on the national level. Although the pro-alliance 
stance was adapted and evolved in response to changing circumstances, virtually 
throughout the entire war the CNT turned to some form of militating for a CNT-UGT 
alliance. The idea of an alliance was put to use for a wide range of purposes in accordance 
with present circumstances, including variously using the idea to discredit political rivals, 
further the Social Revolution and present it as the model for running the Republic, and 
simply seeking to retain some influence. The change in the ideas underpinning CNT-UGT 
alliance, not to mention some of its side effects, such as the improbable lionizing of Largo 
Caballero, are indicative of the extent to which the CNT struggled to cope with the 
political infighting that beset the wartime Republic. The reliance throughout on the same 
basic response to all situations of suggesting a CNT-UGT alliance demonstrates the lack of 
options that an anti-political movement had when it found itself forced into the political 
arena.  
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